The Political Economy of Policy-making in Indonesia Opportunities for Improving the Demand for and Use of Knowledge by Datta, A. (Ajoy) et al.
Overseas Development 
Institute
 advancing knowledge, shaping policy, inspiring practice
The political economy of  
policy-making in Indonesia
Opportunities for improving the demand 
for and use of knowledge
Ajoy Datta, Harry Jones, Vita Febriany, Dan Harris, 
Rika Kumala Dewi, Leni Wild and John Young
Working Paper 340
Results of ODI research presented 
in preliminary form for discussion 
and critical comment
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper 340 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The political economy of policy-making in Indonesia 
 
Opportunities for improving  
the demand for and use of knowledge  
 
 
 
Ajoy Datta, Harry Jones, Vita Febriany, Dan Harris,  
Rika Kumala Dewi, Leni Wild and John Young 
 
 
December 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
Overseas Development Institute 
111 Westminster Bridge Road 
London SE1 7JD 
www.odi.org.uk 
 
 
 
* Disclaimer: The views presented in this paper are those of the authors and do 
not necessarily represent the views of ODI. 
 
 ii 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
This report would not have been possible without the significant contributions of several individuals. 
We would like to thank and convey our gratitude to the following: 
 
• The Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) for generous financial 
assistance; 
• Key informants/respondents for generously allocating their time to be interviewed and to share 
valuable information with us; 
• Participants in the validation workshop held in Jakarta on 30 July 2011; 
• Staff within AusAID’s Knowledge Sector Programme, including (but not limited to) Diastika 
Rahwidiati, Benjamin Davis, Idauli Tamarin, Jessica Mackenzie, Peter de Mej and Endang 
Dewayanti for their invaluable support and assistance (including peer review) throughout the 
project; 
• Dyan Mardiani and Nuning Akhmadi of The SMERU Research Institute for facilitating 
discussions with key informants; and 
• Syaikhu Usman, a senior researcher at The SMERU Research Institute for peer review support. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISBN 978-1-907288-57-9 
Working Paper (Print) ISSN 1759 2909 
ODI Working Papers (Online) ISSN 1759 2917 
 
 
© Overseas Development Institute 2011  
 
Readers are encouraged to quote or reproduce material from ODI Working Papers for their own 
publications, as long as they are not being sold commercially. As copyright holder, ODI requests due 
acknowledgement and a copy of the publication. 
  
 iii 
Contents 
 
Acronyms v 
Executive summary vii 
1. Introduction 1 
1.1 Background, objectives and definitions 1 
1.2 Approach and analytical framework 2 
1.3 Methodology 2 
1.4 Structure 4 
2. Formal policy processes 6 
2.1 Regularised planning and budgeting 6 
2.2 Laws and implementation guidelines 10 
2.3 The effectiveness of formal bureaucratic rules 13 
3. Reformasi and the legacy of the New Order 14 
3.1 The accommodative nature of Reformasi 14 
3.2 Policy-making under the New Order 14 
3.3 Summary 16 
4. The executive branch of the government 17 
4.1 Presidential and vice-presidential decision-making 17 
4.2 Cabinet-level decision-making 18 
4.3 Policy-making across the government 21 
4.4 Decision-making within ministries 25 
4.5 Summary 28 
5. Political parties and the parliament 29 
5.1 Political parties 29 
5.2 Influence of the DPR 31 
5.3 Parliamentary commissions 34 
5.4 Political parties and their DPR members 36 
5.5 Summary 36 
6. Knowledge production and procurement 38 
6.1 Analytical capacity within the executive 38 
6.2 Analytical capacity in the legislature 43 
6.3 Civil service performance 44 
6.4 Informal and personalised networks 47 
6.5 Sources of knowledge external to government 48 
6.6 Summary 50 
7. Factors that shape policy-makers’ use of knowledge 52 
7.1 Factors that might motivate policy-makers to use knowledge 52 
7.2 Factors that might discourage policy-makers from using knowledge 62 
7.3 Summary 63 
8. Conclusions, recommendations and further work 65 
8.1 Formal policy processes 65 
8.2 The ‘rules of the game’ 65 
8.3 Factors that shape knowledge use 67 
8.4 Recommendations 69 
8.5 Further work 71 
References 73 
Appendix 1: Analytical framework 76 
 iv 
Tables, figures and boxes 
 
Table 1: Parliamentary budget approval timetable   9
Table 2: Policy-makers’ incentives to use knowledge   64
 
Figure 1: Key components of a political economy analysis   2
Figure 2: The Indonesian development planning hierarchy   6
Figure 3: Developing the RPJMN   7
Figure 4: Hierarchy of laws and guidelines that make up the Indonesian legal framework   11
Figure 5: UKP-PPP priorities   21
Figure 6: The challenges of coordination   23
Figure 7: Possible sources of knowledge within ministries   40
Figure 8: Making reforms happen—translating political analysis into action   70
 
Box 1: A brief definition of musrenbang   7
Box 2: Parliamentary commissions   10
Box 3: The drafting of a moratorium on forestry licenses   19
Box 4: Ministry of Finance versus regional administrations   25
Box 5: The enquiry into the Bank Century bailout   32
Box 6: The formulation and implementation of a strategy on character education   33
Box 7: The Fiscal Policy Office   42
Box 8: Rigidities in the budget   46
Box 9: Drawing on knowledge to help remove basic education user fees   53
Box 10: The production of knowledge on reforming the energy subsidy regime   58
Box 11: The controversy over national examinations   59
 
 
 
 v 
Acronyms 
 
ACDP Analytical and Capacity Development Partnership 
ADB Asian Development Bank 
AFC  Asian Financial Crisis 
APBN Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara [Central Government Budget] 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
AusAID Australian Agency for International Development 
Balitbang Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan [Research and Development Unit] 
Bappenas Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional [National Development Planning Board] 
BKF  Badan Kebijakan Fiskal [Fiscal Policy Office] 
BNPB  Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana [National Board for Disaster Management] 
BOK  Bantuan Operasional Kesehatan [Health Operational Assistance] 
BOS Bantuan Operasional Sekolah [School Operational Assistance] 
BPK  Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan [Audit Board of Indonesia] 
BPS  Badan Pusat Statistik [Statistics Indonesia] 
CGI Consultative Group on Indonesia 
CPIS  Center for Policy and Implementation Studies  
CSIS  Centre for Strategic and International Studies  
CSO Civil Society Organisation 
DAK Dana Alokasi Khusus [Special Allocation Fund] 
DAU Dana Alokasi Umum [General Allocation Fund] 
DFID UK Department for International Development 
DIM Daftar Inventarisasi Masalah [Problem Inventory List] 
DPD  Dewan Perwakilan Daerah [Regional Representatives Council] 
DPR  Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat  [House of Representatives] 
DPRD  Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah [Regional House of Representatives] 
ESSP Education Sector Support Program 
EU European Union 
GAM  Gerakan Aceh Merdeka [Free Aceh Movement] 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GIAT  Growth Through Investment and Trade  
GIZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit [German Agency for International 
Cooperation] 
GoI Government of Indonesia 
IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute 
IISD International Institute for Sustainable Development 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IRI International Republican Institute 
IRIS Institutional Reform and Informal Sector  
ITB Institut Teknologi Bandung [Bandung Institute of Technology] 
JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency 
KASJSN Komite Aksi Sistem Jaringan Sosial Nasional [Committee for Action on the National Social Security 
System] 
Kempan & RB Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform 
Komisi XI Commission XI 
KPK Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi [Corruption Eradication Commission] 
LIPI  Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia [Indonesian Institute of Sciences} 
LPNK Lembaga Pemerintah Non-kementerian [Non-ministerial Government Institution] 
LP3ES  Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial [Institute for Social and 
Economic Research, Education and Information] 
LPEM  Lembaga Penyelidikan Ekonomi dan Masyarakat [Institute for Economic and Social Research] 
LSI  Lingkaran Survey Indonesia 
MDG Millennium Development Goal 
MOHA Ministry of Home Affairs 
MP Member of Parliament 
MPR Majelis Permusyaratan Rakyat [People's Consultative Assembly] 
Musrenbang Musyawarah Perencanaan Pembangunan [Development Planning Deliberation] 
 vi 
NDI  National Democratic Institute 
NGO Non-governmental Organisation 
NLSP  National Legislative Strengthening Program 
NPRS National Poverty Reduction Strategy 
NU  Nahdlatul Ulama  
ODI Overseas Development Institute 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  
OPEC  Organization of the Petroleum-exporting Countries  
PAN Partai Amanat Nasional [National Mandate Party] 
Pansus Panitia Khusus [Special Committee] 
PD Partai Demokrat [Democratic Party] 
PDI-P Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan [Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle] 
Perda  Peraturan Daerah [Provincial/District Regulation] 
Perpres Peraturan Presiden [Presidential Regulation] 
Perpu Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-undang [Government Regulation Substituting Law] 
PIP  Pusat Investasi Pemerintah [Government Investment Unit] 
PKB Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa [National Awakening Party] 
PKH Program Keluarga Harapan [Household Conditional Cash Transfer]  
PKS Partai Keadilan Sejahtera [Prosperous Justice Party] 
PNPM Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat [National Program for Community Empowerment] 
PP  Peraturan Pemerintah [Government Regulation] 
PPP Partai Persatuan Pembangunan [United Development Party] 
P3DI Pusat Pengkajian dan Pengolahan Data dan Informasi [Center for Research and Data and 
Information Processing] 
REDD Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation 
Renja-KL Rencana Kerja Kementerian Negara/Lembaga [Ministry/Agency-specific Work Plan] 
RKA-KL Rencana Kerja dan Anggaran Kementerian Negara/Lembaga [Ministry-/Agency-specific Budget 
Plan] 
RKP Rencana Kerja Pemerintah [Annual Work Plan] 
RPJMN Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional [National Medium-term Development Plan] 
RPJPN Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang Nasional [National Long-term Development Plan] 
SBY President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
SKPD Satuan Kerja Perangkat Daerah [Regional Working Unit] 
SPPN Sistem Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional [National Development Planning System] 
SRMI Serikat Rakyat Miskin Indonesia [Poor People’s Union of Indonesia] 
Tatib Peraturan Tata Tertib [Rules of Procedure] 
TNP2K Tim Nasional Percepatan Penanggulangan Kemiskinan [National Team for Accelerating Poverty 
Reduction] 
UGM  University of Gadjah Mada 
UI University of Indonesia 
UKP-PPR Unit Kerja Presiden Pengelolaan Program dan Reformasi [Presidential Work Unit on Managing 
Programs and Reform] 
UKP-PPP Unit Kerja Presiden Pengawasan dan Pengendalian Pembangunan [Presidential Work Unit on 
Monitoring and Controlling Development] 
UN  Ujian Nasional [Nationwide Standardised Exams] 
UN  United Nations 
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme 
UNFPA UN Population Fund 
UNIFEM UN Development Fund for Women 
USAID  United States Agency for International Development 
UUD Undang-Undang Dasar [1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia] 
Wantimpres Dewan Pertimbangan Presiden [Presidential Advisory Council] 
 vii 
Executive summary 
 
Between May and July 2011, the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) together with SMERU, an 
independent institution for research and policy studies, undertook research for AusAID in Indonesia to 
(i) describe rules that govern policy-making processes in Indonesia and (ii) assess factors that 
determine the use of knowledge in policy-making processes. Research methods included documentary 
reviews; interviews with a wide range of stakeholders, including government policy-makers, civil 
society and staff of donor agencies; and a validation workshop. Focusing initially on formal processes 
in the shape of regular development planning and budgeting processes, as well as the development of 
more ad hoc laws and implementation guidelines, we found that formal bureaucratic rules appeared to 
be weak in incentivising policy-makers to invest in, demand and use knowledge in order to draft 
policies. 
 
As such, the study aimed to uncover other (perhaps stronger) factors by undertaking a political 
economy analysis, focusing on how historical legacies coupled with institutional constraints (in 
essence, the ‘rules of the game’) shaped policy-makers’ incentives to seek and use knowledge. An 
analysis of the executive branch of the government (including at the level of the president, the cabinet, 
across government and within ministries); political parties and the parliament (including the influence 
of the parliament and the role of parliamentary commissions); and analytical capacity within the 
government (including within the executive and the legislature, civil service performance, the strength 
of informal and personalised networks and sources of knowledge external to government) provided 
some clues as to the incentives different types of policy-makers face in seeking and using knowledge in 
their work. Based on this, we found that policy-makers may be motivated to draw on and use 
knowledge in order to, 
 
• Respond to the president or those with a presidential mandate, such as a highly placed 
supervisor; 
• Seek economic or financial benefits: This may be for the government as a whole, individual 
ministries or individual government officials; 
• Seek favourable perceptions among the media and the public by designing and launching 
populist policies and conducting opinion surveys to assess public preferences; 
• Seek favourable perceptions among key international actors by performing well economically, 
especially in comparison with neighbouring countries, preparing for negotiations in key 
international forums and meeting global goals and targets such as the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs); 
• Exercise authority over others to, for instance, assess and resolve competing claims for 
resources; 
• Prevent and/or mitigate the effects of crises and acute social and political disorders: This could 
be in relation to food price rises, fuel price rises, terrorist attacks or natural disasters; 
• Deflect or insulate oneself from criticism and/or influence: This may be in relation to developing 
a firm position to avoid significant and repeated shifts in policy in response to external criticism 
from, say, the media and civil society; 
• Bolster arguments or legitimise policy positions and approaches to addressing policy problems 
that have already been taken; 
• Exert pressure on others by, for example, exposing them or highlighting deficiencies in their 
performance or behaviour; 
• Prove and increase one’s legitimacy to improve, for instance, a Member of Parliament (MP)’s 
ability to represent his/her constituents; 
• Strengthen relationships with others by consulting those who are valued and trusted, or 
circulate patronage; 
• Establish and improve one’s credibility, for example by wishing to be seen as a resource person 
by others; 
 viii 
• Advance one’s career in the civil service, or perhaps as a politician, which would entail 
establishing credibility with colleagues in the party, for example; 
• Act in accordance with one’s ethics: This could be personal and/or professional, whereby 
individuals may receive satisfaction from drawing on analysis or consulting civil society as a 
means to develop good policies, or see civil society consultation as good in itself; 
• Adhere to established technical standards in a limited number of ministries where there seems 
to be a culture of ‘more rational’ decision-making and where outputs and outcomes are more 
quantifiable; or 
• Address higher levels of technical complexity in areas which appear more abstract to the lay 
person, such as those relating to finance and economics. 
 
However, there is usually no one reason why policy-makers invest in, demand and/or use knowledge in 
policy-making. For instance, consultations undertaken to draw up a moratorium on forestry licenses 
happened in response to presidential directives channelled through a highly placed supervisor, the 
head of the Presidential Work Unit on Monitoring and Controlling Development (Unit Kerja Presiden 
Pengawasan dan Pengendalian Pembangunan, or UKP-PPP), but were also spurred on by economic 
incentives (aid up to $1 billion) as well as a desire to be perceived favourably by international actors 
(and reduce greenhouse gases, in light of statistics revealing that the country was the world’s third-
largest emitter of these). 
 
At the same time, policy-makers may be discouraged from seeking knowledge because of the following.  
 
• There may be actors or interests who oppose any reforms that knowledge might suggest or 
inform: Although policy-makers may demand knowledge, they may not be in a position to act on 
it. They may be faced with opposition from influential actors who benefit from the status quo. 
• They may lack the power to convene multiple actors or those with more power than them: Given 
the extent of siloisation and the challenges of coordinating equals across government or within 
a ministry, acting on any knowledge is challenging and may discourage policy-makers from 
demanding analysis in the first instance.  
• They may not have the time: Given pressure from the media and the public to perform, many 
policy-makers feel compelled to roll out policies quickly, often without adequate research and 
analysis. 
• They lack sufficient analytical capacity: Even if policy-makers want to draw on knowledge, given 
weaknesses in government’s analytical capacity, coupled with systemic weaknesses in the civil 
service, they may lack sources to pursue. 
• Overall, with the exception of a few factors, motivational and constraining factors are based 
largely on economic or monetary metrics, an assessment of power gained or lost, bolstering 
one’s status and safeguarding relationships, among others. The political economy of the 
demand for and use of knowledge is clearly bound up with the political economy of the policy 
itself. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Background, objectives and definitions 
 
Just over a decade ago, in 1998, Indonesia was the hardest-hit country during the 1997/98 Asian 
financial crisis (AFC), resulting in severe economic, political and social disorder. The country 
experienced a severe economic crisis that resulted in the economic dislocation of millions of 
households, a sharp rise in poverty, a 13% decline in gross domestic product (GDP) and near 
bankruptcy in the financial sector. Cracks in Soeharto’s long authoritarian regime were exposed: in the 
face of growing discontent, including significant popular protests in the capital and the loss of 
traditional sources of support, including the Indonesian Armed Forces, he resigned (Harris, 2010). 
 
Since the AFC, Indonesia’s political system has undergone a profound transformation (through the 
Reformasi1
 
) from ‘a highly centralised political and policy decision system with a powerful and 
dominant president, who held power for 32 years, to a more pluralistic, diffused and evolving system 
with an increasingly active parliament’ (Abonyi, 2005:4). The country has subsequently emerged 
economically strong and remarkably stable in political terms (World Bank, 2009a). The processes 
through which policies have been shaped no doubt played a critical role during the Reformasi period, 
and are likely to be important in continuing the positive trajectory in the years to come. However, few 
studies have examined the nature of policy-making processes in Indonesia, and in particular the role of 
knowledge. 
Specifically, this paper aims to inform the Australian International Agency for International 
Development (AusAID)’s efforts to develop a programme in support of Indonesia’s knowledge sector. 
The broad objectives are to: 1) describe the rules that govern policy-making processes in Indonesia; 
and 2) assess the factors that determine the use of knowledge in policy-making processes. In 
particular, we were asked to help AusAID determine in which set of issues research uptake is likely to 
be greater, and hence where AusAID should deploy its available funding. We did not propose to assess 
impact or the level of influence of knowledge on policy and policy-making processes in Indonesia. 
 
In defining policy, Jones and Villar (2008) suggest that policy can be interpreted as altitudinal, 
discursive (language and rhetoric), procedural (process), content-focused (frameworks, legislation and 
budgets) and behavioural. Nevertheless, given time and resource limitations, we focused largely (but 
not entirely) on policy processes as defined by the drawing-up of development plans and budgets, the 
drafting and enactment of legislation and the development of implementation guidelines in the shape 
of presidential/government/ministerial regulations, instructions and decrees. We define knowledge 
broadly as ‘information that has been evaluated and organised so that it can be used purposefully’ 
(Perkin and Court: 2005:2). As such, we include technical research and analysis, statistical data, 
stakeholder consultations and expert opinion. 
 
Despite the massive programme of decentralisation that took place at the turn of the century in 
Indonesia, our study assesses policy processes at the country level, as sub-national-level policy 
processes have been addressed by Sutmuller and Setiono (2011). It will thus help AusAID reach a 
common consensus about the nature of policy processes at the national level and serve as a 
background for more issue-specific political economy analyses. Moreover, by engaging with a wide 
range of stakeholders, the research process itself can help build relationships and expand networks for 
future dialogues and for promoting change. 
 
 
                                                          
1 The post-Soeharto era in Indonesia, which began immediately after his downfall as president in 1998. 
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Structural Features (often 
deeply embedded and 
slow to change) 
Institutions (the rules of 
the game that govern 
behaviour of agents) 
Agents (individuals and 
organisations with 
interests) 
1.2 Approach and analytical framework 
 
In policy-making across all fields, the demand for and use of knowledge are about organisational 
incentives, general and professional ideologies and power and vested interests (Jones et al., 2009; 
Young and Mendizabal, 2009). Hence, politics and political economy determine how policy processes 
are shaped and the underlying incentives that promote the demand for and use of knowledge by policy-
makers (namely, elected politicians and bureaucrats) in Indonesia. 
 
As such, our research draws on the World Bank’s problem-driven approach to governance and political 
economy analysis (World Bank, 2009b), which comprises three layers: (i) identifying the problem, issue 
or vulnerability to be addressed; (ii) mapping out the institutional and governance arrangements and 
weaknesses; and (iii) drilling down to the political economy drivers, in terms of both identifying 
obstacles to progressive change and understanding where potentially a ‘drive’ for positive change 
could be emerging from. Based on this, we have employed a framework which includes the three 
variables commonly considered in a political economy analysis: structures, institutions and agents 
(see Figure 1 below), as well as a fourth variable: knowledge or discourse. 
 
Figure 1: Key components of a political economy analysis 
 
Source: Adapted from DFID (2004) and Edelman (2009). 
 
Structural factors are those that are beyond the direct control of stakeholders, for example historical 
legacies which have left their mark on policy-making in Indonesia and are often deeply embedded and 
slow to change, if at all. Institutional variables are those related to ‘the rules of the game’ (formal laws 
and regulations and established processes as well as informal rules that are derived from social norms 
and practices) and, in a wider sense, also comprise the ways in which a public sector is organised. 
Agents or stakeholders comprise individuals as well as organised groups such as political parties or 
business associations. Importantly, external stakeholders, such as donors, foreign policy actors and 
foreign investors, often also play an important role, for example in negotiations over policies, rules for 
foreign investment and foreign trade or cross-border water and transport management. Finally, 
knowledge or discourse includes the mainstream analysis on an issue, its causes and consequences; 
the central policy discourse, ideologies and narratives; the relative integration of different perspectives 
and sources of knowledge; the types of information available; and the various forums within which 
actors interact and communicate. In this paper, we explore how both structural characteristics and 
institutional features have shaped the incentives and interests of agents or stakeholders to invest in, 
demand and/or use knowledge in policy-making processes. Appendix 1 contains the full outline of the 
analytical framework used, together with the detailed interview questions. 
 
1.3 Methodology 
 
The study lasted 10 weeks during May and July 2011 and had four key components: First, document 
reviews were undertaken on: (i) formal policy processes in Indonesia, namely, the production of 
development plans and annual budgets, the drafting of legislation and the development of 
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implementation guidelines in the shape of presidential/government/ministerial regulations, 
instructions and decrees; and (ii) structural and institutional features which shape politics and policy-
making processes in Indonesia. 
 
Second, 46 face-to-face, semi-structured interviews were undertaken (concurrently with the 
aforementioned literature review), each between 45 and 60 minutes long, with 58 key informants in 
Jakarta. Questions varied according to the profile of the respondent, but on the whole there was space 
for respondents to discuss the realities of policy-making, specific policies that had been formulated the 
factors they saw as contributory as well as the effects of specific pieces or bodies of knowledge on 
policy formulation processes. The research team compiled a list of interviewees before undertaking the 
fieldwork and complemented this by taking a ‘snowball’ sampling approach—asking interviewees for 
recommendations on others we could interview for this study. In order to ensure that interviewees were 
as open and honest as possible, we promised respondents that they would remain anonymous and 
that a list of respondents would not be provided. However, they included: 
 
• Government: one former minister; fourteen respondents from the executive branch of the 
Government of Indonesia (GoI); and three from the House of Representatives (Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat, or DPR). Respondents from the GoI comprised a cabinet-equivalent post, 
one advisor to the president, one advisor to the Office of the Vice-president, five government 
officials at echelon one, five at echelon two and one at echelon three. GoI respondents came 
from the National Development Planning Board (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional, 
or Bappenas) and the Ministries of Finance, Health, Education, Agriculture and Home Affairs. 
• Civil society, donors and consultants: five from the Indonesian research community, four of 
whom were institute directors; two directors of civil society organisations (CSOs); an editor of a 
magazine; twenty-seven staff from two prominent donor agencies—the World Bank and AusAID; 
two consultants providing technical assistance working within government agencies; and two 
international consultants who, at the time of writing, had undertaken research for AusAID. 
 
The limited number of GoI respondents (in comparison with the number of donor agency staff) can be 
explained in part by both the limited time the research team had to conduct interviews (resulting in 
little advance notice being given to interviewees) and the (relatively longer) time required to mobilise 
busy government officials. Staff from donor agencies seemed to be quicker at making themselves 
available for interview. The triangulation of data was an important principle behind the analysis. This 
included posing a similar set of questions to multiple respondents in order to corroborate emerging 
claims. 
 
Third, analysis was undertaken on an ongoing basis. All interviews were recorded digitally and 
transcribed. During the fieldwork (which lasted four weeks), the research team wrote up short five-page 
reflections which were shared with AusAID and accompanied by formal and informal discussions 
around emerging findings. Reflections focused on the effectiveness of the methodology, key actors 
within the policy process and factors and incentives shaping the demand for and use of research by 
policy-makers. These reflections helped refine the approach and interview questions, addressing 
issues which may have earlier been left out, provided AusAID staff with insights in relation to the 
design of particular elements of their Knowledge Sector Programme and informed our draft report. Once 
the fieldwork had concluded, a qualitative data analysis software package (MaxQDA) was used to draw 
together themes from the interview data. This entailed the development of a coding structure, the 
coding of interview transcripts and the retrieval of ‘segments’. Analysis from use of the software, 
together with evidence from the literature reviews, was used as a basis for drafting the report. 
Feedback on the first draft was then sought from AusAID staff and members of the research team. 
 
Finally, a half-day workshop was held in Jakarta, primarily to share and validate preliminary findings, in 
particular on the factors encouraging policy-makers to demand and use knowledge. The workshop had 
32 participants in total: sixteen people from the GoI; five from AusAID (including the chief of operations 
and staff from the Knowledge Sector Programme); eight from SMERU, an independent institution for 
research and policy studies; and two from the Overseas Development Institute (ODI). GoI participants 
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came from Bappenas and the Ministries of Health, Education, Agriculture, Social Affairs and Home 
Affairs, with staff ranked at echelon three and four as well as those who were ‘non-structural’. Topics 
for discussion included an overview of the preliminary AusAID Knowledge Sector Programme design 
and preliminary research findings. The workshop report, as well as additional material from the 
literature, together with a further reading of the interview transcripts and relevant information from the 
Indonesian online press, informed the writing of this report.2
 
 
Given the hugely complex set of actors, interactions and processes that make up policy-making in 
Indonesia, and bearing in mind our very limited sample of respondents and short timeframe, our study 
was far from comprehensive—it merely aimed to provide a flavour of how policies might be shaped and 
possible factors that may encourage policy-makers to demand and use knowledge in policy-making. 
Furthermore, given the nature of hierarchy and incentives for bureaucrats to remain loyal to their 
seniors, respondents from the GoI were, on the whole, slightly more reluctant to go beyond describing 
formal policy processes to reveal the more informal practices. Respondents from the GoI may also have 
overstated the role that knowledge has or the strength of bureaucratic incentives in encouraging policy-
makers to draw on knowledge in policy processes. 
 
At the same time, respondents from outside the GoI in many cases may have had less of a ‘true’ 
understanding of the realities of policy-making in Indonesia. Furthermore, staff from donor agencies, 
some of whom might treat rich country institutions as best practices of relevance to Indonesia, with a 
tendency to be frustrated in the face of limited progress, may have overstated some of the challenges 
faced in policy-making and understated the role that knowledge played (for example being unaware of 
the strong informal links there seem to exist between policy-makers and knowledge producers, or at 
least viewing them with at least some suspicion). As such, rather than delivering a magic bullet for 
AusAID’s Knowledge Sector Programme, this study aims to provide a fuller illustration of the kinds of 
incentives that might motivate policy-makers to use knowledge and help AusAID set out options and 
solutions and not just point to obstacles to the use of knowledge. 
 
1.4 Structure 
 
This paper is structured as follows:  
 
Section 2 describes the formal rules that govern policy processes (including the role that knowledge 
plays) in Indonesia, with a focus on: (i) development planning and budgeting; and (ii) the drafting of 
laws requiring parliamentary approval and of instructions, decrees and regulations, which do not. We 
conclude by suggesting that formal bureaucratic rules tend to provide weak incentives for policy-
makers to use knowledge in policy processes, which in essence becomes our problem statement or 
vulnerability to be assessed. We then outline our intentions, using a political economy approach, to 
uncover the underlying rules that might govern policy-making, and assess it and how this shapes the 
incentives that policy-makers might have in requesting and using knowledge. 
 
Section 3 argues that the accommodative nature of the Reformasi has resulted in a number of features 
from the New Order era persisting today. So, in order to identify some clues as to the nature of the 
current policy-making system, we draw on a subset of the wider literature to briefly review some of the 
most relevant characteristics of policy-making processes under the New Order era. 
 
Section 4 describes some of the institutional features of the policy-making process in Indonesia. In 
particular, we assess policy-making within the cabinet (including the role of the president and vice-
president), across the GoI (with a focus on national development planning and coordination across 
ministries) and within particular ministries (looking at the role of ministers, deputy-ministers, director-
generals and directors). 
 
                                                          
2 A note on the workshop proceedings is available on request. 
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Section 5 describes institutional features on the legislative side of the GoI, with a focus on political 
parties, the extent of the DPR’s influence, the role of parliamentary commissions and the links between 
political parties and their DPR members. 
 
Section 6 assesses the technical capacity within the GoI to generate and acquire knowledge from 
elsewhere, as well as policy-makers’ own links with actors external to the GoI. We describe capacity 
within both the executive and the legislature. Suggesting that analytical capacity is generally weak, we 
argue that this is in large part down to problems with the civil service. Next, we highlight the hugely 
important role that informal and personal networks play in Indonesia, especially in facilitating flows of 
information and knowledge, before describing some of the external sources to which GoI officials turn 
in pursuit of knowledge, including universities, civil society groups and donor and international 
agencies. 
 
Section 7 draws on the institutional features described in the previous sections and explores how these 
shape the factors influencing policy-makers’ behaviour in relation to knowledge. This includes an 
assessment of factors which might both motivate and discourage policy-makers in terms of using 
knowledge. 
 
Section 8 concludes with a summary of our findings; some discussion of the factors that both motivate 
and discourage policy-makers from using knowledge; recommendations for AusAID in relation to 
selecting policy issues to work on and designing interventions to improve policy-making capacity; and 
suggestions for further research.  
 
We now turn our attention to some of the formal bureaucratic rules that outline how policies should be 
made. 
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2. Formal policy processes 
 
In this section, we describe some of the formal rules that govern how policies should be drafted. Our 
research suggests there are two main types of policy processes. First are regular processes, namely, 
long-term, medium-term and annual planning (the latter of which includes the development of a 
budget, which requires parliamentary approval), at the national and ministerial levels. The second 
entails the development of laws, which requires parliamentary approval, and implementation 
guidelines, in the shape of regulations, decrees and instructions, which do not require parliamentary 
approval. Although political leaders may start the year with a list of laws they would like to pass, this 
tends to take place on a more ad hoc basis with, it appears, no time limit for completion. We proceed 
by initially describing the steps that are formally required for each of the two types of policy processes, 
including what, if any, the role of knowledge is. We assess the extent to which these rules are followed 
and suggest that formal bureaucratic rules provide only weak incentives in terms of producing effective 
outputs and, in particular, investment in, demand for and use of knowledge.  
 
2.1 Regularised planning and budgeting 
 
The National Development Planning System (Sistem Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional, or SPPN), as 
invoked by Law No. 25/2004 on National Development Planning and operationalised in Government 
Regulation No. 40/2006 and No. 8/2008, calls for the production of 20-year, long-term development 
plans (RPJPs); five-year, medium-term development plans (RPJMs); and annual development plans 
(RKPs) at national, ministerial and regional levels. The RPJP is operationalised each year through the 
RKPs, which aim to inform the (annual) budgeting process. Figure 2 illustrates how long-term, medium-
term and annual plans at the national, ministerial and regional levels interact with one another. 
 
Figure 2: The Indonesian development planning hierarchy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: STIE YKPN, (n.d). 
 
Formal rules governing the drafting of development plans suggest development planning should be (i) 
political: drawing on the agenda proposed by the president (or other democratically elected leaders); 
(ii) technocratic: based on data generated through scientific methods; (iii) participatory: incorporating 
the views of interest groups or stakeholders, including those from the executive, judiciary, legislature, 
society, private sector and non-governmental organisations (NGOs); (iv) top-down: centred on plans 
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prepared by the president, ministries and agencies; and (v) bottom-up: founded on plans from the 
village, district and regional levels (Suzetta, 2007).3
 
 
Long-term planning 
In formulating the 20-year long-term plan, Bappenas, guided by the long-term vision (informed by the 
1945 Constitution), follows a mainly technocratic process and considers an evaluation of the previous 
RPJPN. A draft is then presented to a stakeholder forum, or development planning deliberation 
(musyawarah perencanaan pembangunan, or musrenbang) (see Box 1) no later than one year prior to 
the end of the ongoing RPJPN. Based on feedback from the musrenbang, the head of Bappenas will 
finalise the RPJPN and send it to the president for approval, who in turn will present it to the DPR. The 
final RPJPN guides the RPJMN, regional RPJPs and priorities for future presidential candidates. 
 
Box 1: A brief definition of musrenbang 
Musrenbang gather input for national and regional development plans and are held at various levels of the 
government, from village, sub-district, district, provincial to national level, to help synchronise development 
plans. Musrenbang are held for long-term, medium-term and annual work plans. They aim to undertake three of 
the five approaches that development planning processes should: participatory, bottom-up and top-down. 
 
Medium-term planning 
 
Figure 3: Developing the RPJMN 
 
Source: Bappenas (2009). 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 Booth (2005:209) says, ‘Exactly what will happen if these various approaches produce conflicting outcomes is not 
considered.’ 
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The preparation of the RPJMN starts with a situational analysis of Indonesia’s development context, to 
identify key problems and their causes. This is essentially a research study undertaken by Bappenas 
two years prior to issuing the five-year plan. The situational analysis is followed by an assessment of 
the main problems and challenges that are likely to unfold over the course of the five-year development 
plan, which in turn is informed by an evaluation of the last RPJMN and unaccomplished targets as well 
as by stakeholder input. The situational analysis and the assessment of problems over the five-year 
period, coupled with priorities of the 20-year plan, presidential priorities and international 
commitments, inform the objectives of the five-year plan. The objectives in turn inform overall policy 
direction and national development strategies, which comprise national priorities, specific 
programmes, activities and the macroeconomic framework and broad resource allocation. Figure 3 
illustrates the key components of the RPJMN. 
 
In consultation with line ministries, the parliament, universities, local governments and the cabinet, 
Bappenas prepares a draft, one year prior to issuing the five-year plan, which is submitted to the 
president, who then approves this as a guideline for ministries to prepare their five-year strategic 
plans. Within the framework of the draft RPJMN, ministries and agencies similarly prepare their five-year 
strategic plans. These are also based on an evaluation of the previous plan and stakeholder input. 
Bappenas presents the draft RPJMN in a musrenbang no later than two months after the president is 
inaugurated. Based on responses from the musrenbang, Bappenas finalises the RPJMN and submits 
this to the president. The RPJMN is established by a presidential regulation no later than three months 
after the president’s inauguration. 
 
Annual planning and budgeting 
Blondal et al. (2009) describe the annual planning and budgeting process in some detail. We 
summarise this here and supplement this with responses from key informant interviews. It is important 
to note that, while long-term, medium-term and annual plans require approval only from the president, 
annual budgets on the other hand require approval from the parliament and are thus enshrined in the 
law. 
 
• Economic assumptions: The process for budgeting starts in February of every year when the 
Fiscal Policy Office (Badan Kebijakan Fiskal, or BKF) in the Ministry of Finance starts preparing 
the economic assumptions, such as projected economic growth, foreign exchange, interest, 
inflation and crude oil production. The BKF suggests a narrow range of assumptions, as the 
exact figures are subject to negotiations between the GoI and the parliament. 
• Resource ceilings: Once the macroeconomic framework has been established, the Directorate-
general for Budget divides the resulting available resources (less fuel subsidies, regional 
autonomy funds and interest payments) into those that are required for funding ongoing 
activities (‘non-discretionary’) and those that are available for new programmes 
(‘discretionary’). For the first category, the Directorate-general for Budget will take the current 
year’s budget and apply set norms and indices to arrive at a figure for the following year’s 
budget. 
• Allocating resources for non-discretionary funds: Once the Ministry of Finance has 
established the ceiling for resources available for new and discretionary programmes, 
Bappenas takes the lead responsibility (in cooperation with the Ministry of Finance) in 
allocating these funds. A government RKP elaborates on the national priorities specified in the 
five-year RPJMN. The RKP provides the framework for the preparation of the Ministry-/Agency-
specific Work Plan (Renja-KL) and the Ministry-/Agency-specific Budget Plan (Rencana Kerja dan 
Anggaran Kementerian Negara/Lembaga, or RKA-KL). 
• Drafting the plan: In developing the RKP, Bappenas starts the year with a series of internal 
workshops identifying specific priorities and their funding needs. Once Bappenas receives the 
expenditure ceiling from the Ministry of Finance in early March, it fine-tunes the RKP. This 
process culminates in a March cabinet meeting to discuss the draft RKP and to approve its 
broad outlines. 
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• Stakeholder consultations: Bappenas also conducts a series of musrenbang with regional 
governments, de-concentrated units of government ministries and various CSOs before 
finalising the RKP. These usually take place in late April or early May and enable Bappenas to 
outline the draft RKP and solicit feedback. 
• Drawing up ministry/agency plans and budgets: After the aforementioned cabinet meeting in 
March, Bappenas and the Ministry of Finance issue guidelines on drawing up the Renja-KL. This 
includes indicative budget ceilings for each ministry, broken down by programmes and 
expenditure types. Each line ministry must then draw up its Renja-KL, which should be informed 
by an evaluation of the previous year’s Renja-KL. 
• Bappenas and Ministry of Finance consultations: During April, senior officials from line 
ministries meet with counterparts at Bappenas and the Ministry of Finance. While Bappenas 
focuses on substantive aspects of the Renja-KL, the Ministry of Finance ensures robust costing 
of new initiatives. 
• Issuing the RKP: The final RKP is issued by the president following a cabinet meeting in May. 
The president then meets with ministers and heads of agencies to emphasise the importance of 
carrying out planned activities. The RKP will likely contain several programmes (in excess of a 
hundred), some of which cut across ministry boundaries. The programmes are in turn divided 
into smaller and more numerous activities. 
• Presentation of the RKP to the parliament: The RKP, Renja-KL and fiscal policies and budget 
priorities (which include a description of the macroeconomic framework, fiscal policies and 
priorities, the deficit target, revenue projections and proposed expenditure ceilings for the 
upcoming year) are presented to the parliament. Table 1 provides the timetable for the DPR’s 
role in reviewing the budget. Annual plans and budgets are discussed in two parallel spaces. 
 
Table 1: Parliamentary budget approval timetable 
Mid-May Government submits pre-budget report 
Mid-May to mid-June • Discussions held by Ministry of Finance with Budget Committee on fiscal policy 
and overall ceilings 
• Discussions held by spending ministries and agencies with their respective 
sectoral commissions on detailed allocations 
16 August • Government submits budget proposal 
• President delivers budget speech 
16 August to late October Budget Committee and sectoral commissions review budget proposal 
By 31 October DPR approves annual budget 
November–December  Finalisation of detailed budget implementation guidance (‘informal process’) 
1 January Start of fiscal year 
Source: Blondal et al. (2009). 
 
 
• Discussion with parliamentary committees: First, the Ministry of Finance and Bappenas have 
discussions with the Budget Committee and with Komisi (Commission) XI, focusing on broad 
macroeconomic and fiscal policy objectives. Box 2 provides information on parliamentary 
commissions. Together, through deliberation and consensus-building, they will arrive at fixed 
points within the proposed ranges for key economic assumptions and revenue forecasts. 
Second, individual line ministries will have discussions with their respective sectoral 
commissions on their Renja-KL and proposed expenditures. 
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Box 2: Parliamentary commissions 
The parliament consists of 17 commissions and committees, 11 of which refer to legislative issue areas and six to 
internal administration. Parliamentary factions distribute commission leadership posts on a proportional basis in 
accordance with party size. Those that are particularly influential are Komisi I (defence, foreign affairs and 
information), Komisi II (internal affairs and regional autonomy), Komisi III (law, human rights and internal security) 
and Komisi XI (finance and development planning). The Budget Committee is composed of selected members of 
11 of the 17 sectoral commissions. 
 
In addition to deliberating legislation, the commissions also serve as venues in which parliamentarians can 
express their views on topical issues, particularly with regard to the performance of the executive branch. 
Executive branch representatives make public presentations before parliamentary commissions on a regular 
basis. As for non-legislative commissions, these include committees governing ethics, budgeting, protocol, 
planning and legislative drafting. In addition, the parliament also sometimes forms special committees (panitia 
khusus, or pansus), or teams to conduct probes into the government or research special topics. 
 
• Temporary government annual budget and ministry-/agency-specific budgets: Once 
agreement is reached with the parliament in mid-June, the Ministry of Finance issues a 
‘temporary’ or indicative budget. Ministries and agencies then prepare their RKA-KL, which have 
a different structure and format to the Renja-KL. They have to be submitted to Bappenas by mid-
July. Bappenas reviews them to ensure conformity with the RKP and the Directorate-general for 
Budget reviews them for compliance with the preliminary budget ceilings, unit costs, and 
classification. 
• Finalisation of budget: The Ministry of Finance finalises the budget documentation and 
prepares the budget proposal and accompanying financial notes. The president delivers a 
budget speech to the parliament on 16 August. The parliament proceeds to hold two plenary 
sessions dedicated to an exchange of views on the government’s budget proposal, to which the 
Minister for Finance responds on behalf of the president. The budget is then referred to the 
Budget Committee, where the parliament’s scrutiny takes place. This meets frequently over the 
next two months to review macroeconomic assumptions and revenue forecasts. All ministers 
and directors-general are invited to give testimony during commission hearings. Several smaller 
working groups are usually formed to focus on specific subjects. Meetings of the Budget 
Committee are not open to the public and no record is made available of its proceedings. The 
Budget Committee invites sectoral commissions to submit advisory opinions on budget 
priorities and financial needs. The budget that is approved by the parliament by 31 October is at 
a very detailed level and is enacted by consensus rather than by majority voting. The approval 
of the budget two months before the start of the fiscal year is meant to give sub-national 
governments time to finalise their own budgets. 
 
2.2 Laws and implementation guidelines 
 
Here, we outline some of the formal rules for developing legislation and implementation guidelines. 
First, though, we outline the hierarchy of the various legal processes that exist in Indonesia according 
to Law No. 10/2004. This is illustrated in Figure 4, which comprises (Mardha, 2009): 
 
• The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, or UUD 1945) 
and its amendments thereto; 
• Laws, which are formulated in agreement between the DPR and the GoI, signed by the president 
(UU No. 10/1997). These provide statements of general principles; 
• Government regulations as substitute laws (perpu), which are made by the president in urgent 
situations, such as in times of crises; 
• Government Regulations (peraturan pemerintah, or PP), to provide implementation guidelines 
for specific laws, which are drawn up and initiated by a minister (department or non-
department) within an executive agency and signed by the president; 
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• Presidential regulations (peraturan presiden, or perpres), issued by the president as the head 
of executive bodies; and 
• Provincial/district regulations (peraturan daerah, or perda), which are formulated in agreement 
between the provincial or district House of Representatives and head of province/district. 
 
In practice, there are also presidential instructions, presidential decrees, ministerial decrees, joint 
ministerial decrees and circulation letters. Regarding presidential instructions, there is little 
documentation on any official procedures for drawing these up, indicating that considerable discretion 
is left with the president (Hamid and Atamimi, 1992). 
 
Figure 4: Hierarchy of laws and guidelines that make up the Indonesian legal framework 
 
Source: Mahendra (2008). 
 
In describing formal legal processes, given the availability of literature, we focus on only two of these 
components: (i) the drafting and enactment of a law or bill and (ii) the drafting of an implementation 
guideline, namely, a government regulation. 
 
Drafting laws 
Procedures for work in the DPR are set out in the Peraturan Tata Tertib (Rules of Procedure), otherwise 
known as the Tatib.4
 
 Further, Presidential Regulation No. 68/2005 on the General Mechanism of 
Establishing a National Legal Framework describes the processes necessary to draft laws, government 
regulations as substitute laws, presidential regulations and government regulations. Official 
procedures for drafting and passing laws differ according to whether the bill is introduced by the 
government or initiated by the DPR itself. Government bills are drafted in the relevant ministry and/or 
the Ministry of Law and Human Rights—usually by a taskforce, which can include key decision-makers 
from the executive as well as technical experts from universities and CSOs. 
A bill is supposed to be accompanied by an academic document containing a detailed explanation of 
the matters to be dealt with, including a breakdown of all clauses. The Ministry of Law and Human 
Rights is responsible for coordinating the final drafting of all laws that the government proposes to the 
parliament. Draft bills are taken up to the relevant coordinating ministry, before being received by the 
DPR leadership (speaker and deputy-speakers) and passed to a steering committee that decides which 
commission will be responsible for overseeing its passage through the DPR. 
 
                                                          
4 The Tatib describes the roles of each of the organs of the DPR, such as committees, the types of meetings that can be held 
and the procedures for conducting meetings and making decisions. 
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The first stage of the legislative process takes the form of discussions between the relevant DPR 
commission and government representatives. The minister usually attends the initial meeting (which is 
mandatory if a bill is to proceed through the parliament), and is then represented by ministry officials in 
subsequent meetings. At the first meeting, the general views of each party caucus are presented. This 
is followed by the government’s formal response to the positions of the caucuses. Commissions are 
also legally obliged to open proceedings up to the public and civil society (Lay, 2010). The 
administrative section of the commission is said to invite a range of stakeholders, including 
bureaucrats from state agencies, academics, industry representatives and CSOs (ibid.). 
 
The main part of the discussion concerns the compilation of a problem inventory list (daftar 
inventarisasi masalah, or DIM) identifying potentially controversial clauses of the bill. This list—which 
may contain hundreds of items—forms the basis for negotiations between the GoI and DPR members. 
The formulation and discussion of a DIM usually takes place in a working committee, which is 
essentially a subcommittee of the commission appointed to deal with the bill. Agreement on the final 
draft of the bill is reached when all issues in the DIM have been resolved. The bill is then sent back to 
the commission. The second stage of the legislative process features the formal acceptance and 
passage of the bill through a plenary session. This session hears a report on the results of the 
deliberations in the first stage, presentations of the final views of the caucuses and the GoI response. 
The bill is then passed to the president to be signed. 
 
Bills initiated by the DPR undergo further steps in addition to those undertaken by the executive. A bill 
initiated by the DPR may be proposed by one or more commissions or by the Legislation Committee, 
and it must be signed by at least 10 DPR members. Similar to bills drafted by the executive, taskforces 
will be established consisting of decision-makers and experts who help draft the bill. The bill is then 
submitted to the DPR leadership, which passes it to a steering committee. From there, it is sent to a 
plenary session for formal acceptance as a DPR initiative. The leadership then submits the bill to the 
president with a request that a minister be assigned to represent the government in deliberations. The 
bill then enters the first stage and from there on follows procedures outlined above for government-
sponsored bills (this draws largely on Febrian, 2010 and Sherlock, 2010b). 
 
Drafting implementation guidelines 
Having outlined the formal process for developing legislative bills, here we outline briefly the steps 
required to draft a government regulation, particularly where a number of ministries are involved: 
 
1 A (relevant) ministry is assigned as a sponsor, which then coordinates an inter-ministerial 
consultation. 
2 A minister within the sponsoring ministry or someone from an equivalent post establishes a 
taskforce to draw up an academic concept and a draft government regulation. 
3 The minister sends a letter, together with the academic concept and the draft government 
regulation, to other relevant ministers and institutions and asks for the names of people who 
could make up an inter-ministerial team. 
4 Once the names of the inter-ministerial team have been received from the relevant ministries 
and institutions, the sponsoring minister establishes the team, which then proceeds to discuss 
and review the draft government regulation. 
5 After several inter-ministerial team discussions and reviews of the draft, the sponsoring 
minister issues the final draft of the government regulation and sends it to other relevant 
ministries and institutions for approval. 
6 The final draft with an approval letter is sent to the State Secretariat, which coordinates all draft 
decrees and instructions issued by the government, for a cabinet-level discussion and then a 
presidential signature. 
7 Once legislative products are promulgated, the State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia 
(Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia) is issued from the State Secretariat. 
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2.3 The effectiveness of formal bureaucratic rules 
 
We have outlined here some of the formal procedures for developing policies, both planned (regular 
development planning and budgeting) and ad hoc (laws and implementation guidelines). Throughout 
these processes, knowledge in the form of academic drafts and consultation processes among both 
state and non-state actors is supposed to play a significant role. However, some respondents indicated 
that formal processes for drawing up plans and policies were not followed in practice. Although there 
were differences between sectors, little work tended to go into drafting laws. Others suggested that, 
despite formal rules, they rarely knew how policy was made; some suggested that they often ‘muddled 
through’. The World Bank argues that decision-making processes underlying formulation of policies are 
often unclear (2009a:vi). 
 
Other respondents suggested that, even if policy-making followed formal rules, rarely does this result 
in well-informed plans. Sherlock (2010a) suggests that projects, which might be invoked by laws and 
government regulations, are often regarded by officials as just a way to move money, indicating that 
process is followed at the expense of the quality of policy outputs. A number of respondents 
questioned the depth of academic studies accompanying recent laws. For instance, environmental and 
social impact studies are said to be repeatedly reused, with only the name of the relevant location 
changed to suite a particular contract (ibid.). 
 
Together, this suggests that formal bureaucratic rules do not provide effective incentives to invest in, 
demand and use knowledge, with outputs possibly suffering as a result. For instance, Booth (2005) 
suggests that national planning processes place emphasis on target-setting, with little indication of 
how those targets will be achieved. The little detail outlined in the DPR’s Tatib leaves parliamentary 
members with a great deal of discretion in the way they work (Sherlock, 2010a). Lay (2010) also 
suggests that there are few guidelines on how DPR members as well as political parties should involve 
stakeholders in their work. 
 
So, what might be the ‘informal’ rules and practices that drive policy-making in Indonesia? And, other 
than formal bureaucratic rules, what factors are likely to encourage policy-makers to request and use 
knowledge in policy processes? We answer these questions by exploring the political economy of 
policy-making in Indonesia. In particular, we examine the historical and institutional characteristics of 
the Indonesian policy-making system and discuss what this means for understanding how policies are 
shaped and the role that knowledge plays. 
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3. Reformasi and the legacy of the New Order 
 
3.1 The accommodative nature of Reformasi 
 
We begin our study of some of the less formal practices that might shape policy-making by trying to 
assess the nature of the current political system, particularly in relation to President Soeharto’s New 
Order regime. Analysts have struggled to agree on the precise nature of the system that has taken 
shape since the fall of the New Order. It is nevertheless possible to identify three broad schools of 
thought on post-New Order Indonesia (Mietzner and Aspinall, 2010). First, there are those who believe 
that Indonesia has done exceptionally well in consolidating its democracy. Freedom House (2009), for 
instance, acknowledges Indonesia as a functioning democracy. And Indonesia’s achievement is seen 
as even more remarkable given that democracy across the world, particularly in Southeast Asia, was 
waning at that time. 
 
A second school of thought suggests that, despite important institutional reforms, democratic change 
has been superficial, with core structures of power remaining unchanged. Oligarchic elites that 
controlled the New Order have survived the 1998 regime change and continue to use the state for rent-
seeking purposes (Robison and Hadiz, 2004). Finally, some authors have taken a middle ground, which 
seems to be substantiated by our research, emphasising that, while Indonesia has made some 
progress towards becoming a more democratic polity, removing all elements of the New Order has not 
and could not have been a priority. Instead, the accommodative nature of Reformasi was a 
fundamental factor contributing to the feasibility of achieving change. In particular, 
 
Now, more than a decade after its democratic transition began, Indonesia has dealt effectively with these 
challenges to democracy. The military has retreated from the commanding heights of the political system. 
The most severe communal conflicts have receded, and the worst of the country’s separatist insurgencies—
in the Sumatran Province of Aceh—has been resolved by a peace deal. Apart from a small fringe, Islamist 
forces have been absorbed into the political mainstream and no longer prioritize campaigning for a state 
based on Shari‘a. The neutralization of these threats has been accompanied by a host of other 
achievements—notably, a dramatic expansion of civil liberties, the emergence of a flourishing and 
pluralistic media market, and freely contested multiparty elections. The story of Indonesia’s democratic 
success, in a decade that has witnessed worldwide democratic stagnation if not recession, presents 
valuable lessons for other countries. There is, however, an underside to Indonesia’s democratic 
accomplishments. The country has dealt with key challenges in ways that have come with costs. Spoilers 
have been accommodated and absorbed into the system rather than excluded from it, producing a trade-
off between democratic success and democratic quality. This trade-off has not been an unfortunate side-
effect of Indonesia’s democratic transition; rather, it has been central to its dynamics, and even an 
important ingredient in its success (Aspinall, 2010:20-21). 
 
The challenges faced by the Indonesian decision-making processes today seem to be the result of the 
accommodative strategies adopted by reformers that allowed them to make the progress they have 
made. Acknowledging this and the relatively short time that has elapsed since the fall of Soeharto, by 
drawing primarily on a small subset of the political economy literature on Indonesia, we look back at 
what we consider to be a number of salient features of the New Order apparatus for clues to the nature 
of policy-making today. 
 
3.2 Policy-making under the New Order 
 
During the New Order regime, Soeharto was said to have practised a form of leadership practised by 
Javanese kings, which was hierarchical and concentric, requiring unconditional respect, deference and 
obedience (Crouch, 2005). The parliament, dominated by the military, was effectively a ‘rubber stamp’, 
while the judiciary enforced the regime’s rules. President Soeharto was subsequently the final policy 
arbiter in a centralised and authoritarian regime (Martinez-Diaz, 2006). As one respondent said, ‘When 
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word came down from Cendana [Soeharto’s residence], you got it done, or there would be 
consequences.’ 
 
The generation of economic resources was of critical importance, with foreign-educated technocrats—
brought in by Soeharto to fill ministerial posts for economic ministries such as Bappenas and the 
Ministries of Finance, Trade and Public Works—responsible for designing and implementing a series of 
five-year plans. However, Booth (2005) notes that, while some five-year plans contained insights into 
government thinking in a number of areas, planning processes seemed to become more ritualistic and 
less important as a guide to government policy as Soeharto’s regime evolved. 
 
Technocratic ministers were the government’s primary interface with the international financial 
institutions, whose aid was crucial in fostering development. However, the influence of technocrats 
was highly variable and context-specific. They had no base support within the government and no 
constituency outside it. The president trusted technocrats primarily as expert crisis managers and 
economic fixers, with their influence peaking at times of economic turmoil. During times of relative 
stability and prosperity, however, national and crony interests (large entrepreneurs who were close to 
the president) tended to dominate policy (Martinez-Diaz, 2006). 
 
Bappenas was responsible primarily for national planning, drafting the development budget, 
coordinating with foreign governments and international organisations and monitoring implementation 
and, as such, held considerable sway over other ministries. However, its influence seemed to be 
dependent on the character of its minister and their relationship with the president. For instance, when 
Bappenas was headed by a strong minister, as Professor Widjojo was considered to be, it could if 
necessary impose coordination between ministries. But after the departure of Widjojo from the cabinet 
in 1983, Bappenas no longer had the same authority (Booth, 2005). Three coordinating ministers 
pertaining to security, law and politics; people’s welfare; and the economy, finance and development 
were powerful actors, whose role was primarily to communicate decisions made by the president to 
ministers (CastleAsia, 2010). 
 
Widjojo’s departure from the cabinet seemed to facilitate the rise of the Ministry of Finance in economic 
policy. Bappenas was relegated to a secondary position, although it still played an important role as a 
coordinator of aid projects and disbursements of development budget funds. Just as the Ministry of 
Finance appeared to have taken over the lead role in macroeconomic policy-making, so line ministries 
took the lead role in sectoral planning as well as in project implementation. Given that salary 
supplements from project implementation were an important part of the remuneration of most civil 
servants (see below), there was a strong incentive for line ministries to seek to increase the size of their 
development budget (Booth, 2005). 
 
At the beginning of the New Order era, there was considerable discussion of civil service reform and the 
related issue of bureaucratic corruption. The widespread view was that the root cause of corruption was 
low salaries. Although the government was keen to streamline the civil service, attempts at reform were 
not successful. By the mid-1970s, one study reported a wide range of payments to civil servants, both 
legal and illegal, with the basic wage for most civil servants—certainly for the more senior—
representing only a small part of total remuneration. There were supplements to compensate for 
inflation and honoraria for projects, which represented the largest single source of legally sanctioned 
supplementary incomes and were paid out of development (or discretionary) budgets. Thus, there was 
an incentive for civil servants to work in ministries that had large development budgets and in those 
directorates that were in charge of project implementation (Booth, 2005). 
 
Regarding knowledge production and use, a number of research centres rose in prominence as 
Soeharto led a process of economic reform. These included the Institute for Economic and Social 
Research (Lembaga Penyelidikan Ekonomi dan Masyarakat, or LPEM) at the University of Indonesia, the 
Indonesian Institute of Sciences (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, or LIPI), the Center for Policy 
and Implementation Studies (CPIS) and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). CPIS 
in particular had considerable influence on policy and practice, including, for instance, in the 
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development of credit programmes through village units that contributed to improvements in the rural 
economy. The 1980s saw a strong role for planning bureaus within most line ministries. In some 
ministries, such as the Ministry of Agriculture, the Research and Development Unit (Badan Penelitian 
dan Pengembangan, or Balitbang), staffed by civil servants with Masters’ degrees and doctoral 
qualifications, played an important role in planning development projects, including those with 
substantial aid finance. 
 
However, McCarthy and Ibrahim (2005) argue that universities and research centres played a 
legitimating function (see Nachiappan et al., 2010), while a number of respondents suggested that the 
original source of knowledge was largely (if not entirely) international (from prominent universities in 
the US such as Berkeley and Harvard), brought into the Indonesian context by foreign-trained 
academics, popularly known as the Berkeley Mafia. 
 
3.3 Summary 
 
In sum, we argue that, while Indonesia has made progress towards becoming a democratic polity, the 
accommodative nature of Reformasi has meant that a number of features of policy-making under the 
New Order are likely to persist today. From our brief look back at the New Order regime, we identify a 
number of key features that may provide some clues as to the nature of the current policy-making 
system: 
 
1 The executive was extremely dominant, with the president seemingly positioned at the top of a 
steep hierarchy. 
2 Considerable emphasis was placed on economic policy-making, which was top-down, with a 
strong role for technocratic officials. 
3 The influence of Bappenas, once a major force in planning and coordinating policy, declined, 
with the Ministry of Finance taking over in the realm of economic policy-making. 
4 As ministries took the lead in sectoral planning, competition over resources from the 
development budget increased, especially since basic civil service salaries were limited (see 
point 6). 
5 The influence of ministries was often dependent on the persona and character of their minister 
and their relationship with the president. 
6 As civil servant salaries were relatively low, there was a high level of bureaucratic corruption. 
Attempts at civil service reform were made, but they were seen as unsuccessful. 
7 Research and development units within ministries and research centres, which rose in 
prominence as Soeharto pursued a strategy of economic development, seemed to play mainly a 
legitimating function. 
8 Knowledge (including ideas) seemed to stem mainly from abroad, from universities such as 
Berkeley and Harvard in the US. 
 
In the following sections, drawing mainly on key informant interviewees, we test the extent to which 
some of these hypotheses still hold true despite the Reformasi and what, if any, are the implications for 
policy-making and the role of knowledge. 
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4. The executive branch of the government 
 
Building on the previous section, this section and the following two attempts to identify and assess 
some of the institutional features of the Indonesian policy-making system. This section first explores 
the rules that may determine the behaviour of actors within the executive arm of the government. It is 
divided into three components: (i) policy-making within the cabinet, including the role of the president 
and the vice-president; (ii) policy-making across the government, with a focus on national development 
planning and coordination across ministries; and (iii) policy-making within particular ministries, 
looking at the role of ministers, deputy-minsters, directors-general and directors. 
 
4.1 Presidential and vice-presidential decision-making 
 
The president, directly elected by the people since 2004, holds considerable authority, although not to 
the same extent as Soeharto under the New Order. The five-year plan, and in particular the process 
behind it, as outlined in Section 2, coincides with the five-year term of the president, with the plan in 
essence serving to highlight the president’s priorities (Blondal et al., 2009). Although the president 
requires the approval of a more independent and active parliament to issue a budget or pass laws, 
he/she can effectively block the progress of legislation by refusing to designate a representative to 
discuss bills—constituting a pre-emptive veto. 
 
Furthermore, considerable policy work, although falling within the scope of legislation, does not require 
parliamentary approval, leaving significant discretion for the president. The use of discretion was 
illustrated shortly after the current President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) was re-elected in 
2009. Upon retaking office, he outlined 15 priorities for his first 100 days, including both food security 
(a key public concern) and climate change (an issue on which Indonesia was under pressure from 
external actors to act and where it could benefit from significant donor investment). Soon after, a 
presidential instruction on ‘securing national rice production in the face of extreme climate condition’ 
was issued, giving instructions to 13 government institutions to take measures in increasing rice 
production. 
 
However, these discretionary powers could also enable the president to slow down progress (though 
not necessarily through intent, given the differing priorities of the cabinet) where laws which provided 
high-level principles required (but lacked) more detailed implementation guidance. For instance, 
despite the enactment of Law No. 40/2004 on Social Protection and Social Security, which protects all 
groups of Indonesian citizens in the areas of health care, occupational accidents, death, old-age and 
pensions, the president has yet to issue 11 government regulations and 10 presidential instructions as 
technical and administrative guidance to implement the law.5
 
 
The role of the vice-president, elected on the same ticket as the president, is no longer ceremonial, with 
his/her instructions in theory carrying some weight. However, given higher levels of political 
competition (see below and Section 5), the vice-president can come into conflict with the president. For 
instance, in 2006, SBY wanted to establish a ‘reform work unit’, later called the Presidential Work Unit 
on Managing Programs and Reform (Unit Kerja Presiden Pengelolaan Program dan Reformasi, or UKP-
PPR). The agency explicitly targeted bureaucratic and judicial reform as top priorities, but was brushed 
aside when Vice-president Jusuf Kalla voiced strong opposition to the unit’s mission and several senior 
figures of the Party of Functional Groups (Partai Golkar) questioned its legality. Faced with such 
opposition, SBY allowed the unit to lapse. 
 
                                                          
5 www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/02/23/sby-%E2%80%98violates%E2%80%99-social-security-law.html. 
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4.2 Cabinet-level decision-making 
 
Ministerial appointments 
In appointing ministers, technical ability is only one of several factors considered, as Indonesia’s 
diversity means that ethnic background, geography, gender and, crucially, political party affiliation are 
also considered.6 In fact, given the inability of any one party to secure a majority of seats in the 
parliament in any of Indonesia’s three elections since the end of Soeharto’s New Order regime, politics 
(and policy-making) have been characterised by coalition.7
 
 As coalitions are seen as alliances based 
mainly on the distribution of cabinet posts and rarely the direction of policy (Pamungkas, 2009), the 
president makes ministerial appointments in close consultation with the leaders of various parties 
(Blondal et al., 2009). Sukma (2010) argues that, in the forming of the 2009 cabinet, SBY’s 
appointment of some ministers, especially from the coalition parties, reflected his preference for 
political compromise rather than expertise. 
Nevertheless, ministries and agencies such as Finance, Trade, the Central Bank and Public Works were 
said by several respondents to have typically benefited from more meritocratic appointments by SBY, 
contributing to a continuing technocratic (knowledge-informed) culture within those ministries. These 
ministries were seen by some as producing both outputs and outcomes, which were more quantifiable 
in economic terms and where indicators of progress were clear, decision-making was more rational and 
systems for storing and reusing information were better. As such, they receive considerable funding 
from the national budget and ministers are subsequently viewed as more powerful. Other ministries, 
such as Agriculture (which received considerable funding during the New Order) and Social Welfare, 
were seen to produce outputs and outcomes that were less visible (at least in economic terms) and 
were thus seen as more ‘political’, perhaps suggesting that appointments were less likely to be based 
on expertise.8
 
 
Decision-making 
With ministerial posts distributed among several parties, each with their own constituency (but not 
necessarily agenda), cabinet-level decision-making is viewed by some as cumbersome, with the 
president needing to work hard at maintaining a broad consensus, making it difficult to pass unpopular 
reform measures into law (see Booth, 2005). This means that, while the president on certain occasions 
has had the ability to push through priority reforms relatively quickly, higher levels of political 
competition may weaken his/her own leadership slightly. This was exemplified in the development of a 
moratorium on new permits to clear primary forests, where the president delegated the task of 
developing a presidential regulation to his presidential work unit, the Presidential Work Unit on 
Monitoring and Controlling Development (Unit Kerja Presiden Pengawasan dan Pengendalian 
Pembangunan, or UKP-PPP) (see below for more on this), but was faced with a competing proposal from 
the Ministry of Forestry (see Box 3 for more details). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 In all, the president appoints 31 cabinet ministers (and five equivalent posts). These include three coordinating ministers, 21 
departmental ministers and 10 state ministers who lack formal departments. 
7 The coalition formed by SBY in late 2009 reflected his decision to opt for a wide but not all-inclusive coalition. Parties 
included: the Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat, or PD), Partai Golkar and four Islamic parties comprising the Prosperous 
Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, or PKS); the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, or PAN); the United 
Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, or PPP); and the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, or 
PKB). The Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, or PDI-P), the Great Indonesia 
Movement Party (Partai Gerindra) and the People’s Conscience Party (Partai Hanura) were not part of the coalition. PD became 
the largest party within the coalition, with a total of 422 seats out of 560. 
8 See Wilson (1989),  for more on classifying the tasks of public agencies. 
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Box 3: The drafting of a moratorium on forestry licenses 
Indonesia has been found to be the third-largest producer of carbon emissions after the US and China, mainly 
because of the release of greenhouse gases through large-scale deforestation. In response to this, at the 
Copenhagen Climate Change Summit, the president announced some ambitious targets—committing Indonesia 
to cutting carbon emissions by 26% by 2020 and to 41% if the country was granted donor support. It was unclear 
how these figures were derived. Nevertheless, the Norwegian government promised $1 billion to the GoI in 
exchange for action around climate change. As part of a package of interventions, the president agreed to pass a 
moratorium on new permits to clear primary forests by January 2011. The UKP-PPP was charged with developing a 
presidential regulation, which it did after consultation with other ministries, including the Ministry of Forestry and 
non-governmental groups from civil society. 
 
However, while the proposed regulation was circulating, the Ministry of Forestry, said to be more aligned with 
certain business interests (author interview, May 2011), also developed a proposal. Two separate drafts were 
subsequently sent out to the cabinet secretary, which reflected a breakdown in the consultation process. 
Interviews suggested that the development and submission of parallel drafts happened because there was a 
deadline for passage of the regulation and the Ministry of Forestry felt it could not wait for the consultation 
process to reach its conclusion, which it felt could have gone on indefinitely. By December 2010, there was little 
consensus on the scope of the moratorium. Ultimately, the regulation was issued in watered-down form, with the 
Ministry of Forestry’s version favoured over UKP-PPP’s. Whose decision was it to take? It started off with the 
presidential taskforce being given authority. In practice, the reality of coalition politics meant that the Ministry of 
Forestry and the coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs (the minister for which is close to the president) were 
influential. The president’s word (albeit delegated to highly placed supervisors) is no longer seen as final. 
 
Moreover, (independent) technocrats face more contestation now than they used to. One respondent 
suggested,  
 
‘Twenty years ago, decisions were taken quickly […] It was mostly the technocrats from UI [University of 
Indonesia]—the Berkeley Mafia—who informed decision-making. Now, there is SMERU and other leading 
universities. Ministers are more open-minded. Ministers […] feel the need to include everyone. But not 
everyone is on same page.’  
 
Technocrats are more dependent than ever before on their ability to secure backing from the president, 
who in turn is likely to be influenced by non-technical and highly politicised factors, such as public 
perception and support; parliamentary, political party and local government approval; and personal 
chemistry (Shiraishi, 2006). 
 
The vulnerability of technocrats, even in ministries, historically known for their ‘technocracy’, was 
exemplified by the recent ‘Bank Century’ scandal, which led to the resignation of the Minister for 
Finance, Sri Mulyani Indrawati—a staunch reformer—and undermined the convening power and 
credibility of Vice-president Boediono, former head of the Central Bank. Sherlock (2010b), argues, that 
if Boediono and Sri Mulyani were affiliated with a particular party, they would probably have been 
defended by their respective parties. As independent technocrats, however, they were ‘fair game’ for all 
parties except the president’s—the PD. 
 
Performance 
Further, ministers, generally speaking, seem to be under considerable pressure to ‘perform’. Kuntoro 
Mangkusubroto, the Head of the UKP-PPP, is responsible for reviewing the performance of ministers on 
behalf of the president (who, now in his second and final term, is himself said to be under pressure to 
leave a legacy), which is in turn rumoured to have considerable influence on cabinet reshuffles. 
Moreover, parties who nominate individuals for ministerial posts probably expect a return in the form of 
a stronger public image, better opinion poll ratings and more financial resources.\ 
 
The media 
The media, having grown rapidly since the fall of Soeharto, and particularly new media in the shape of 
social networking sites, also plays a crucial role in shaping the behaviour of policy-makers. 
Respondents suggested that top government officials often considered the media as an important 
input into decision-making, frequently feeling compelled to address an issue which the media had put 
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under the spotlight. One secretary-general suggested that the agenda for monthly executive meetings 
among directors-general and the minister was in some cases informed by headlines in the press. One 
director also commented, ‘because of the advance in the information and communication, the 
community is not patient enough and they want to know anything, and we don’t have much time to 
inform them. We have to go very fast and have to decide very soon.’ As a result, many ministers often 
feel compelled to roll out policies quickly, often without adequate consultation and with little piloting 
(author interview, May 2011).9
 
 
International factors 
International factors also played on the minds of policy-makers. With Indonesia seen as a major global 
player and now considered a middle-income country, engagement with key forums such as the Group 
of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (G-20) and the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) were viewed as important. Moreover, ministers often sought out ‘quick fixes’ to meet 
international benchmarks, such as the Millennium Development Goals. The Minister of Health, in 
particular, is said to have, for instance, launched a number of initiatives including subsidised 
healthcare, free baby deliveries, and free third-class hospital beds mainly in response to appeals from 
Members of Parliament (MPs) and rarely had an analytical base. 
 
The Presidential Advisory Council 
In addition to the cabinet and other senior officials from ministries, the Presidential Advisory Council 
(Dewan Pertimbangan Presiden, or Wantimpres), consisting of nine advisors who tend to be former 
ministers periodically instated by the president, provides him with a ‘second opinion’ on key policy 
issues. Each advisor appears to have expertise in different issues and varying levels of influence on the 
president and other arms of the government. For instance, one advisor, who is one of the original 
Berkeley Mafia, is concerned with boosting economic development across eastern Indonesia. And, 
according to a political economy analysis by the World Bank, another advisor—the former Health 
Minister—was said to wield considerable influence in the health sector (author interview, May 2010). 
 
Presidential commissions and taskforces 
An array of commissions and special taskforces has also been established, led by the Office of the 
President or the Office of the Vice-president and managed by a prominent leader or ‘champion’. These 
are often set up in response to the realisation that, on some issues, particularly those that require 
cross-ministry coordination, normal government structures have failed to make progress. But such 
vehicles also serve to increase the visibility of the president on key issues, provide him with more 
control over the response and enable him to claim credit for any subsequent progress. The UKP-PPP, as 
mentioned above, is one such commission, officially mandated to monitor priority development 
programmes and ‘debottleneck’ where necessary. Figure 5 provides an overview of some of the UKP-
PPP’s priorities. 
 
Another commission—the Avian Influenza Commission, under the president’s control and managed by 
the current vice-minister for agriculture—has done much to coordinate the government’s response to 
Avian influenza, while the National Team for Accelerating Poverty Reduction (Tim Nasional Percepatan 
Penanggulangan Kemiskinan, or TNP2K), formed in 2010 to accelerate poverty reduction (formerly an 
initiative led by the Ministry of Social Welfare), is led by the vice-president. Other commissions and 
special taskforces include the Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, or 
KPK), the Judicial Commission and a recently established taskforce to help troubled migrants abroad. 
On issues where the president or vice-president has not shown leadership, particularly those requiring 
cross-ministry coordination, progress seems to have stalled, illustrating perhaps how resilient top-
                                                          
9 To illustrate the power of new media and the pressures it can place on individuals and organisations, it is worth highlighting 
the story of Prita Mulyasari. She was charged, fined Rp204 million ($20,500) and imprisoned for complaining by email about 
the quality of treatment she received at a private hospital in the Jakarta Satellite City of Tangerang. Her case was taken up by a 
group on Facebook and attracted considerable support from Indonesian blog sites. A mailing list and the Facebook group 
started raising money from people throughout Indonesia. Seeing the huge support for Prita, Omni International Hospital 
dropped the charges. 
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down lines of control (within a steep bureaucratic hierarchy) inhibit horizontal coordination, but also a 
high level of competition between ministries, something we return to below. 
 
Figure 5: UKP-PPP priorities 
 
Source: UKP-PPP (2011). 
 
Capacity and personal characteristics of senior officials 
Most respondents suggested that almost all senior officials enjoyed high levels of education and 
experience studying abroad, often at the world’s best universities. The technical expertise (in, for 
instance, finance and economics) that was once commanded by only a narrow band of academic 
technocrats during the first part of Soeharto’s rule seems to be shared more widely, not just by a wider 
pool of bureaucrats, but also by several politicians (even those who are considered ‘political’ 
appointments). However, senior officials tend to receive little or no training in leadership or 
management—seen as important in providing coherent direction to numerous directorates and sub-
directorates within a ministry. One respondent suggested that they learnt on the job and drew lessons 
from those around them and from their own past experiences. 
 
Personal characteristics of high-ranking individuals, including their ability to provide strong leadership 
to others, their charisma and their concern for the quality of policy, were considered by several 
respondents to be important. Many respondents pointed to a number of senior officials who were 
viewed as ‘progressive’. For example, Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, the head of the UKP-PPP, was seen as a 
strong and dynamic character. He has a good track record, having managed the rebuilding of Aceh after 
the 2004 Tsunami at the president’s behest. Another top official, a deputy-minister, was considered to 
be very concerned with the quality of policy-making, regularly consulting a range of knowledge 
producers before preparing draft legislation and guidelines. Sri Mulyani Indrawati, seen as a tough 
reformer, credited with strengthening Indonesia’s economy, increasing investments and steering 
Southeast Asia's largest economy through the 2007–2010 financial crisis, was also talked about fondly 
by several respondents. 
 
4.3 Policy-making across the government 
 
National development planning 
After the fall of Soeharto, an already weakened Bappenas saw its powers cut further by President 
Abdurrahman Wahid and ceded to the Ministry of Finance (coinciding with a focus on economic 
stabilisation after the AFC) and to local governments, whose powers and autonomy expanded under 
decentralisation. The Ministry of Finance was seen as officially responsible for fiscal policy and the 
macroeconomic framework as well as for preparing the annual budget. The minister for finance was 
considered the chief financial officer of the Republic of Indonesia, while other ministers were viewed as 
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chief operational officers for their own jurisdictions. The Ministry of Finance was seen to control a 
single consolidated budget (Booth, 2005). 
 
However, as Indonesia recovered from the crisis, President Megawati Sukarnoputri ordered the chief of 
Bappenas to support the president in formulating national development plans. In its new guise, 
Bappenas is both a bureaucratic think-tank and the agency in charge of developing long-term, medium-
term and annual development plans. This is reflected in the competencies of staff at Bappenas, who 
have expertise in various sectors, such as economic development, social development, health care and 
education—while those at the Ministry of Finance generally have backgrounds in finance and 
economics. 
 
Bappenas maintains close relationships with line ministries through, for instance, directors who 
parallel each line ministry and agency. In contrast, the Directorate-general for Budget in the Ministry of 
Finance has three directors who together parallel the rest of the government (Blondal et al., 2009). 
Bappenas also tries to play an inter-ministerial coordination role. Attempting to coordinate line 
ministries seems to be an incentive for Bappenas to deflect undue donor influence, ensure 
independence from central line ministries and help push through important policy initiatives, which in 
turn could help establish and improve its credibility with the president. For instance, in implementing a 
conditional cash transfer scheme, Bappenas worked with the Ministries of Education and Health to 
ensure that conditions could be met by encouraging them to release sufficient funding for doctors and 
midwives. It has also played a role in coordinating a number of other policy processes, including those 
in relation to the National Poverty Reduction Strategy (NPRS) and the national strategy for Reduced 
Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD). 
 
However, the re-emergence of Bappenas has led to overlapping responsibilities with the Ministry of 
Finance. Although Bappenas is responsible for annual planning, the annual plan is in effect the annual 
budget—the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance. Moreover, the Ministry of Finance is responsible 
for drawing up a medium-term expenditure framework, with which the annual budget should be 
consistent. At the same time, Bappenas is responsible for drawing up five-year plans, which also have 
to include expenditure targets. It is thus crucial for both agencies to coordinate their work (Booth, 
2005). 
 
In comparison with its role in the economic sphere under Soeharto, in the opinion of a number of 
respondents, Bappenas was slightly weaker. This is arguably reflected in its own analytical capacity, as 
it lacked the resources to, for instance, undertake its ‘flagship’ background study in-house to inform 
the medium-term development plan. And, since Bappenas no longer controls the budget, 
communication channels, particularly with larger line ministries, appear to be weak, with Bappenas 
less likely to be informed or listened to. For instance, ministries have stopped sending them regular 
updates, which represent much-needed planning inputs. 
 
Planning processes undertaken by Bappenas and the Ministry of Finance still tend to be mainly top-
down in nature. For instance, Blondal et al. (2009) suggest that this is the case with the development of 
the RKP. Musrenbang, where stakeholders are supposed to provide feedback to government plans, are 
mainly ceremonial and rarely result in change; if they do, it is usually around the margins. 
 
Bappenas continue to play a key role in coordinating donors and international agencies in Indonesia. 
Although the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI) was disbanded in 2007,10
                                                          
10 See www.indonesiamatters.com/1065/consultative-group-on-indonesia-cgi.  
 a number of working-
level subgroups focusing on particular issues, such as health and education, meet regularly (probably 
monthly) to discuss key policy issues. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) (2010), government officials feel that bilateral donors exercise excessive 
influence during negotiations. Some ministers are uneasy with this, with one respondent suggesting 
that the previous Health Minister (and now on Wantimpres) was particularly hostile. Strong leadership 
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from within the GoI was thus seen as necessary to keep donors (each with differing missions) in line 
with government priorities. 
 
The few white and green papers that have been written seem to have been influenced heavily by 
donors. The 2003 White Paper was inspired by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—its launch 
perhaps incentivised by the IMF’s impending departure. The development of a green paper on climate 
change was said by one respondent to be influenced in part by, or at least supported by, the Australian 
government. And Booth (2005) argues that the NPRS, drafted in 2004 and informed by accumulated 
knowledge, was in part a response to pressures from international donors for greater detail on the 
specifics of the GoI’s poverty reduction strategy. 
 
Coordination among line ministries 
Several programmes require cross-ministry coordination. Sponsoring ministries often specify inputs 
required by others. For example, the Ministry of Agriculture—the sponsoring ministry in increasing rice 
production—has mapped out the assistance it requires from a number of ministries, including the 
Ministry of Public Works to develop irrigation facilities and dams and the Ministry of Industry to 
increase fertiliser supply. However, securing cooperation from other ministries seems challenging. 
Coordinating ministries, whose responsibility is to provide ministries with strong directives, are now 
poorly funded and therefore forced to rely on small staff and limited resources. In practice, the 
authority of coordinating ministers depends largely on their relationships with the president and the 
support he gives them. Without the personal authority of the president or clear lines of authority over 
the ministries they are charged with coordinating, their influence is often seen to be limited (Blondal et 
al., 2009; CastleAsia, 2010). 
 
Coordination problems mean inter-ministerial consultation processes (to, for instance, draw up 
government regulations), as well as implementation processes, usually experience significant delays. 
Examples of the former include the civil service pension reform, where the Ministry of Finance led three 
other ministries: Labour and Transmigration; Social Affairs; and the Coordinating Ministry. However, 
respondents suggested that there had been little progress on the issue. While there is a technical 
working group to undertake the analytical work, getting key findings and results elevated to the 
political level in that environment has proved challenging. An example of the latter is the aftermath of 
the 2009 Padang earthquake, a situation which was beset by poor management, as multiple agencies 
with overlapping mandates and responsibilities competed for visibility and attention. Figure 6, taken 
from a slide from a presentation on UKP-PPP’s achievement and challenges and not relating to any 
particular issue or sector, highlights some of the generic challenges in coordinating ministries. 
 
Figure 6: The challenges of coordination 
Source: UKP-PPP (2011). 
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While low civil servant salaries mean that there are still strong incentives to attract and thus compete 
for larger shares of the development budget, Downs (1965:444-445) suggests in a theory of bureaucracy 
that such behaviour is not necessarily surprising, as ministries and agencies (or bureaus, as he calls 
them) generally attempt to, 
 
[…] stake out, defend, and expand a certain ‘territory’ of policy related to its social functions. Because of 
numerous technical interdependencies with other bureaus, the boundaries of each bureau’s territory are 
both unstable and ambiguous. Hence, it is continually struggling with other bureaus and non-bureau social 
agents to establish its sovereignty in certain overlapping policy areas. Although such struggles often 
appear to be irrational manifestations of petty pride and jealousy, they may be highly rational attempts by 
the bureau to protect itself from excessive instability in its environment caused by uncoordinated 
decisions made by other agents. 
 
According to respondents, the desire to defend and expand bureaucratic territory was a characteristic 
often seen within the GoI and among line ministries. For example, the former minister for health was 
said to have made a number of efforts to expand the ministry’s territory. She successfully demanded 
that the health module from the Susenus (Census) be undertaken by the ministry and took carriage of 
the health insurance programme for the poor (from another ministry). In another example, one 
respondent suggested that the Ministry of Agriculture was often unable to take decisions on certain 
matters, as decision-making power had been usurped by other institutions, such as the Coordinating 
Ministry of the Economy (the minister for which currently has a good relationship with the president) 
and the Ministry of Trade. Hence, weaker ministries were seen to have their decision-making powers 
taken away from them by more powerful ministries with overlapping mandates. 
 
The competition over territory and, importantly, resources seems to encourage ministries to create new 
and reshape existing priorities. For instance, the Ministry of National Education has made significant 
progress towards halving illiteracy from 14 to 7 million people, with current levels at 8.3 million people. 
The budget for the Directorate-general for Non-formal and Informal Education is subsequently 
decreasing, as the target has almost been achieved. Thus, new priorities (which may or may not have 
been informed by knowledge) such as information technology literacy have emerged to draw in 
resources and maintain the ministry’s share of the (development) budget. 
 
Difficulties in securing cooperation among ministries are exacerbated by ministers often being 
affiliated to rival political parties. For instance, cooperation between the Ministry of National Education 
and the Ministry of Religious Affairs is vital, given their overlapping mandates. However, their ministries 
are affiliated to rival parties, have different governance arrangements (one is centralised and the other 
decentralised), differ in their ethos and approach and are often in competition for the same funds. 
 
Regarding national planning and budgeting, intense competition for the development budget 
(discretionary funding) means that the Ministry of Finance, in control of the budget (and usually close 
to the president), is responsible for assessing competing claims, whose authority carry substantial 
weight. In other cases, officials look either to the president or to someone with a presidential mandate 
to provide leadership. However, as we have discussed, such individuals are not always listened to. 
 
Relations between central and district levels of government 
Large-scale decentralisation has given considerable power and resources to districts in many important 
areas of policy. Central government capacity has weakened to varying extents, with 35% of the APBN 
and 3 million civil servants transferred from central to local authority (World Bank, 2009a). Regional 
politicians are unlikely to cooperate with the centre in implementing reforms unless they see a direct 
personal benefit (Booth, 2005). As such, line ministries now have to negotiate and bargain with local 
governments in the design and implementation of new programmes. On paper, at least, some 
respondents argued that ministries (for example Education) needed to focus more on national policy, 
standards/regulations and evaluation and less on implementation. But many line ministries were said 
to be struggling to come to terms with their new role as ‘facilitators’. Some officials (particularly those 
in Bappenas and line ministries) have refused to accept their powers to plan and implement projects 
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have been severely curtailed (Booth, 2005)—some ministers want to ‘preside over bigger empires, to 
have more spending decisions and to have more procurement’ (author interview, May 2011). Box 4 
describes how the Ministry of Finance was caught up in a dispute with a regional administration over 
the purchase of shares in a gold mine. 
 
Box 4: Ministry of Finance versus regional administrations 
Under its mandatory divestment, PT. Newmont Nusa Tenggara (NNT), part of Newmont Mining Corp—the world's 
largest gold producer—had to divest 31% of its shares to the government or appointed companies. Twenty-four 
percent of the shares were acquired by the administrations of West Sumbawa and Sumbawa regencies and West 
Nusa Tenggara province in 2009, fully funded by their joint venture partner PT. Multicapital, a business unit of the 
mining giant Bumi Resources. Bumi Resources is part of the Bakrie Business Group led by Aburizal Bakrie, who is 
also the chair of Partai Golkar. The government decided to purchase the final 7% through the Government 
Investment Unit (Pusat Investasi Pemerintah, or PIP), with the finance minister and the PIP concluding a sales and 
purchase agreement with NNT for the stake, worth $246.8 million, in May 2011. 
 
However, the DPR deemed this unlawful because the PIP funds were earmarked for infrastructure investment, yet 
the Ministry of Finance did not ask the DPR for approval of the acquisition. DPR members, notably those of Partai 
Golkar, recommended that the stake be acquired by West Nusa Tenggara’s local administration backed by a joint 
venture with Multicapital. With the Ministry of Finance refusing to shift its position, and despite regional 
administrations depending on grants from the central government for more than 80% of their budget, they filed a 
lawsuit against the Ministry of Finance, invoking the regional autonomy law as the legal foundation for their fight 
for the gold mine’s shares. Regional administrations sponsored street demonstrations and even threatened to 
close down NNT’s $3.8 billion copper and gold mine unless they were given the right to acquire the stake. 
 
Commission XI on Financial Affairs and Commission VII on Energy and Mineral Resources Affairs reinforced their 
opposition of the Ministry of Finance’s purchase of Newmont shares, saying that they would ask the Audit Board 
of Indonesia (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan, or BPK) to conduct an investigative audit on the government’s 
purchase; consult the president; and oppose the Newmont shares purchase using the APBN. Minister for Finance 
Agus Martowardoyo threatened to resign if DPR members continued to oppose the government’s acquisition of 
the shares. At the time of writing, the transaction was still in limbo and the Minister for Energy and Mineral 
Resources had not approved the deal, as required by mining and investment laws. Despite apparently 
considerable power asymmetry between the finance minister and a regional administration, decision-making was 
far from straightforward.11
 
  
Nevertheless, according to several respondents, the central government still plays a significant role in 
sectors that have been decentralised. For instance, after a local parliament signed a draft bill on the 
Special Status of Aceh and passed it, the Ministry of Home Affairs proceeded to erase most of the 
important articles, such as those on the authority of the local government, independent candidates for 
the local election and a human rights court before bringing it before the parliament for debate. Lay 
(2010) suggests that senior government officials remained suspicious of secessionist movements, in 
particular the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, or GAM), and felt that the bill would 
provide GAM with further legitimacy. And as the central government was still responsible for disbursing 
autonomy funds, many local governments were known to maintain cordial relationships with them. 
Many continued to respect directives from the centre in the shape of presidential instructions while, in 
many cases, elements of the autonomy grants were earmarked, in practice, if not in name. 
 
4.4 Decision-making within ministries 
 
Ministers 
Having discussed the role of ministers in relation to the cabinet, we turn to their role in making policy at 
the ministry level. Ministers were said to be concerned with setting strategic policy goals and with 
taking key decisions. Their influence over the structure of the institution as well as the composition of 
                                                          
11 www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/06/12/the-week-review-the-bashing-contractors.html, www. 
reuters.com/article/2011/06/21/indonesia-newmont-idUSL3E7HL0UJ20110621, and http://www.thejakartapost.com/ 
news/2011/06/21/agus%E2%80%99-relations-with-legislators-stake-over-newmont-share.html. 
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staff appears considerable. For instance, the minister for finance, at the time of writing, upon taking 
office replaced his entire senior management team—reappointing nine of his directors-general (which 
took six months). But, in another case, a minister, wanting to promote continuity (and highlighting the 
strategic nature of minister–director-general relationships), relaxed the policy of rotation to maintain a 
good working relationship with a certain director-general. 
 
Ministers are expected to formulate policy and provide directives to echelon one-level bureaucrats 
(deputy-ministers, directors-general and executive secretaries) to implement policy. However, despite 
the concentric and hierarchical nature of the bureaucracy, as policy-making has become more 
complicated and wide-ranging (for instance in light of economic, political and social processes of 
globalisation, regional integration, decentralisation and urbanisation), and particularly in cases where 
ministers have limited technical expertise, ministers have increasingly come to provide more normative 
high-level goals (perhaps reiterating presidential directives) and, as such, have delegated 
responsibility for more practical policy formulation to directors-general and, more recently (since their 
emergence), to deputy-ministers. 
 
Deputy-ministers 
Perhaps recognising that some ministers had limited technical expertise, often had a wide portfolio 
and were faced with different incentives to non-elected officials, the president increased the number of 
deputy-ministers from one (initially in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) to ten by January 2010. 
Appointments were made based on the weight of the ministry’s duties. All deputy-ministers are 
‘professionals’ or ‘career officials’—reflecting SBY’s intention to strengthen his cabinet—many of whom 
are politicians from his coalition parties.12
 
 Deputy-ministers are mandated to help the minister deliver 
on ‘their contract to the president’ (author interview, May 2011). 
Deputy-ministers do not have authority over directors-general (a couple of respondents suggested that 
this might be frustrating for some), unless the minister asks him/her to lead on specific issues, in 
which case directors-general report to the deputy-minister. Making the appointment of a deputy-
minister a rule rather than an exception required changes to bureaucratic structures. According to one 
respondent, the Cabinet Secretary and the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform (Kempan 
& RB) were still to provide clarity on how this relatively new position fits within the existing structure. As 
such, it seems that deputy-ministers do not have their own staff to provide day-to-day as well as 
analytical support (and, importantly, associated budget). When they require analysis, they have to seek 
assistance from staff who report to others, which, in a ‘tall’ hierarchy, was seen by one respondent to 
be fairly challenging, or to external actors such as universities, research centres and 
donors/international agencies. 
 
Directors-general 
Despite the power vested in ministers, the overwhelming consensus among respondents was that 
directors-general were key decision-shapers. Prior to the appointment of the deputy-minister, they were 
among the most senior bureaucrats in the civil service. As a result, they were responsible for policy 
implementation, controlled operational budgets and were more likely to draw on knowledge in advising 
the minister and to shape ministerial priorities. The Health Operational Assistance (Bantuan 
Operasional Kesehatan, or BOK) fund, giving supplementary funding to health centres, for instance, 
was inspired by a director-general, who was in turn influenced by studies undertaken by national 
universities showing that health outcomes had not improved in line with economic growth after the 
global financial crisis starting in 2008. Another director-general in the Ministry of Agriculture was 
apparently responsible for designing a food security project to promote enhanced agribusiness (which 
came under the banner of the National Program for Community Empowerment (Program Nasional 
Pemberdayaan Masyarakat, or PNPM)). 
 
                                                          
12 www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/indonesias-new-deputy-ministers-told-to-avoid-rivalries/341133. 
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The importance of directors-general is illustrated in them being summoned along with ministers to 
respond to questions during hearings conducted by parliamentary commissions, particularly during 
budget review processes. An exception to this appears to be in the Ministry of Finance where, in 
addition to directors-general, echelon-two and even echelon-three staff are often summoned. Further 
illustrating their strategic role, Sherlock (2010a) argues that, if ministers draft proposals without 
consulting (or receiving support from) senior officials (such as directors-general), the latter could go as 
far as obstructing (albeit covertly) the minister’s initiative. 
 
Below directors-general are directors who, according to a couple of respondents, are responsible for 
translating policy goals into specific projects. One respondent suggested that directors had some 
scope in selecting their own staff but, given the rigid hierarchies, convincing other bosses to release 
key staff was challenging. Echelon-three bureaucrats seem to be concerned mainly with how to carry 
out particular projects. 
 
Communication within and across divisions 
Although directors-general play an important role in generating policy ideas, they still require approval 
from the minister, with one respondent saying, ‘I had never met an echelon one who had actually made 
a decision.’ However, acquiring approval is not always straightforward, as the same respondent went 
on to say: ‘It isn’t feasible for a subordinate to call up his senior to ask for sign-off [...] You have to wait 
until he/she calls you for something and then have a list of other things you were waiting to ask him 
for’ (author interview, May 2011). As such, according to one respondent, ‘selling ideas’ (to use a market 
metaphor) to those higher up or convincing them to act or think in a certain way could be challenging. 
 
Several respondents suggested that the institutional setup often restricted the flow of information 
within the bureaucracy to top-down lines of control, inhibiting more horizontal forms of 
communication. For instance, a couple of respondents suggested that poor communication across 
divisions was evident within Bappenas, as well as the Indonesian National Board for Disaster 
Management (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana, or BNPB). Further, within the Ministry of 
Finance’s BKF, weak horizontal communication has resulted in the Fiscal Policy Unit not receiving 
much-needed assumptions with which to formulate the national budget each year from the 
Macroeconomic Forecasting and Analysis Unit. As such, it has created its own, effectively making the 
work of the forecasting unit redundant (see Box 7 for more details about this and the BKF). 
 
A number of respondents suggested that, when bureaucrats did interact with one another formally (for 
planning and budgeting purposes, for instance), meetings were often held with a very large number of 
representatives, leaving little space for real debate and discussion. Moreover, an unwillingness to be 
associated with particular positions, at least formally or openly, means that participants tend to avoid 
criticism of previous or existing policy initiatives which, as one respondent suggested, limits the extent 
of innovation and change. Time pressures mean most officials tend to protect their area in the short 
time they have to input. 
 
One respondent described budgeting processes in the Ministry of National Education, where the 
Planning Bureau organised a workshop to help translate annual work plans into planned expenditures 
(within stated expenditure ceilings). Coordinated by the executive secretary (also echelon one), this 
aimed to allocate funding among the  directorates-general. Several reviews and meetings later, the 
ministerial team reached a consensus. But ‘muddling through’ was seen as ‘tiring’, with seven or eight 
iterations required to adjust to demands from various actors within and outside the ministry (including 
those from the president) before agreement was finally reached. Any analysis on risk and risk 
management was said to be ineffectual given the almost political nature of decision-making (author 
interview, May 2011). 
 
Some government institutions appear to be taking steps to address some of these challenges. For 
instance, BNPB has decided to embed 15 staff to build links between divisions, while Bappenas has 
made efforts to strengthen horizontal learning mechanisms. Moreover, some ministries have made 
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attempts to embrace plurality in decision-making. For example, a few respondents suggested that 
directors were often invited to meet with directors-general, and even the minister in the Ministry of 
National Education. But even if processes appear to be more consultative, directors are not necessarily 
brought in at a point where their contribution is meaningful. 
 
4.5 Summary  
 
Using some of the features of the New Order identified in Section 3 as an entry point, we have explored 
policy-making dynamics within the executive arm of the government. Some notable points include the 
following: 
 
1 The president, directly elected by the people since 2004, is seen as the country’s most powerful 
policy-maker, with the capacity to block the progress of legislation and considerable discretion 
in the formulation of implementation guidelines. The vice-president, elected on the same ticket 
as the president, no longer holds merely a ceremonial position, and his/her instructions can 
carry considerable weight. 
2 Coalition politics have meant that appointment to ministerial posts is often informed by 
discussions between the president and the leaders of a number of political parties. But 
appointments to ministries considered economic, such as Bappenas and the Ministries of 
Finance, Trade and Public Works, typically continue to benefit from meritocratic appointments, 
suggesting a continued focus on economic policy. But technocrats, especially those without 
political backing, seem to face higher levels of contestation than they did under Soeharto’s 
New Order.  
3 Policy-makers, especially those who are elected, are under considerable pressure from various 
quarters, especially from the media and the public (through television stations, the written 
press and social networking sites), to deliver development results. 
4 Given the country’s status as a middle-income country, policy-makers are also under pressure 
to prepare for and perform on the international stage in forums such as the G-20 and the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and to meet global targets such as the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
5 The Ministry of Finance stands out as the most powerful ministry, with its role of managing the 
economy and controlling the budget. As such, it is responsible for assessing competing claims 
from ministries and agencies for resources. Although Bappenas is responsible for long-term, 
medium-term and annual planning, it lacks the power (and resources) to do so adequately. 
Moreover, overlapping planning functions have meant that both institutions need to work 
closely together. 
6 With power diffused across the government (within the cabinet, between ministries and 
between the central and sub-national governments), decision-making tends to be protracted. 
As a result, the Offices of the President and Vice-president have established an array of 
commissions and taskforces to champion reform on pressing issues, particularly those which 
have experienced bottlenecks. 
7 Within ministries, deputy-ministers and directors-general are key actors in shaping the 
decisions of ministers. Siloisation has meant limited communication across divisions, although 
steps are being taken in some cases to address this. 
8 Performance of senior-ranked officials is to varying extents often determined by their own 
personal and professional ethics, but they seem to lack training in leadership and 
management. 
 
Given its rising influence, the following section explores policy-making dynamics in the DPR. 
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5. Political parties and the parliament 
 
In the Reformasi period, policy-making was more subject to political bargaining within a multiparty 
system, which has arguably made policy-making more explicitly political rather than technocratic 
(McCarthy and Ibrahim, 2010). In this section, we take a deeper look at these assumptions, examining 
the institutional features on the legislative side of the government, with a focus on (i) political parties, 
(ii) the influence of the DPR, (iii) the role of parliamentary commissions and (iv) the link between 
political parties and DPR members. 
 
5.1 Political parties 
 
Since the fall of Soeharto, there has been a proliferation of new parties in Indonesia. However, Tomsa 
(2010) argues that, paradoxically, while the party system in Indonesia has apparently become stronger, 
most of the core parties that constitute the system have become weaker. Pointing towards a 
strengthening of the party system as a whole, the five largest parties in the 1999 parliament are still 
represented in 2009, despite the introduction of a parliamentary threshold and the emergence of new 
parties. Such party longevity is rare in most East Asian democracies: parties in South Korea, Thailand 
and the Philippines have often disappeared after one or two elections. Despite criticism that coalition 
politics have promoted complicity among parties, many view Indonesian party politics as highly 
competitive, with election results often contested hotly by one party or another. And, finally, in spite of 
a continuous decline since 1999, voters’ participation in elections in Indonesia has remained fairly high 
by international standards, suggesting generally strong support for the overall system among the 
broader populace and a normalisation of the democratic system since changes were made to the 
system following the fall of Soeharto. 
 
However, the share of the vote secured by the five largest parties in the 1999 parliament has declined 
in every election since, suggesting a weakening of individual parties as well as declining ability of 
parties to fulfil their key functions.13
 
 Although reasons for this weakening vary from party to party, 
Tomsa (2010) suggests a number of common explanatory variables. First, parties lack organisational 
coherence and programmatic distinctiveness. Although most of the core parties have distinct histories 
and political values (derived from, for instance, long-existing social cleavages—PKB is effectively a 
political arm of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and PAN has close ties with Muhammadiyah), as well as 
favourable starting conditions (PDI-P, PKB and PAN inherited old party networks from the New Order 
and previous regimes), they are beset by internal problems such as factionalism and ineffective 
leadership, and are unable to sharpen their programmatic profiles. Their core values have also become 
diluted over the years, owing in part to the inclusion of nearly all the main parties in the various multi-
party coalition cabinets since 1999. In the run-up to the 2009 elections, for instance, campaign 
strategists found it difficult to position their parties against their competitors, as all except PDI-P were 
represented in SBY’s first United Indonesia Cabinet. As a consequence, the majority of parties during 
the 2009 election campaign were almost indistinguishable in terms of their promises to voters. 
Second, in line with this decline in parties as programmatic platforms, Indonesian politics has become 
increasingly (but not entirely) personalised, especially with the introduction of direct presidential 
elections in 2004 and the subsequent extension of direct elections to governors, mayors and district 
heads in the following year (Mujani and Liddle, 2007). PD illustrates that it is possible to create a party 
from scratch without paying much attention to organisational structures or political ideas. From the 
beginning, the party’s identity has been tied closely to the presidential ambitions of SBY. PD’s gains in 
2009 were a reflection more of the president’s popularity than of the performance of the party. Inspired 
                                                          
13 Carothers (2006:9) suggests that, formally, political parties have a number of key functions: (i) representing citizens’ 
interests to the state (interest articulation and aggregation); (ii) presenting policy choices and platforms; (iii) engaging and 
involving citizens in democratic participation; (iv) forming government and opposition; and (v) managing conflicts among 
groups in society and between society and the state. 
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by PD’s success, two former generals founded their own parties—Partai Hanura and Partai Gerindra. 
Despite major financial investments, they have not been able to emulate PD’s achievements. But the 
fact that the two parties have been able to pass the electoral threshold seems to confirm this trend. 
 
This in turn seems to be linked to the growing importance of political consultancies and the mass 
media, especially television. Polling companies and professional political consultants who hone the 
image of nominees have become ubiquitous in all national and local elections. They are seen as crucial 
actors in shaping the opinions and perceptions of voters, who, exposed to a continuous stream of 
broadcasts, are said to base their political choices purely on the media image of candidates over any 
concern of policy issues (Mietzner, 2009a; Qodari, 2010). 
 
Political consultants, some of whom are recruited from abroad, communicate their messages through 
thousands of political advertisements in the media. In the first quarter of 2009 alone, the media 
research institute ACNielsen documented more than 20,000 party advertisements spread over 19 
different television channels. More than half of these were for PD and Partai Golkar, with Partai 
Gerindra also spending a considerable sum. According to ACNielsen estimates, in that period Partai 
Golkar spent $18.5 million and PD $12.3 million. Partai Gerindra spent $6.6 million on advertisements 
in print and electronic media outlets (Tomsa, 2010). 
 
Finally, unable to raise funds through regular means, parties often engage in illicit fundraising activities 
(often within the bureaucracy), such as extracting rents from contracts and procurement processes, in 
order to supplement party funds and improve their financial situation (Mietzner, 2009a). Closely 
related to this is the commercialisation of electoral politics, linked to the introduction of direct 
elections and the personalisation of politics described above. The need to mobilise huge amounts of 
money in order to run for parliament has diverted parties’ attention further away from policy solutions 
towards attracting support from private entrepreneurs. For example, in the race for governorship in 
Jakarta, it is necessary to spend at least $20 million to secure nomination as an official candidate 
(Ufen, 2006). And this does not include campaign costs, which could include paying polling 
companies, which often charge their clients billions of rupiah. However, party membership fees are 
negligible, as is public funding for political parties. The need for such large investments has in recent 
years resulted in businesspeople, such as Yusuf Kalla (Partai Golkar) and Sutrisno Bachir (PAN), taking 
up posts as party heads, while financiers like billionaire Aburizal Bakrie have been rewarded with 
ministerial positions. Regulations on party financing exist, but violations are hardly ever punished 
(Hadiwinata, 2006:106). Politicians have to pay back ‘loans’ in some shape or form, with some often 
feeling compelled to provide special favours to their supporters. 
 
Transparency International Indonesia lists various manifestations of corruption, including the bribery of 
DPR members who plan to scrutinise entrepreneurs on their activities, members of parliament (MPs) 
acting as brokers to help private companies get government contracts and financial rewards from 
public officers in ‘fit and proper tests’ before the parliament (Ufen, 2006). Respondents suggested that 
corporate interests were influential in a number of policy areas, including fuel subsidies and rice 
distribution. A substantial amount of subsidised fuel is consumed by high wealth individuals as well as 
illicitly by industrial sources that stand to lose out if subsidies are reduced (IISD, 2011). Despite fuel 
subsidies consuming a substantial share of the government budget, wealthy individuals and industrial 
interests are said to be exerting considerable pressure on officials from both the executive and the 
legislature to limit reform. Furthermore, the Rice for the Poor programme, brought in after the AFC, is 
now deemed unnecessary and to consume considerable government funding. However, top officials are 
again said to be under pressure by predatory business interests such as rice importers and suppliers. 
In sum, the role of corporate interests seems to compromise parties’ ability to function as a genuine 
platform for political debate and reform.14
 
 
                                                          
14 However, since the establishment of the KPK, some officials, both elected and unelected, who have misused authority and 
resources have been brought to justice and found guilty. 
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Despite the pervasive nature of ‘money politics’, not all politicians are necessarily under the influence 
of corporate interests, and thus not all pursue the same political strategies. Rosser et al. (2011a) 
suggest that, at the district level, district heads’ choices about what strategy to pursue are dependent 
more on incentives created by their personal networks, alliances and constituencies and less on their 
political ambition and administrative or technical skills. They go on to say that, where district heads 
rely on the backing of predatory interests such as business groups, the military and criminal gangs, 
they have a strong incentive to pursue strategies of patronage distribution, because such groups 
expect something in return for their support and typically have the capacity to retaliate effectively if 
they do not get what they expected. 
 
But where district heads are relatively autonomous of predatory interests, they have an incentive to 
incorporate ‘political entrepreneurship’ into their strategies. This could help them generate the popular 
support needed to get re-elected, gain promotion or promote their political careers, or bolster their 
position with regard to the local parliament and political parties by enhancing their popularity to an 
extent that the latter do not challenge them for fear of alienating the voting public (Rosser, 2011b:12). 
This dynamic may well apply to politicians at the national level. 
 
Nevertheless, despite the apparent weakening of political parties, they have generally sought largely 
non-violent means to express their views within the party system. Unlike during the presidencies of 
Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid, when parties tried to settle conflicts by mobilising their supporters 
at the grassroots level, political leaders today mostly resort to negotiations, power-sharing and 
peaceful dispute resolution in democratic institutions such as the DPR (Aspinall and Mietzner, 2010), to 
which we now turn our attention. 
 
5.2 Influence of the DPR 
 
As a result of constitutional reforms carried out between 1999 and 2002, the DPR has gone from having 
limited powers and mainly giving consent to laws drafted by the executive to being named explicitly as 
Indonesia’s law-making institution, shifting power away from the executive towards the legislature. 
Further, with the introduction of an open-list electoral system in the 2009 elections (increasing 
accountability to local constituents and shaping their electoral incentives15
 
) and the media (both 
serious and light) increasingly shining the spotlight on DPR members, they are under increasing 
pressure to hold the government to account, address public concerns, build strong local profiles in 
their districts and respond to constituency demands for improvements to local infrastructure and 
services. 
The DPR’s most significant role is probably its participation in the newly consultative budget process 
(outlined in Section 2). Under Soeharto, the parliament was called only to formally approve the budget 
presented by the executive. However, now parliamentary engagement takes place formally at all stages 
of the budget process, with MPs able to hold the executive to account. One MP interviewed suggested 
that, on occasion, the Budget Committee had questioned allocations (or non-allocations) to certain 
programmes and asked why certain programmes that had not been discussed during committee 
meetings had been included in the budget statement. In terms of addressing local concerns, one senior 
official (within the executive) suggested that, during budgetary discussions, certain commission 
members would insist, for example, that schools be built in their particular constituency. Moreover, one 
MP stated that he would often address concerns from regional governments that were unhappy with 
their share of budget resources by lobbying the Budget Committee. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15 Until recently, party leaders selected individuals who would fill the party’s seats in the parliament, thus rendering 
parliamentarians more accountable to their party chairs than to the constituents they are supposed to represent. 
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Box 5: The enquiry into the Bank Century bailout 
In 2008, the government took over Bank Century at the height of the global financial crisis, arguing that the fall of 
the bank at such a sensitive time could precipitate the collapse of the whole banking system. The DPR’s 
Commission XI on Finance and Banking subsequently endorsed a government decision to inject Rp1.3 trillion into 
the bank, but by mid-2009 this had risen to Rp6.8 trillion. In August 2009, at a meeting attended by Finance 
Minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati, Commission XI members questioned the government’s handling of the case. Bank 
Indonesia was criticised for its failure to detect certain transactions carried out by Bank Century, offences that 
had led to one of the bank’s owners being sentenced to four years’ imprisonment. These criticisms were notable 
in that they involved not only SBY’s newly elected vice-president, former Bank Indonesia Governor Boediono, but 
also one of his key cabinet members, Sri Mulyani Indrawati. The attacks on Boediono and Sri Mullyani were 
supported by all major parties in the DPR, except SBY’s own PD. 
 
The DPR stepped up its efforts to investigate the case in September 2009, when Commission XI asked the BPK to 
carry out an audit of the funds used to prop up Bank Century. During the course of this, the chair of BPK, Anwar 
Nasution, reported that Sri Mulyani had expressed doubts about the quality of the data gathered by Bank 
Indonesia when monitoring Bank Century transactions. Sri Mulyani accused the Partai Golkar chair, Aburizal 
Bakrie, of instigating the investigations because some of her decisions as minister had disadvantaged his 
companies. Other analysts suspected some coalition parties of eyeing Boediono and Sri Mulyani’s posts. 
Nevertheless, Commission XI’s activities succeeded in focusing public attention on the problems in the 
government’s oversight of the banking system, particularly the apparent failings in the operations of Bank 
Indonesia. 
 
Although the vast majority of bills are drafted by executive agencies, MPs, in response to local 
concerns, are drafting increasing amounts of legislation, particularly on social issues such as 
education and health. Public hearings convened by DPR commissions are sometimes broadcast live on 
television and help to put the spotlight on the activities of the government or specific individuals. For 
instance, a special committee was set up to pursue the mudflow disaster in Sidoarjo, East Java, which 
was said to be caused primarily by the activities of a company owned by Partai Golkar-affiliated 
minister and tycoon Aburizal Bakrie. Sensitivity to public concerns was illustrated by the DPR’s 
involvement in the case of Prita Mulyasari, who was sued for defamation and subsequently imprisoned 
and fined for complaining about the quality of health care she received from a private hospital.16
 
 And 
parliamentary oversight of the government was epitomised in the parliamentary investigation into the 
government bailout of the insolvent Bank Century in November 2008 (see Box 5) (Sherlock, 2010b). 
Although the extent to which the government has been forced to make substantive changes in 
response to DPR pressure is unclear, there are some anecdotal examples. For instance, the government 
was forced to back down and withdraw from the Defence Cooperation Agreement with Singapore after 
strong DPR pressure. Further, the parliament (together with the media and NGOs) has been influential 
in inspiring a national programme on ‘character education’ to improve the morals and values of the 
general public (see Box 6). During the budget process, individual commissions whose concerns have 
not been addressed have been known to hold back budgetary disbursements until they have, even 
when the budget has been formally approved. As a result—even with a two-month period to finalise the 
details—budget disbursements on occasion have not been authorised until several months into the 
next fiscal year. In 2007, for example, about 45% of all expenditures were delayed (Blondal et al., 
2009). 
 
However, in terms of representing voters, some MPs are hampered in addressing local concerns, given 
Indonesia’s geography as the world’s largest archipelago. Most MPs interviewed in Lay (2010) admitted 
that travelling to local areas to meet constituents and local activities was challenging. Many MPs have 
vast areas to cover. For instance, three MPs are mandated to serve Papua province, but are not 
provided with adequate resources (such as transport allowances) to address this. Moreover, MPs are 
faced with discussing an excessive number of laws, which few have the capacity to undertake. As one 
MP said, ‘Our tasks in the parliament are so many, making it impossible for MPs to engage adequately 
with specific issues.’ 
 
                                                          
16 www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/facebook/8630662/Indonesia-court-overturns-Facebook-womans-acquittal.html. 
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Box 6: The formulation and implementation of a strategy on character education 
In response to corruption, fighting among students and protests resulting from land disputes, among other 
things, the parliament, together with the media and NGOs, pressured the government to develop a national 
programme on character-building to improve the integrity, morals and values of the general public. A national 
strategy for character building was subsequently designed, led by the Ministry of Social Welfare, which was 
assigned the role of coordinating ministry. The strategy was informed by a special team of experts from 
universities and CSOs. Since there were sufficient laws to instigate the programme, the coordinating minister 
endorsed the programme by issuing a government decree. It was then the responsibility of the Ministry of 
National Education and the Ministry of Religious Affairs to take the lead. The Minister for National Education 
issued a call to draw up a ‘grand design for character education’. 
 
Within the Ministry of National Education, the Balitbang evaluated existing initiatives, understanding their 
strengths and weaknesses by, for instance, consulting teachers at the district level. A programme strategy was 
subsequently drafted, with a focus on awareness-raising, curriculum development and teacher training. A 
national seminar was conducted with around 400 key stakeholders, including a plenary and breakout session. 
Similar seminars were held in large cities and regions. The revised strategy was approved by the minister. 
Different directorates-general supported by the Balitbang produced information, education, and communication 
materials such as manuals, training modules and video tapes. Guidelines were drawn up for school-based 
character education. There is also a block grant for local governments, enabling them to implement innovative 
initiatives to improve character education in their schools. 
 
Moreover, schools have been invited to showcase good practice by capturing video footage and hosting an 
annual national event. The aim of the programme is to reach out to 3.4 million teachers in 268,000 schools 
across 500 districts and municipalities. But it started with a pilot in 125 schools in 16 districts and by May 2011, 
the Ministry of National Education had trained 1,200 teachers in Jakarta, who were in turn to be responsible for 
training province-based trainers. Decentralisation meant that implementation was very challenging. The ministry 
had to convince district executives that the programme was worth investing in and identify ‘champions’ at the 
local level to spearhead activities. After a year of implementation, it was unclear how successful the programme 
had been. 
 
The growing assertiveness of the legislature has given way to discourse, suggesting that the parliament 
has become too powerful in relation to the executive branch. For instance, MPs are often seen as 
potential veto players, helping to water down, delay or block supposedly ‘good legislation’ drafted by 
executive agencies. Under the glare of the media, the general public and their political party, legislators 
are often seen to sacrifice constructive engagement for a more adversarial relationship with officials 
from the executive. For instance, one respondent suggested that a certain piece of legislation was 
turned ‘upside down’ (several of the clauses were altered with little regard to the problem the law was 
initially intending to address). This seemed to be the case with the Dana Alokasi Khusus (DAK)—a 
special allocation fund—and, in particular, the formula that would determine allocative decisions, 
which was initially prepared by the Directorate-general for Fiscal Balance within the Ministry of Finance 
but faced opposition from DPR members; it was eventually altered considerably (author interview, May 
2011). 
 
However, as mentioned briefly in the previous section, the executive branch has effective veto power 
over all legislation, as the provision for joint agreement to legislation means the president can delay 
the passage of the bills initiated by the DPR simply by not naming a minister to participate in 
discussions between its representatives and the relevant DPR commission. Obstruction of the passage 
of bills or proposed amendments occurs mainly out of public sight, greatly reducing the political risk for 
a president who refuses to pass or delays legislation (Sherlock, 2010b). Moreover, the accommodative 
nature of Reformasi discussed in Section 3 means that members of the executive who were fairly 
prominent under the New Order, such as the military and the police, appear to have retained the power 
to prevent certain laws from being passed. For instance, the military were able to prevent the Military 
Court Bill (which would mean members of the military would be tried in a civilian court for any criminal 
activity) from being passed (Lay, 2010). Thus, despite the post-1998 evolution of the parliament from 
being a rubber stamp body to being a more influential institution, the executive retains a considerable 
degree of power. 
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Nevertheless, it appears that the executive is yet to come to terms with the increased power of the 
legislature, increased levels of contestation and protracted decision-making processes. As a result, 
some respondents felt that the government’s approach in engaging with the parliament was not 
sufficiently sophisticated. One respondent in particular suggested that some external actors had a 
more constructive approach to engaging the DPR than did the executive. For instance, looking to bolster 
its constituency in the United Nations (UN), the Iranian ambassador had facilitated exchanges and 
tours among politicians between the two countries. The country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the 
other hand, appeared not to have an engagement strategy on this or other pressing issues. 
 
5.3 Parliamentary commissions 
 
Although there are a number of spaces of the discussion of issues within the DPR, power seems to 
centre in its legislative commissions, rather than in the party-controlled caucuses (Meitzner and 
Aspinall, 2010; Sherlock, 2010b; Sukma, 2010). Top officials from ministries and agencies from the 
executive are said to exercise great care in trying to satisfy the wishes of their respective commission 
(Blondal et al., 2009). Even on budgetary issues, which are formally discussed by the Budget 
Committee (which, one top official suggested, has good relations with representatives of the BKF), key 
decisions tend to be made in commissions, with the Budget Committee usually accepting all advisory 
opinions from commissions, as these are agreed informally before being submitted. One respondent 
suggested that commissions had considerable say in planning and budgeting, which seems to have 
become a process driven more by political rather than technical criteria, with considerable ‘to-ing and 
fro-ing’ between senior officials within the executive and commission members before the budget is 
finalised. 
 
Commissions’ record on consultation, in terms of both number and quality, is mixed, and varies from 
one commission to another. There are examples of inclusive deliberations. For instance, in drafting Law 
No. 27/2009 on the Majelis Permusyaratan Rakyat (MPR), or People's Consultative Assembly, the DPR, 
Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (DPD), or Regional Representatives Council and the Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat Daerah (DPRD), or Regional House of Representatives in 2009, a legal NGO that had often been 
critical of the DPR and its proceedings commended a certain commission for its openness to public 
input and its willingness to experiment with new methods of conducting deliberations (PSHK, 2009, in 
Sherlock, 2010b). The process for debating the Bill on the National Election Commission and on 
Parliament also seemed to be open to the public (Lay, 2010). 
 
There are also examples of commissions being reluctant to undertake open consultations, perhaps 
because of the presence of special interests. For example, the initial draft of the anti-pornography bill 
was compiled without public consultation during the 1999-2004 DPR. The legislation then lay dormant 
for several years in the DPR secretariat before it was revived by a special committee in 2005. 
Deliberations then once again occurred without any public input. After some token consultations with 
regions potentially affected by the bill (such as Bali and Papua), a slightly watered-down version was 
eventually passed in October 2008 (Sherlock, 2010b). Moreover, in the drafting of the Bill on the 
Special Status on Aceh, debates on crucial articles such as the human rights court, the truth and 
reconciliation commission, local political parties, independent candidates for local leaders, Islamic 
law, authority of national and local governments and sharing of revenue, all of which were highly 
contested, were discussed mostly behind closed doors (Lay, 2010). 
 
The patchy record of the DPR in relation to public accountability is also illustrated by the issue of public 
access to documentation on DPR debates. For instance, transcripts of consultations, which could help 
to formalise knowledge inputs, were produced only at the discretion of the commission concerned, for 
the commission’s own internal use, and were not normally accessible by the general public. However, 
one particular motivation for producing transcripts was to defend newly passed laws against a possible 
challenge in the Constitutional Court (Sherlock, 2010b). 
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Despite the seemingly adversarial nature of political engagement alluded to above (particularly in 
formal spaces under the media spotlight), decisions within commissions are generally reached through 
deliberation and consensus-building (and rarely through majority vote). Sherlock (2010b) suggests 
that, during meetings of committees or other DPR organs, each caucus usually presents its views on the 
matter under discussion. If all take the same position, the chair will declare a consensus. If not, the 
caucus leaders withdraw to closed-door ‘lobbying’ meetings until a deal is reached—whereby parties 
are expected to make concessions so that the final product is presented as a result of a genuine 
agreement (mufakat). Decisions are not considered final until there is a unanimous agreement. In 
practice, though, it is assumed that agreement has been reached if no further dissent is expressed. 
These deliberations often take place away from the DPR building in more discreet venues such as 
hotels, resorts and golf courses, channels which often exclude women, who are less likely to 
participate in informal spaces. The leaders usually emerge from these meetings to declare that all 
caucuses are in agreement so that the chair can rule that consensus has been reached (ibid.; Lay, 
2010). 
 
There are both merits and drawbacks to this approach. On the upside, it prevents the adoption of 
partisan and exclusivist policies and laws—an important prerequisite for social stability in an ethnically 
and religiously diverse nation—and provides a means to prevent deadlock in decision-making 
processes in a peaceful way. On the downside, if there is a difference of opinion, minority caucuses 
‘can hold the consensus hostage’ (as one respondent stated) until their issue has been addressed. 
Non-substantive issues can consume huge amounts of time, while discussion of critical policy issues is 
rushed through in order to meet deadlines. 
 
The consensus-based system has effectively made every party caucus a veto player, which has in turn 
created rent-seeking behaviour (see Sherlock, 2010a). One respondent confirmed this by suggesting 
that ‘the government tends to approach things by saying here’s the bill, pass it please. [They] then get 
upset when it’s not passed. [Their] second instinct is to use money to pass it.’ Although the consensus-
based system is not a direct cause of rent-seeking behaviour, it does seem to help facilitate it. 
 
On several occasions, the parliament has struggled to pass coherent legislation, with laws often 
featuring contradictory or deliberately vague stipulations in order to please all those involved in the 
negotiations (Sherlock, 2010a). 
 
Finally, the lack of transparency in decision-making—with parliamentarians on occasion appearing to 
speak out against government policies formally but then appearing to support criticised bills after 
backroom deals—closes the door to the formal participation of CSOs and other non-state actors, giving 
the media further ‘ammunition’ to depict Indonesia’s parliament, whether fairly or not, as 
unaccountable and corrupt (Lay, 2010; Ufen, 2006).17
 
 
The dominance of the commissions in decision-making in the DPR has left plenary sessions with a 
relatively minor role. These are largely ceremonial, and substantive debates during these sessions are 
very rare. The plenary session that begins the second stage of the legislative process, for instance, is 
entirely so: in most cases, the bill will not go to plenary until it is agreed to by all caucuses in the 
committees and by the government. This also applies to the two plenary sessions that follow the 
president’s announcement of the national budget in August each year. Despite the 
ceremonial/procedural value that plenary sessions have, they are the public face of the DPR, with 
media outlets (unfairly) focusing on, for instance, non-attendance of plenary sessions by DPR 
members. As such, when substantive debates do occur, they almost never relate to bills. Instead, 
plenary sessions are a forum for parties or individual members to publicly put pressure on the 
government on issues of current significance. Prominent examples include debates on fuel subsidies, 
the importation of foreign rice and the mudflow disaster in Sidoarjo. 
 
                                                          
17 However, this does not stop non-state actors from influencing MPs through informal linkages (Lay, 2010). 
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Lay (2010) argues that the limited influence of plenary debates, the hugely important role of 
commissions and the informal nature of decision-making have led to a great deal of competition 
among MPs for places on parliamentary commissions. But, although appointment of DPR members to 
commissions probably differs from party to party, a number of respondents suggested that 
appointments tended to lack transparency and were not based on appointees having the requisite 
expertise. 
 
5.4 Political parties and their DPR members 
 
A major effect of the concentration of decision-making power in the commissions has been the 
fragmentation of the DPR. DPR members know what their commission is doing, but often have little 
interest in or knowledge on the issues being considered by other commissions, unless they are 
particularly controversial issues. As such, members of the DPR often identify more strongly with their 
commission members than with their party members, with commission-based solidarity prevailing over 
loyalty to the party or caucus. For instance, when commissions are in dispute with each other over, say, 
the right to take carriage of a particular bill, members of one commission can potentially line up against 
their colleagues from the same party in an opposing commission (Sherlock, 2010b). 
 
Moreover, Sherlock (2010b), along with a number of respondents, argues that dominance of 
commissions over party caucuses means that coalitions in the DPR are far from solid alliances that vote 
strictly either for government or for the opposition, nor have parties been able to substantially 
differentiate themselves from each other (a feature we discussed earlier). While party leaders control 
resources and appointments, they tend to exercise little day-to-day control over ordinary members of 
their caucuses in the DPR (though this varies across political parties). Since policy development is 
relatively weak within most parties, leaders rarely have predetermined views on issues related to 
individual bills, particularly if they entail complex technical detail. One respondent, however, 
suggested that commission members did receive directives to focus on specific issues when assessing 
the annual work plan and budget, with PDI-P asking one of their members on the Budget Committee to 
focus on social safety nets. Nevertheless, committee caucuses rarely have to refer to party leadership 
when expressing opinions with regard to the drafting of legislation. The position adopted by members 
of one committee has even been known to conflict with the position adopted by members of the same 
party in another committee. 
 
Although this lack of consistency and discipline tend to go unnoticed by the public, if the issue under 
discussion is controversial, the pluralism of personal opinions becomes apparent, which appeared to 
be the case during the drafting of the anti-pornography law, where members of the same caucus often 
expressed contradictory opinions during committee meetings. Nevertheless, central party boards are 
largely indifferent to the chaotic pluralism of views within their parliamentary caucuses (Sherlock, 
2010a).18
 
 So, in an interesting twist, lack of party discipline and coordination ensures that legislators 
are more likely to scrutinise government legislation, programmes and budgets critically, even when 
their parties are represented in the cabinet, as most of the major parties are. 
5.5 Summary 
 
We have identified a number of features of decision-making in the DPR: 
 
1 Although the five largest parties in the 1999 parliament were still represented in 2009 and can 
rely on core constituencies to provide them with some support, especially during elections, they 
tend to have low and falling memberships, lack independent funding sources and serve as 
weak platforms for presenting policy choices. 
                                                          
18 Although some MPs have been recalled by their parties, this has been for embarrassing personal behaviour, after an internal 
party split or for switching parties, never because they have failed to toe the party line (Sherlock, 2010a). 
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2 The DPR’s powers have expanded considerably since the fall of Soeharto, with it being named 
explicitly as the country’s law-making institution. However, claims that it is too powerful seem 
unfounded, as the president has a pre-emptive veto, and considerable policy work, including 
detailed implementation guidelines for legislation, resides with the executive. Nevertheless, 
the DPR can still influence the latter, as almost all major parties are represented in the cabinet 
and all party commissions are extremely important (see below). 
3 The personalisation of politics (facilitated by direct elections) coupled with the 
professionalisation of politics (encouraged by the rise of the media and the need to create a 
favourable media image) has dramatically increased the cost of campaigning (and politics 
generally), with politicians under pressure to hire opinion-polling companies and political 
consultants. Politicians’ desire for campaign funding has brought them closer to corporate 
interests which, looking for a quid pro quo, often have considerable influence on decision-
making in the DPR. 
4 DPR members have often sought to expose or exert pressure on individuals, especially top 
officials within the government, particularly during plenary discussions, which tend to be the 
DPR’s ‘public face’. 
5 DPR members are often hampered in their ability to represent their constituents owing to vast 
distances and limited resources to travel. 
6 Power in the DPR is centred in its legislative commissions, rather than in the party-controlled 
caucuses that dominate conventional parliaments, with DPR members often identifying more 
strongly with their commissions than with their parties. 
7 While this has encouraged commissions to scrutinise government activities even when their 
parties are represented in the cabinet, the excessive powers vested in commissions has also 
led to a lack of transparency and accountability, with decisions often made in closed-door 
meetings. 
8 Decision-making in the DPR is generally conducted through deliberation and consensus-
building. All parties are expected to make concessions before agreement can be reached. This 
usually prevents the adoption of partisan and exclusivist laws, but also makes it more difficult 
to pass coherent legislation. 
 
In sum, coalition politics at the national level and greater voice in the political arena (particularly from 
DPR members) have made the task of policy formulation or reaching consensus on critical policies and 
reforms much more challenging (World Bank, 2009a). As one respondent said,  
 
‘You have the legislature sending mixed signals. You have the executive part of the central government 
sending mixed signals because it’s a coalition cabinet, not speaking with one voice, and then local 
officials who might have a completely different agenda. When you have multiple principles, agents can do 
what they want [...]. You’re not going to get much coherence and coordination in policy formulation.’ 
 
The next section explores the capacity of government ministries, departments and agencies to generate 
knowledge as well as their links to external knowledge sources. 
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6. Knowledge production and procurement  
 
In this section, we provide a brief assessment of the analytical capacity within both the executive and 
the legislative arms of the government, describe the effectiveness of the civil service and then suggest 
how and where else policy-makers can turn to in their pursuit of knowledge. 
 
6.1 Analytical capacity within the executive 
 
Although the executive has a number of units generating and procuring knowledge, including research 
and advice, here we limit our analysis to those within ministries, Statistics Indonesia (Badan Pusat 
Statistik, BPS) and LIPI. 
 
Capacity within ministries 
Several respondents suggested that the hierarchical nature of bureaucracies meant that requests for 
information and analysis were often channelled downwards. Generally speaking, if ministers require 
information, they can turn to the Balitbang which resides in each ministry. The head of the Balitbang, 
headed up by an echelon one-ranked bureaucrat, is generally tasked with providing the minister with 
inputs to high-level policy and decision-making processes on a demand-led basis. Within each 
Balitbang, there are usually a number of research centres or institutes. For instance, the Balitbang 
within the Ministry of Agriculture houses the Centre for Social and Economic Studies (which focuses on 
social science issues including issues of poverty) and the Centre for Agricultural Policy Assessment 
(which tends to focus on technical and natural science issues including seed varieties and pest 
control). 
 
Some Balitbang produce regularised data, such as data from cohort studies in the Ministry of National 
Education, which officials find particularly useful during budget processes. Others were said to conduct 
mainly evaluative work.19
 
 For instance, the Centre for Agricultural Policy Assessment in the Ministry of 
Agriculture was set up to assess the effectiveness of the ministry’s policies. A number of respondents 
suggested that some Balitbang had good connections to universities as well as international agencies. 
For instance, the Balitbang in the Ministry of Agriculture has links with the International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI), with which it has done collaborative research. 
However, the capacity of Balitbang varies widely. Most ministers tend to focus on operations at the 
expense of research and analysis, making few demands of the Balitbang. As a result, although a few 
Balitbang have sourced funding from international and donor agencies, budget allocations for 
Balitbang usually amount to a small fraction of the ministry’s overall budget, with the ministry’s 
analytical function tending to suffer (see also Suryadarma et al., 2011). 
 
Moreover, directors-general, together with their staff, who are often responsible for developing policy 
solutions and often require analysis, tend to have very weak links with staff from the Balitbang who 
could provide them with specialist expertise. As elsewhere in the bureaucracy, siloisation seems to be 
a strong feature (see Sherlock, 2010a) and working through the hierarchy seems to appear a 
disincentive. 
 
Suryadarma et al. (2011) also suggest, reflecting the little value management place in the Balitbang, 
that the latter tend to be a unit where low-performing civil servants are located, who tend to receive 
fewer benefits than their counterparts elsewhere in the ministry. Frequent rotation of staff also leads to 
high-quality individuals there moving on quickly and, given weak mechanisms to store knowledge, 
often taking considerable knowledge and contacts with them. Balitbang are subsequently trapped in a 
self-perpetuating cycle of declining capacity, deteriorating standards and falling utilisation. One 
                                                          
19 Some officials may see evaluative work as potentially threatening, which may in turn act as a disincentive to approaching 
them in the first instance. 
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respondent stated that one particular centre was ‘at the same level it was 15 years ago’. One 
respondent suggested that directorates-general have subsequently relied on directorates for data and 
information. 
 
However, there are exceptions, namely, the Balitbang in the Ministry of Finance, or BKF. Box 7 provides 
a detailed description of the functions and roles of the BKF, while the next section explores possible 
reasons why considerable investments have been made in it. Respondents also suggested that the 
Balitbang in the Ministry of Trade was particularly good, as well as that in the Ministry of Agriculture 
(perhaps because it was favoured by Soeharto), while those in the Ministries of Health and Education 
were seen to be improving. 
 
Where the minister or other senior official require analysis (to, for instance, accompany a draft 
regulation or law), as Balitbang are seen to produce work of variable quality (or, alternatively, if there is 
considered to be a dearth of expertise or information externally), bureaucrats can undertake the work 
in-house. Respondents suggested that demands channelled down the hierarchy were often made with 
very short time horizons, with ministers asking for answers to be delivered immediately. One deputy-
minister, for example, received ad hoc requests from his minister to prepare for parliamentary 
meetings, often at a very short notice. The quality of answers inevitably depends not only on the time 
available, but also on whether the respondent uses their latent expertise or contracts out questions for 
further investigation. 
 
Although ministers were said to have expert staff to rely on, according to some respondents more 
substantive work is likely be undertaken by staff within the directorates, probably at echelon three 
level. The availability of information within a ministry was said by a few respondents to vary according 
to the extent to which the ministry was considered economic versus non-economic. Some respondents 
suggested that access to information in non-economic ministries was entirely dependent on the 
individual and, in particular, their personal networks (which we discuss below). However, access to the 
internet was seen by some to help ‘level the playing field’. Most likely drawing on their own networks, 
ministries can also invite experts to seminars to assess whether there is pre-existing work they can 
draw on before undertaking the work themselves. 
 
However, some respondents suggested that civil servants often had limited technical capacity to, 
among other things, generate and interpret information and data. For instance, on the fuel subsidy 
reform, technical aspects of an assessment of policy options undertaken by bureaucrats was seen as 
questionable by one respondent, who felt estimates of cost savings were much too optimistic. 
Although this was seen as partly a politically-driven outcome, it was also put down partly to inadequate 
technical abilities of civil servants (from the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources). 
 
If officials cannot or do not want to undertake work in-house, they can commission external actors, 
such as universities, research centres and/or NGOs. One respondent suggested that most 
commissioned research typically took place at directorate (echelon two) and sub-directorate (echelon 
three) levels. For example, Bappenas, unable to undertake all the research it needs in-house, 
particularly for the five-year medium-term plan, consults with a range of academics, individual experts 
and national and international consultants. 
 
However, rigidities in ministry budgets (we discuss this below) mean that officials cannot easily 
mobilise resources if demands to undertake research arise during the fiscal year. Some ministries 
address this by allocating resources for a number of research projects in annual budget plans whose 
objectives are defined as they emerge, but the amounts are usually too small and, in any case, are not 
released until the second half of the fiscal year. Budget rigidities also inhibit ministries from 
commissioning multi-year research projects (Suryadarma et al., 2011). 
 
Limited funding means that ministries, particularly those outside the Ministry of Finance, are unlikely to 
spend considerable sums on hiring consultants, especially international ones. One respondent 
suggested that the Ministry of Transport would not consider using the local office of 
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PricewaterhouseCoopers. Moreover, the late Hadi Soesastro, once director of CSIS, observed in an 
interview that only a few government institutions had mechanisms to formally sponsor research, and in 
most ministries it depended on the minister and a few senior officials. 
 
Further, regulations prohibit the government from paying non-profit organisations anything above Rp50 
million ($5,600) (see Sherlock, 2010a). Some officials work around this either by defining a research 
project as swakelola, or self-managed, enabling them to contract external experts but depict the 
research project as conducted in-house, or by approaching donors to pay for experts to provide 
analysis (Suryadarma et al., 2011). However, for many, procurement rules close formal channels, 
forcing officials to rely on (potentially poor quality information from) the Balitbang, undertake the work 
in-house (with officials who do not always have sufficient capacity) or pursue informal channels (see 
below). 
 
Respondents also suggested that top officials had often turned to both district and provincial offices 
for data. However, data were seen as inferior, as they are often not in continuous consistent formats 
and tend not to match figures from the BPS (which we describe below). Some respondents suggested 
that policy-makers made requests to other ministries. However, it is unclear whether information is 
secured through formal requests or through informal, personalised and more horizontal networks that 
tend to exist across the bureaucracy. Figure 7 provides an illustration of the options available for top 
officials in accessing knowledge. 
 
Figure 7: Possible sources of knowledge within ministries 
 
 
 
 
Statistics Indonesia  
An important source of knowledge within the government is BPS, a non-ministerial government 
institution (lembaga pemerintah non-kementerian, or LPNK) under the direction of and responsible 
directly to the president and headed up by a director-general. This is responsible for collecting and 
analysing statistical data. Several respondents saw BPS as the primary source of data of this kind, 
which they felt was particularly useful during planning and budgeting processes. The importance 
attached to such data indicates an increasing preference for quantifiable measurable indicators. But 
this has proved challenging in areas such as the environment. Further, some respondents often felt 
dissatisfied with BPS data, as they are not always current and are insufficiently disaggregated, with 
data from regions further away from Jakarta, particularly Eastern Indonesia, seen as questionable or 
less robust, reflecting in part the geography of the country. Although most of the poor live in Java, 
where power has traditionally been centred, depth of poverty tends to increase the further east one 
goes, with poverty rates among the highest in places such as Papua. 
 
Demand for analysis 
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Other ministries and agencies 
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Indonesian Institute of Sciences 
LIPI, another LPNK, is a largely government-funded research institute. Oey-Gardiner (2011) states that 
LIPI’s resources are used mainly to fund bottom-up proposed research projects, with few funds 
available for ad hoc projects. However, government requests are usually accommodated through 
special top-up allocations. LIPI’s researchers have suggested that they have provided a number of 
government agencies with knowledge inputs, mainly through discussions/seminars around research 
design and outcomes:  
 
Through this process, LIPI researchers claim to have contributed to discussions and changes in public 
sector rules and regulations on, for instance, the labour law, the education laws, and policies (e.g., BOS 
[Bantuan Operasional Sekolah, or School Operational Assistance]) by the Population Division, or inputs 
were contributed on the creation of the election commission(s), and activities and law(s), and other rules 
and regulations, in this regard, for MOHA [Ministry of Home Affairs]. Currently (2011), the Culture and 
Society Division is conducting a national priority study to produce a dictionary on ‘dying’ languages spoken 
by isolated communities in various parts of the archipelago (approved by Bappenas) (Oey Gardiner, 
2011:7). 
 
At the individual and informal level, 
 
Researchers from the Politics and Economics Divisions claim to provide inputs to the government on 
decentralisation and regional autonomy laws and modifications thereof. Then, the UKP-PPP […] draws on 
LIPI’s expertise about Papua to prepare a road map. This unit calls on individuals for their expertise known 
to the leadership in the unit to provide ‘quick’ answers to their questions. It is the UKP-PPP which then puts 
it all together as advice and/or solutions for decision-making by the president. This office does not (due to 
time constraints) rely on new research findings for its advice to the president. Hence, it does not need to 
identify financial resources for the compilation of knowledge through research (ibid.). 
 
In addition, two respondents suggested that members from the DPR’s Commission IX had requested 
information from LIPI on issues related to social and health insurance schemes. TNP2K and the Ministry 
of Forestry have had also made requests. And the Office of the Vice-president has invited researchers 
from LIPI to help monitor a programme of work implemented by various ministries. Respondents also 
claimed that LIPI tended to provide research that was more theoretically grounded and, given its 
distance from central ministries (compared with, say, the Balitbang), offered advice that was more 
politically neutral. However, since these respondents were from LIPI itself, this claim requires further 
verification. 
 
Donor support 
Our research suggests that donors are funding a number of capacity-building initiatives targeting 
various ministries, departments and agencies on the executive side of the government. We could not 
assess the number, scale and impact of these initiatives, but we provide a few indicative examples. The 
Ministry of Women’s Empowerment, for instance, was said to have received considerable support from 
a number of international agencies. This includes a UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM)-funded 
expert working with the secretary to the minister; German Agency for International 
Cooperation(Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, GIZ) funding for a policy 
analysis unit; and a UN Population Fund (UNFPA)-funded project management unit on reproductive 
health issues. The World Bank is lending support to BPS. AusAID has a presence in the form of 
technical advisors in the Directorate-general for Tax in the Ministry of Finance. Moreover, some Global 
Fund money is going into data production and surveillance work (some of which is to be channelled 
through the Balitbang). In addition, the Analytical and Capacity Development Partnership (ACDP), worth 
$50 over five years, has been established by the European Union (EU), AusAID, and the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) to provide the government with technical expertise and access to 
international knowledge and best practices in support of its education reforms, complementing its $1 
billion five-year commitment to the Education Sector Support Program (ESSP). 
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Box 7: The Fiscal Policy Office  
The BKF was established in 2006 and has between 350 and 400 staff, who prepare all speeches for the minister 
as well as draft ministerial decrees. Key functions of the BKF include (i) macroeconomic forecasting and analysis; 
(ii) fiscal policy; (iii) fiscal risk; and (iv) managing international work. Based on the comments of two respondents, 
we describe each of these functions in turn. 
 
1. Macroeconomic Forecasting and Analysis Unit: This unit prepares the economic assumptions, such as 
economic growth, foreign exchange, interest, inflation, crude oil production and revenue forecasts. For this, the 
BKF relies on a committee of technical experts whose members represent the Ministry of Finance, Bappenas, BPS, 
the Central Bank, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources and the Coordinating Ministry for Economy, 
Finance and Industry. The committee is chaired by the minister for finance and meets on numerous occasions. 
 
One respondent suggested that the analysis produced tended to be a factual narrative of what the economy was 
doing and lacked the overlay of political context, which was thought to be needed for the head of the BKF or the 
minister to mount an influential argument in public. This may be because the BKF wants to remain pure, but it 
might also indicate a preference for tools and systems which provide an answer, avoiding the overlay of 
judgement and discretion. However, it was suggested that economic forecasting rarely provided an ‘answer’ and 
was subject to a considerable number of assumptions and substantial interpretation. 
 
2. Fiscal Policy Unit: This unit establishes maximum expenditures and assesses how they affect the economy. 
The environment they work in is highly politicised, with members (usually echelon two and echelon three, and 
even lower-ranking staff) regularly asked to appear before the parliament during the negotiation of budgets (and 
to respond to questions around the economic assumptions used to construct the budget). In theory, this unit 
should draw on the economic assumptions developed by those in the Macroeconomic Forecasting and Analysis 
Unit. However, with flows of information restricted to top-down lines of control, possibly combined with weak 
leadership from the head of the BKF, communication between the two directorates is limited. As such, this unit 
prepares its own economic assumptions which are then fed into the official budget. 
 
3. Fiscal Risk Unit: This unit assesses possible risks to the budget. These include, for instance, the risks that 
implementation of larger social safety nets might pose as well as the impact of disasters. These are core areas 
which the BKF needs to provide leadership on. However, perhaps as the current head of the BKF is new to the job, 
there seems to be little demand for the unit and, as a result, it has little influence on higher levels of authority. As 
a consequence, the quality of work seems to have suffered with, for instance, policy proposals reviewed after and 
not during the policy development stage. 
 
4. International Unit: This unit is responsible for Indonesia’s international engagement. It undertakes many of 
the logistical elements of the country’s participation in international forums, such as the hosting of the recent 
ASEAN conference. Because of the extensive amount of international engagement, it is stretched and 
subsequently has little spare capacity to focus on developing robust analyses to inform the government’s policy 
position. However, Kempan & RB has approved the establishment of a new centre to take the lead on multilateral 
and climate change engagement. The head of the BKF is also the chair of the taskforce leading on climate change 
financing. The aforementioned centre is likely to have around 15 people who are more research-focused. 
 
Formal communication outputs: The BKF has three types of study: (i) short studies in response to requests from 
the minister, which usually take five days and tend to be a synthesis of materials found on the internet; (ii) 
research that can take a few months to undertake to feed into key decisions; and (iii) fundamental research which 
can take several years and may include statistical modelling. The BKF usually delivers findings in a range of 
formats (determined by audience and objective), which include three-page policy memos. 
 
Personnel for the BKF are initially drawn from a number of existing directorates within the Ministry of Finance. 
Having the crucial function of determining the budget and assessing competing claims for funding, staff are 
technically sound and were said to have a position on almost every sector, from agricultural seed varieties to the 
vehicle industry. Critically, Kempan & RB have agreed to free the Ministry of Finance from constraints of 
centralised regulations around salary issues and helped it set up separate rates of remuneration for its staff. This 
has allowed BKF to introduce an internal system of performance appraisal for staff, which is linked to 
remuneration and to the immediate needs of the unit. This has improved the scope for the enhancement of staff 
skills and capacities, with the potential of improving the quality of advice provided to senior officials and the 
minister (Sherlock, 2010a). There is also a significant interest among foreign donors in providing technical 
support.  
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Despite all this, communication between the BKF and other directorates-general tends to be weak, as the BKF 
rarely receives requests from other directorates-general. If other directorates-general are not satisfied with, for 
instance, the forecasts issued by the BKF, complaints tend not to be heard through formal channels (which are 
through the hierarchy—up, across and down) and are thus unlikely to translate into a request to alter the way in 
which the information is produced. 
 
6.2 Analytical capacity in the legislature 
 
Although the DPR was seen to have acquired considerable powers, several respondents suggested that 
many MPs did not necessarily possess the expertise to draft and scrutinise legislation. One respondent 
pointed to the Bank Century enquiry as an example. While this was seen as an attempt by some 
individuals to put pressure on the president and leading members of his cabinet, MPs’ questions were 
not sufficiently sophisticated and some statements were said to be factually incorrect. The enquiry 
subsequently centred on whether the bailout was appropriate, rather than why the initial outlay 
multiplied to over 10 times. While the finance minister had the support of several officials as well as 
considerable amounts of information to construct a robust defence, MPs, on the other hand, lacked any 
detailed information and analysis. So the enquiry highlighted MPs’ ability to hold government 
accountable, but it also revealed their inability to conduct that process effectively. Part of this was said 
by some respondents to be because of inadequate capacity within the DPR to support its members.20
 
 
Blondal et al. (2009) suggest there are a number of constraints faced by MPs in the DPR. First, the 
turnover of MPs is high. In the 2009 elections, nearly 75% of MPs were entering the parliament for the 
first time. While this reflects the transition to democracy, it also highlights the lack of legislative 
experience of most MPs. Reviewing the budget, for instance, could be an overwhelming experience, as 
new MPs are faced with three large volumes of budget documents, hugely technical in detail without 
any of the expertise that executive officials had (in the shape of the BKF, for instance). Rotation of MPs 
from one commission to another is also high, limiting the time they have to accumulate knowledge and 
experience on an issue. 
 
Second, overall resourcing of the parliament has not increased in line with its new responsibilities. For 
instance, MPs on occasion have not had the resources to collect information from their constituencies 
owing to the vast size of the areas they have to cover and are unable to play their representation 
function effectively. That the executive is ultimately responsible for approving the DPR’s budget may go 
some way towards explaining its under-resourcing. 
 
Third, the parliament lacks sufficient analytical support. Blondal et al. (2009) suggest that there are 35 
‘experts’ working for the Center for Research and Data and Information Processing (Pusat Pengkajian 
dan Pengolahan Data dan Informasi, or P3DI) in the DPR’s secretariat-general, responsible for serving 
550 MPs (and their staff). P3DI staff include researchers, librarians, archivists, computer specialists and 
legislative drafters and are tasked with supporting DPR members across all activities (Sherlock, 2010a). 
Blondal et al. (2009) state that, of the 35 experts, only 7 are responsible for providing support on 
budgeting. The secretariat-general’s staff also appear to focus on preparing lengthy research studies 
rather than timely policy syntheses for MPs. Staff were said to lack adequate qualifications and 
specialised knowledge. Training by SMERU for parliamentary staff on research methods is said to have 
had little impact on the quality of their work. As a result, MPs and their own staff (see below) saw little 
point in turning to the secretariat-general for assistance. 
 
More recently, the government has provided MPs with more resources to hire up to three staff. These 
tend to be assistants who essentially help MPs manage their day-to-day workload rather than experts 
to help with making decisions. Specialist staff exist for factions; these tend to be political staff 
                                                          
20 However, more analytical capacity may not necessarily change this. In the recent select committee hearing of Rupert 
Murdoch centred on the phone hacking controversy in the UK, MPs who had considerable analytical capacity at their disposal 
(including Parliamentary Research Services) was criticised for often asking open-ended or irrelevant questions (see 
www.economist.com/blogs/bagehot/2011/07/british-press-and-phone-hacking-scandal-8). 
  
44 
appointed by the DPR member or party but funded by the state budget (Sherlock, 2010a). Further, 
commissions are allowed to hire part-time advisors to assist them. These advisors are not civil servants 
with specialised expertise and are often associated with a specific political party or faction. Each party 
or faction can also recruit a limited number of experts according to its proportion of seats in the DPR 
(ibid.). Some respondents stated that several political parties had Balitbang, but they knew little of 
their capacity. 
 
Regardless of these developments, commissions rely on cost calculations submitted by the Ministry of 
Finance or respective line ministries when discussing the budget impact of various amendments under 
consideration (Blondal et al., 2009). So that the DPR is not totally dependent on the government, it has 
set up an independent budget office (separate to the research office mentioned above), modelled on 
the United States’ Congressional Budget Office, which aims to provide non-partisan advice on the 
budget.21
 
 With most of the budget not changing, given the rigidities highlighted earlier, of vital interest 
is whether the budget office is able to assess actual changes from year to year and to present these in 
an appropriate format. Interviewees knew little of its capacity and usage by MPs apart from one 
respondent, who suggested that it was not able to provide, for instance, analysis on the budgetary 
implications of passing specific legislation. 
On the whole, despite the relatively high level of responsibility the DPR has, the legislature’s capacity 
to generate, interpret and use knowledge products, although increasing, remains fairly limited. As a 
result, some respondents suggested that the parliament was not able to perform effectively. For 
instance, the DPR, some respondents noted, is not able to effectively process the current volume of 
legislation that goes through it. It is also suggested that members of the Budget Committee are able to 
provide only a limited critique of the macroeconomic framework, fiscal policies and priorities, deficit 
targets, revenue projects and expenditure ceilings, instead focusing on small and detailed items of 
expenditures (Blondal et al., 2009). This was confirmed by one respondent who suggested that some 
DPR members during the last budget process demanded expenditure in the budget of the Ministry of 
Education be shifted from school and classroom building to computers, laboratories and libraries.  
 
Donors providing support to the DPR, and in particular its analytical function, appear to be far fewer in 
number than those working with executive agencies, perhaps in part because of a reluctance among 
donors to appear overtly political. The World Bank, for instance, was unclear as to how to engage with 
the DPR and has brought in a consultant to help. Nevertheless, our research did uncover a few 
examples of donor support. These include programmes undertaken by the National Democratic 
Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI), the UN Development Programme (UNDP) 
through its Parliamentary Support Programme, the Institutional Reform and Informal Sector (IRIS) 
Parliamentary Project under the University of Maryland, the Growth through Investment and Trade 
(GIAT) Parliamentary Support Project and the joint Asia Foundation and United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID)-funded National Legislative Strengthening Program (NLSP), among 
others. The NLSP, in particular, is a programme that has been running since 2001 which targets the DPR 
through the Budget Committee and members of other commissions and the secretary-general by way of 
technical assistance in the form of policy analysis, seminars, discussions and direct consultations 
(Arianto and Fatmawati, 2008). 
 
6.3 Civil service performance 
 
As discussed above, analytical capacity in the executive and, especially, the legislative arms of the 
government appear limited. However, a number of respondents suggested that the problem was not 
necessarily the inadequately trained technical and managerial staff, but more the civil service as a 
whole, in particular the way it is organised. For instance, Sherlock (2010a) suggests that the secretary-
general’s poor performance owes in part to the way staff are categorised, supervised, remunerated and 
advanced in their careers, which discourages staff from producing adequate knowledge products and 
                                                          
21 It is not clear as to when the budget office was established. 
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weakens the flow of information between the DPR and outside sources of knowledge. We describe a 
number of the features that characterise the civil service, starting with recruitment. 
 
Civil servants enter the government at a young age and are guaranteed tenure, salary, promotion and 
other benefits (CastleAsia, 2010). However, the selection process is not always competitive, with the 
recruitment system said to be characterised by informal payments for entry into the system and for 
promotions (World Bank, 2009a). A number of respondents suggested that, as a result of these 
dynamics, top university graduates were unlikely to join. Moreover, the civil service does not allow the 
lateral recruitment of mid-career professionals for limited terms, with any such candidates recruited 
starting from the bottom, alongside those who have left school or college only recently (author 
interview, May 2011). 
 
Once civil servants are recruited, training seems to be general in nature, rather than technically or 
managerially based (CastleAsia, 2010). Most civil servants are likely to remain in the same ministry in 
which they start, although they are rotated within that ministry, often at a very short notice, which is, 
arguably, a continuation of a feature practised under the New Order. The Ministry of Finance, for 
instance, has had three directorates-general in charge of tax in the past three years and, within the 
Directorate-general for Tax, five directors in charge of the Human Resources Bureau. At the lower levels, 
one respondent suggested, ‘You could be in one job one week and then ordered to go to Papua or East 
Java the next.’ Although rotation could provide civil servants with benefits (such as exposure to new 
work and training in order to move up to higher levels), the practice also has some drawbacks. One of 
the World Bank’s reviews on public sector reforms suggests that continuity among leaders is a 
prerequisite for effective reform (author interview, May 2011). Rotation then, particularly among key 
civil servants, was viewed as disruptive, as new staff often require long periods of time before they are 
adequately ‘socialised’. And, given the institutional setup, if they leave, there are few mechanisms to 
ensure the continuation of good work that may have started. 
 
Despite job security, the system for determining overall pay and benefits is opaque, discretionary and 
prone to abuse, with weak links to either individual or group performance. Extra supplements in cash 
and kind still comprise the bulk of remuneration of many civil servants (Booth, 2005). 
 
Performance criteria for promotion are weak and there are few credible sanctions for low performance 
and corruption (World Bank, 2009a). In fact, several respondents suggested that promotion up the 
ranks of the civil service had little to do with ‘performance’ and tended to be determined by seniority 
and, importantly, loyalty to those higher up. As such, ‘most [civil servants] will wait for orders, rather 
than initiate actions.’ Another respondent suggested that, within the bureaucracy,  
 
‘Whatever the boss says, you do. There’s very little push back. [... In some cases,] those below will 
implement even if they don’t agree. [Others will] stall, so nothing will happen, which is detrimental to any 
organisation. They don’t feel that they can challenge or disagree with superiors. Loyalty and fear are key. 
[... But] in other cases, there’s loyalty and respect’ (author interview, May 2011). 
 
Ministers propose individuals for promotion whom the president then has to approve. In some 
ministries, particularly those that are not considered ‘economic’, promotion of bureaucrats as low as 
directors is often determined by loyalty to the minister’s respective party. This is particularly important 
if there are several candidates going for the same position. However, this seems to change for 
promotions to echelon one level which, according to some respondents, appears somewhat more 
meritocratic, although this varies across ministries. 
 
Risk aversion seems to be quite common among decision-makers, especially at echelon two and 
echelon three levels. Given the constraints bureaucrats are under, taking risks is unlikely to help 
someone climb through the ranks and, in some cases, is likely to hold them back. This was clearly 
illustrated recently when the authors heard how one director seemed to have their promotion prospects 
put on hold after they were seen to overstep their remit—by advising a newly appointed minister that 
they prioritise bureaucratic reform. 
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Sherlock (2010b) suggests that bureaucrats are influenced by a culture where rules and regulations are 
slavishly followed for their own sake to the detriment of good results. A number of respondents 
suggested that the focus on process at the expense of outputs and outcomes was reinforced by the fear 
of being picked up by the BPK, which oversees the management of state funds, and being seen as 
potentially corrupt. All line ministries and local governments require an unqualified result or risk being 
brought to task. This was confirmed by one respondent, who suggested,  
 
‘Most [bureaucrats] are pushing papers [to avoid being seen as corrupt], so they will spend money 
according to the budget process, with very little concern what they are spending money for, to satisfy 
financial audits, even though they are clever. It takes nine months to do a detailed budget and they spend 
it in two months and comply with audits—that’s the obsession.’ 
 
The way in which the annual national budget is drawn together creates little space for policy change, 
hence few incentives for bureaucrats to move beyond routine work. Although all budgets are, in one 
sense, rigid, with change occurring only at the margins, in Indonesia there are additional factors which 
limit flexibility further. Box 8 lists five factors which reinforce the rigidity of the budget (Blondal et al., 
2009). 
 
Box 8: Rigidities in the budget  
Factors which limit changes in the budget: 
 
• Natural resource revenue and 26% of all government revenue (net of revenue sharing) must be transferred to 
regional governments in the form of general allocation funds (dana alokasi umum, or DAU). 
• Constitutional provisions mandate allocations to certain sectors. For instance, 20% must be allocated to 
education. There is disagreement as to what should be considered education for these purposes and there 
have been numerous court cases to resolve the issue. 
• Tax revenues are often earmarked for certain functions. For instance, forestry fees, in some cases, are 
dedicated to reforestation and related activities. 
• Civil servants are tenured for life once appointed. They are largely insulated from fiscal adjustments and from 
critical scrutiny during the budget formulation process. 
• The traditional split of budgeting into development and routine budgets has left the latter on ‘autopilot’ and 
not subject to critical scrutiny. This problem is now being addressed, but room for manoeuvre is limited, not 
least because of civil service protections. 
 
On the whole, merit and professional expertise matter relatively little in lower and mid-level civil service 
postings. However, according to some respondents, there appear to be two exceptions to this. Both the 
Ministry of Finance, in particular the BKF (or its Balitbang), and the Central Bank secured permission 
from Kempan & RB22
 
 to establish different rates of pay for staff. As a result, they introduced an internal 
system of performance appraisal for staff linked to salaries and benefits. It is not surprising, then, that 
both institutions tend to attract the ‘best’ people and funding for a considerable number of 
scholarships for their staff to study abroad. 
In light of the aforementioned concerns and others around the broader civil service, the government 
initiated a process of bureaucratic reform led mainly by Kempan & RB and elevated to the level of the 
president through the UKP-PPP. However, the World Bank (2009a) argues that a large number of 
agencies with overlapping authority share responsibility for management of various aspects of the civil 
service. As a result, no single agency is proactively managing the structure and shape of the civil 
service and no agency has the recognised authority to undertake comprehensive civil service reform. 
Moreover, one respondent suggested that the reform programme was too generic and high level, and 
was unlikely to reach lower levels unless greater efforts were made to operationalise it. 
 
As a result, the World Bank (2009a) suggests that reforms have so far been undertaken at the 
ministerial level, such as in the Ministry of Finance and a few others, and that it is not Kempan & RB but 
                                                          
22 Kempan & RB is officially responsible for the organisational structure of national institutions. 
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the Ministry of Finance that is the driving force behind reforms, in part because of the powers it has to 
determine budget allocations for reform processes. For instance, the Ministry of Finance has already set 
up a taskforce to examine salaries and benefits for high-ranking state officials, intended to lead to an 
independent remuneration commission to determine both the level and structure of pay for Indonesia’s 
highest-ranking officials. But in the highly codified system that Indonesia works in, transforming 
elements of the civil service and the culture within it has been far from straightforward. For instance, it 
took the Directorate-general for Tax within the Ministry of Finance two years to create a transformation 
directorate merely to handle the reforms that were required. Moreover, the civil service, especially its 
senior ranks, is still largely a product of the New Order era and is likely to resist measures that are 
perceived to threaten its traditional role (Booth, 2005). This seems to confirm a World Bank study in 
2000 which suggested that patronage networks wielded considerable influence over civil service 
staff—maintaining rent-collecting opportunities while viewing reform with suspicion (CastleAsia, 2010). 
 
Rosser et al. (2011a) illustrate the influence of such forces in explaining the persistence of formal and 
informal user fees. They suggest three main reasons, all of which reflect the continuing power of senior 
officials and corporate interests from the New Order period. First, senior officials outside the education 
sector managed to draw off resources intended for education initiatives to boost their own sectoral 
budgets. Second, they successfully resisted the development of genuinely participatory school 
committees at most schools (introduced following the fall of the New Order), with committees being 
harnessed to further the rent-seeking agenda of politico-bureaucratic elements within the education 
system, rather than being used to promote the interests of the poor. Finally, the justice system was not 
willing to enforce children’s rights to free basic education (as stated in the 1945 Constitution), 
suggesting that relevant agencies were dominated by elements of the New Order. Further evidence is 
provided by Sherlock (2010a), who suggests that senior officials such as ministers and directors-
general have considerable power vested in informal networks within ministries and across the 
government, and often behave in ways to maintain those networks at the expense of achieving a 
progressive policy or programme outcome. With informal networks hugely influential in policy-making 
circles, this is the subject of the next part. 
 
6.4 Informal and personalised networks 
 
Both the literature and respondents suggest overwhelmingly that informal relationships are hugely 
dominant in terms of how people go about looking for information. But the strength of informal 
networks seems to be facilitated by regulatory obstacles within the ‘knowledge market’ and inadequate 
analytical capacity within both the executive and the DPR (as we have seen). For instance, Sherlock 
(2010a) suggests that the most common way for government agencies and office holders to circumvent 
these obstacles is to call on individual academics in a personal capacity to provide advice without 
payment or to directly engage single individuals. The strength of informal links was illustrated by an 
advisor to the president (who had neither a budget for research nor institutional links with research 
producers): 
 
‘I have a network and use it, for example on the moratorium [on issuing forestry licenses]. I ask who’s the 
expert on an issue in a region. The network knows who is who and puts me in touch with the right people. I 
have contacts with NGOs who provide some suggestions based on grassroots experience. I have friends 
who work in these NGOs. I invite them in for a seminar and have a discussion.’ 
 
Further, respondents suggested that MPs often resorted to their informal networks for knowledge 
inputs, with one MP who required support in assessing the annual budget saying, 
 
‘I ask some of my contacts, friends who are professionals in business, e.g., health business, infrastructure 
business. I ask them how they spend things in their company, how much different things cost in the private 
sector for comparison like building a harbour. The government costs were different from what private 
sector would have paid. I know contractors who work for the government; they are pleased to give me 
information. They provide some pointers.’ 
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However, there appears to be an assumption that informal and personalised networks in the policy-
making process, which some might associate with other less legal forms of personal links, are inferior 
to more formal forms of engagement with, for instance, published and disseminated research. For 
instance, Sherlock (2010a) suggests that not only is informality unsystematic and ad hoc, but also it 
does not recompense universities for their work and relies on salaried staff to devote their time unpaid 
and mostly unrecognised. He goes on to argue that personal networks in the knowledge sector 
reinforce a culture of patronage, nepotism and corruption. 
 
While there may be an element of truth in this, we are more optimistic. For instance, Lay (2010) states 
that such linkages (between MPs and members of CSOs, for instance) tend to be based on long-
established relationships, shared social histories, friendship, ideology and/or political affiliation. Many 
policy-makers seem to prefer this, as it is characterised by high levels of trust and credibility; as a 
result, they prefer links with individuals over those with organisations. Informal networks provide 
effective conduits for information flows from experts such as university professors to decision-makers 
and help decision-makers identify pieces of evidence they need. Thus, knowledge products are often 
seen as intangible and dependent on face-to-face contacts. Heryanto (2010:183) suggests that this may 
owe at least in part to Indonesia being an orality-oriented society. In particular, he says, ‘Compared to 
their counterparts in more literacy-dependent societies, people in Indonesia, including the literati and 
graduates of higher education, prefer to share important information and messages through face-to-
face communication.’ 
 
Further, information is said to flow more quickly through informal channels than it does through those 
that are more bureaucratic and institutional in nature. And even where there are institutional links, 
these tend to be underpinned by personal contacts. 
 
6.5 Sources of knowledge external to government23
 
  
University and nongovernmental research centres 
Policy-makers tend to have strong links with academics from university research centres. Both formal 
and informal knowledge inputs from academics are often drawn on to inform legislation, plans and 
budgets. For instance, Bappenas formally partnered with six of the country’s largest national 
universities to access academic content for its planning processes. On the reduction of fuel subsidies 
and labour law reform, universities were formally approached individually or in consortia to undertake 
analysis and formulate policy options. Some MPs appreciate academics’ depth of analysis (over that 
produced by CSOs). In the health sector, several policy initiatives were said to have been inspired by a 
number of academics. Influential academics tend to come from UI and the University of Gadjah Mada 
(UGM). However, a few respondents suggested that MPs did not have complete trust in the objectivity 
of work by universities which had close links to the government; others suggested that the executive 
was reluctant to turn to particular universities that were historically seen as sites of challenge and 
potential opposition. 
 
Although we did not undertake a detailed mapping, the fact that respondents mentioned very few NGO 
research centres may indicate the limited links that policy-makers have with such organisations or 
indeed the absence of a great many institutes of this type, with one respondent suggesting this 
problem owed in large part to a weak higher education system. The major exception is SMERU, which 
several government respondents said they were familiar with. Although GoI respondents may have 
been influenced by the presence of SMERU during interviews, many said that they had at least 
considered its findings in policy work. For instance, TNP2K invited SMERU to discuss issues related to 
the Household Conditional Cash Transfer (Program Keluarga Harapan, or PKH). Moreover, the PNPM 
steering committee, made up mainly of government ministries, was said to have drawn on SMERU’s 
                                                          
23 Although the media can be seen as a key input in policy-making processes, because of limited data, we omit them from our 
analysis. 
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recommendations, particularly in reaching marginalised groups. Directors-general and directors at 
Bappenas are said to have good relations with senior researchers from SMERU. 
 
Given the increase in demand from politicians seeking advice on voters’ behaviours and campaign 
strategies, the number of survey institutes has increased considerably since 1998. The Jakarta-based 
Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education and Information (Lembaga Penelitian, 
Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial, or LP3ES) quickly emerged as a major actor in this 
field soon after Soeharto’s fall. And since 2005, when direct elections for local leaders began to be 
held, these survey institutes have flourished. They now include established names such as Lingkaran 
Survey Indonesia (LSI) and more recent entrants, such as the Indo Barometer and the CIRRUS Surveyor 
Group and others. 
 
Civil society organisations 
Mietzner and Aspinall (2010) suggest that CSOs, and in particular NGOs, have, since the fall of the New 
Order, been very effective in scrutinising government budgets, uncovering corruption scandals and 
advocating for urgently needed policies. Without such energetic activism—strongly supported by the 
media—many of the key post-New Order political reforms might not have materialised or might have 
been much weaker. Although representatives of NGOs tend to have links with policy-makers from both 
the executive and the DPR, these seem to be stronger with the latter, as some MPs are former students 
or NGO activists, subsequently shared the same personal networks and often shared the same goal in 
holding the executive to account. Moreover, in drafting legislation, MPs, with access to far less 
analytical capacity than their counterparts in the executive, have turned more readily to CSOs for 
knowledge inputs. 
 
For instance, MPs have approached CSOs such as Fitra to help gain insights into the annual budgeting 
process. On the anti-pornography bill, one MP found working with a CSO very helpful, as it provided her 
with not only political support but also strong arguments to back up her position. On gender issues, the 
Ministry of Women’s Empowerment has worked with the Women’s Coalition to, for instance, draft the 
domestic violence law. Some policy-makers have turned to CSOs to play a mediation role when 
members of the executive and/or the legislature have reached deadlock in negotiations. For example, 
Propratria has provided a space for the military and the police and helped the DPR’s Commission I and 
key government institutions to sit together to find a resolution to disputes. Individuals from political 
parties were also said to have links with CSOs. Members of PDI-P, for instance, are said to have links 
with individuals from Democratic Youth and the Poor People’s Union of Indonesia (Serikat Rakyat 
Miskin Indonesia, or SRMI) (Lay, 2010). 
 
Some respondents suggested there were a number of disincentives to drawing on CSO inputs. Some 
policy-makers felt that some CSOs lacked sufficient technical expertise. However, some CSOs were 
seen to be addressing this, with one NGO, Kontras, for example, recruiting activists with Masters’ 
degrees in human rights and environmental law. Some MPs felt that CSOs could be confrontational in 
their approach, with some of their work being considered sensational, designed more to capture the 
attention of the media than to foster constructive engagement with MPs. Moreover, some MPs viewed 
CSOs with suspicion, particularly because many, if not all of them, tended to be funded by foreign 
agencies (Lay, 2010). 
 
International actors 
Policy-makers have often turned to international actors based both in and out of the country for 
analysis and advice. Bappenas and other ministries, for instance, have relationships with foreign 
universities. Links between government institutions and foreign universities may be formalised through 
agreements in the shape of memoranda of understandings, while other links might be more informal, 
through relationships between counterparts in respective institutions. Nevertheless, links with 
international actors, by and large, tend to be more formal. 
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In-country bilateral (such as the Japan International Cooperation Agency, or JICA, and AusAID) and 
multilateral agencies (such as the UN and the World Bank) were considered by several respondents to 
be credible sources of policy advice. The World Bank, in particular, was highlighted by many. Although 
the World Bank’s loan portfolio is relatively small (in comparison with other donors), it has significant 
staff numbers—approaching 800 (providing mainly technical assistance), many of whom are funded by 
a range of donors through trust funds. Several high-ranking officials are known to approach the Bank 
for advice. One deputy-minister, for instance, approaches the Bank on a regular basis for analysis on a 
number of policy issues, including a recent law on teaching reform. 
 
There are several incentives for government officials to turn to donors and multilateral agencies for 
knowledge inputs. Government officials working within short timeframes tend to demand information 
at short notice in succinct delivery formats. With Balitbang generally lacking the capacity to undertake 
such analysis and regulatory constraints inhibiting the formal contracting of research institutes such as 
SMERU, officials turn to donors and multilateral agencies, including the Bank. The Trade Unit within the 
Bank, for instance, typically responds to requests from the Ministry of Trade within a week. There are 
financial incentives too, as the World Bank can pay for its own research. The Ministry of National 
Education, for instance, is reluctant to fund research itself (given the limited funding it has for research) 
and is hence happy to receive ‘free’ research findings from the Bank. 
 
A few respondents suggested that, perversely, some officials were more likely to draw on external 
analyses to provide them with insulation from domestic criticism. For instance, one respondent said, ‘If 
policy “fails”, they can blame it on the World Bank.’ Importantly, given our discussion of informal 
networks and the importance of trust, the Bank has an established historical relationship with top 
levels of the government and is seen as credible. For instance, despite the incentives for World Bank 
consultants to publish as much of their work as they can, some have agreed not to where the 
government has deemed this politically sensitive. Further, some suggested that the government lacked 
confidence in its own bureaucracy or in domestic think-tanks to deliver high quality analysis 
(highlighted by the analysis above). One respondent suggested that the government would also rather 
pay significantly for top-quality advice that is provided with a promise of political neutrality. 
 
Nevertheless, working with external actors, particularly the Bank, can be politically sensitive, given 
some anti-donor sentiment within the GoI. One respondent suggested that, by demanding and using 
information from donors, there was a risk that the government could be pulled away from its own policy 
agenda. The UKP-PPP, for instance, has been criticised for being too reliant on international sources of 
knowledge. As a result, the Bank, for instance, has on occasion taken more of a backseat role, instead 
working closely with universities such as UGM and UI. A number of respondents suggested, though, 
that much of the Bank’s resources could be better spent improving the government’s own in-house 
analytical capacity. 
 
6.6 Summary 
 
In this section, we have assessed, to some extent, the government’s capacity to produce and procure 
research and advice. In sum: 
 
1 Within ministries, policy-makers, particularly senior officials, can draw information from a range 
of sources. These include the Balitbang, BPS, provincial and district offices and other 
ministries. They can also do the work in-house, formally commissioning ‘outsiders’ or drawing 
on knowledge inputs through personal and informal networks. 
2 However, our analysis suggests that, although the capacity of Balitbang varies widely, these 
have generally declined relative to their role during the New Order era. They tend to suffer from 
a number of mutually reinforcing problems including insufficient funding, inadequately skilled 
and poorly remunerated staff, poor utilisation, high turnover and weak communication 
mechanisms with operational directorates. However, there are exceptions, including the BKF, 
  
51 
which has up to 400 staff and essentially helps the Ministry of Finance to manage the economy 
and prepare the budget. 
3 Ministries face a number of obstacles in commissioning outsiders to undertake research, 
including limited funding and inhibitive regulations. 
4 An important source of data is the BPS, reflecting an increasing preference among policy-
makers for quantifiable indicators. However, some respondents suggested that data could be 
better disaggregated and produced more regularly, especially for regions in Eastern Indonesia. 
LIPI, a government research institute, tends to produce research not directly in response to 
government requests but theoretical research based on priorities outlined in the government’s 
medium-term development plan. 
5 Analytical capacity in the legislature seems to be weak but improving. Overall resourcing of the 
parliament has not seemed to increase in line with the considerable increase in its 
responsibilities. The secretariat-general seems to be under staffed and is not provided with the 
necessary incentives to produce appropriate material. Specialist staff for MPs, commissions, 
factions and parties seem to be increasing in number but still appear inadequate, with staff not 
necessarily equipped with the right expertise. A budget office has been set up for DPR members 
to help them review the annual budget, but little is known of its quality. 
6 Limitations in analytical capacity in the government stem mainly from systemic problems in the 
civil service. These include problems with recruitment, training, promotion and compensation. 
This, coupled with rigidities in policy-making processes, especially in the budget, means that 
civil servants are unlikely to go beyond routine work. Although the government has initiated a 
bureaucratic reform, senior officials from the New Order period retain considerable influence, 
were said to view reform with suspicion and are likely to resist and maintain their patronage 
networks. 
7 Partly because of the weak analytical capacity within the government (including poor formal 
links), but also because of cultural features, informal or personal networks are hugely dominant 
in the way policy-makers go looking for information. 
8 Sources of knowledge external to the government include university research centres, non-
governmental research centres, NGOs, foreign universities and bilateral and multilateral 
agencies. 
 
Drawing on the institutional characteristics of Indonesian policy-making in Sections 4, 5 and 6, in 
Section 7 we explore what this means for the factors that shape policy-makers’ demand for and use of 
knowledge in policy processes. 
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7. Factors that shape policy-makers’ use of knowledge 
 
Drawing on the institutional features of the policy-making system in Indonesia outlined in the previous 
sections, we now explore what implications these have on the incentives policy-makers have to invest 
in, demand and use knowledge of different sorts in policy-making processes. Although investing in, 
demanding and using knowledge are three very different actions, for the purpose of this study we do 
not discriminate between them. Furthermore, as will become clear, these incentives inevitably overlap, 
as there is rarely ever one single reason why knowledge in the shape of a piece of research, a body of 
knowledge, expert opinion, stakeholder consultation or statistical data is seen as valuable or not. Once 
we have explored factors that might encourage policy-makers to invest in, demand and use knowledge, 
we then explore factors that might discourage policy-makers from doing so. 
 
7.1 Factors that might motivate policy-makers to use knowledge 
 
Seeking to respond to the president or those with a presidential mandate 
As we have discussed, although higher levels of political competition have weakened the leadership of 
the president somewhat, he is still considered the most powerful political actor in Indonesia, and his 
instructions carry considerable weight. As such, policy actors are often compelled to respond to 
directives whether they come from him/her directly or through a highly placed supervisor with a 
presidential mandate. 
 
Several respondents indicated that responding to presidential directives could require the provision of 
knowledge in some shape or form. For instance, presidential directives to implement the large-scale 
cash transfer programme before the 2009 election led to considerable analytical work by Bappenas 
and the Ministry of Finance. Lacking relevant expertise, one director of Bappenas brought in experts 
through his informal network to give a seminar on key issues and later hired a consultant to undertake 
some of the groundwork. He also used research undertaken by SMERU, whose ability to produce results 
quickly was much needed in response to rapidly rising oil prices, to improve phase two of the scheme. 
 
Some respondents mentioned another priority for the president—the removal of user fees in basic 
education and the role knowledge has played recently in relation to the implementation of this. 
Elements within the government were said to have resisted a number of policy measures, with user fees 
both formal and informal persisting. For instance, Rosser et al. (2011b) suggest that senior officials 
outside the education sector appropriated education resources to enhance their own sectoral budgets. 
SBY subsequently mandated the minister for national education to spearhead necessary reforms, who 
in turn sought advice from a number of donors including the World Bank and the ACDP on, for instance, 
what free basic education really meant and, given the endurance of the New Order bureaucrats and 
corporate interests, how such an initiative could be successfully financed. 
 
ACDP subsequently agreed to support the ministry in the production of appropriate knowledge inputs 
and the development of a financing strategy and policy instruments (Box 9 provides more detail). In 
fact, the government’s emphasis on education, particularly given that a fifth of the budget was to be 
spent on the sector, saw the ($50 million) ACDP attract 50 proposals from top officials to support policy 
development on a range of issues, 14 of which were to be followed up at the time of writing. A number 
of respondents also suggested that this had encouraged the Balitbang in the Ministry of National 
Education to improve the quality and coverage of its knowledge inputs. 
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Box 9: Drawing on knowledge to help remove basic education user fees 
The removal of user fees in basic education has long been a priority for the GoI, and in particular SBY. The 1945 
Constitution was amended in 2002 to require central and regional governments to spend 20% of their respective 
budgets on education (Article 31 (4)). In Law No. 20/2003, the DPR went further, specifying that this 20% should 
not include teachers’ salaries, the largest single item of education expenditure in Indonesia, in effect requiring 
the central and regional governments to spend beyond 20% of their budgets on education. In 2004, SBY 
campaigned on a platform that included improving access to quality education, especially for poor and 
disadvantaged people. The commitment to remove user fees was seen as an example of higher levels of 
responsiveness of the state, but it also served to provide opportunities for SBY to build his support base, 
appealing across different regions and to different classes who sought to prioritise education. Following his 
victory in the 2004 election, SBY introduced a range of measures to promote the removal of user fees in basic 
education (Rosser et al., 2011a). 
 
The first measure his government introduced was to dramatically increase government spending on the education 
sector. This included the introduction of BOS in 2005. Funded through cuts to central government fuel subsidies, 
BOS sought to realise free basic education in Indonesia by providing funds directly to local governments and 
private primary and junior secondary schools on a per pupil basis to cover operational costs such as those related 
to the registration of new students, the purchase of textbooks, the production of report cards, stationery, teacher 
development and training, remedial teaching programmes and examinations. The second was to issue various 
implementing regulations, such as Minister for National Education Regulation No. 11/2005 on Textbooks and 
Government Regulations No. 47/2009 and No. 48/2009 on Compulsory Education and Education Funding, and to 
instruct regional governments to produce their own local regulations to enable implementation of free basic 
education within their respective regions. Finally, SBY ran a large-scale public information campaign to promote 
awareness of the government’s free basic education policy. Timed to coincide with the 2009 elections, this 
campaign involved blanket advertising across all forms of media—newspapers, television, radio and the internet 
(Rosser et al., 2011a). 
 
Together, these initiatives had a significant short-term positive impact on enrolment levels in primary and junior 
secondary education. Nevertheless, both formal and informal school fees have persisted, reflecting, as Rosser et 
al. (2011a) argue, the continuing power of politico-bureaucratic and corporate elements in the post-New Order 
period. For instance, in addition to resistance from senior business figures, most notably Vice-president Jusuf 
Kalla, one of Indonesia’s wealthiest businessmen; technocratic policy-makers, such as Finance Minister Sri 
Mulyani Indrawati; and members of the donor community, notably the World Bank—all of whom expressed strong 
concern about their budgetary implications—politico-bureaucrats outside the education sector manoeuvred to 
appropriate education resources to enhance their own sectoral budgets. As free basic education was a key 
component of SBY’s 2009 election manifesto (and related to the president’s own desires to seek favourable 
perceptions among the public), the minister for national education and the deputy-minister approached a number 
of sources for advice and analysis on realising free basic education. Sources included the ACDP, as well as the 
World Bank. The deputy-minister in particular asked questions about allocative decisions and standard-setting. 
The ACDP subsequently agreed to work with the Ministry of National Education to undertake a mapping of the 
Indonesian education system (including early childhood education, madrasa education, senior secondary 
education and gender mainstreaming), develop a strategy and define a policy instrument informed by a political 
economy analysis of funding arrangements. 
 
Poverty reduction, which achieved limited progress under the leadership of the relatively weak Ministry 
of Social Affairs and was subsequently elevated to the Office of the Vice-president through the 
establishment of a taskforce—the TNP2K—is an example of another key priority for the president. 
Chaired by the vice-president and including several cabinet-level posts, the team is advised by working 
groups, each informed by a number of university scholars and experts. One respondent suggested that 
TNP2K had commissioned research studies that had helped them to convey the depth of the challenge 
in addressing poverty in Indonesia. 
 
The presidential work unit has also responded to key presidential priorities by generating knowledge 
inputs. Part of the UKP-PPP’s role is to monitor and verify action plans implemented by certain 
ministries. This involves fieldwork and the compilation of reports, which could arguably be interpreted 
as the production of knowledge. For instance, in monitoring the preparation of a floating storage and 
regasification unit in North Sumatra, West Java and East Java, site visits revealed key problems with 
pricing, gas supply and land reclamation. In addition, UKP-PPP’s ‘debottlenecking’ strategy included a 
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quick and hands-on problem assessment, such as an on-site examination and discussion with relevant 
experts. 
 
In sum, our evidence suggests that policy-makers seem more likely to demand and use knowledge 
when responding to presidential directives (although there is less evidence to suggest that presidential 
priorities themselves are evidence-based). 
 
Seeking economic benefits 
Given the continued importance of generating economic resources for the country as a whole (and 
thereby the significance of its economic policy); strong competition over resources among ministries 
and agencies, not only within the central government but also between central and sub-national 
governments; as well as perverse incentives for top officials to extract rents where they can (in part 
because of poor civil servant salaries), there is strong evidence to suggest that policy-makers are more 
likely to demand and/or draw on research if there are (significant) economic benefits at stake that 
could be quantifiable in economic terms. Respondents suggested a number of examples, as follows. 
 
The vision of the Ministry of Finance to, among other things, manage the country’s finances effectively 
and be an instrument for improving economic prosperity24
 
 is probably a key contributing factor to the 
considerable investments that have been made in the production of knowledge within the ministry and 
its demand for analysis outside. For example, the BKF, an equivalent to Balitbang in other ministries, 
installed in 2006, is said to have 400 staff and to produce considerable analysis on macroeconomic 
forecasting, fiscal policy and fiscal risk. 
Moreover, the Ministry of Finance can also draw on its expert staff, who produce analysis on a range of 
issues including state income, state expenditure and macroeconomic and international finance.25
 
 The 
ministry is also said to regularly seek advice from a number of donors and international agencies, in 
particular the World Bank, with one respondent suggesting that the World Bank had effectively been 
installed as an ‘in-house advisor’. 
The Central Bank, which is responsible for achieving and maintaining the stability of the value of the 
rupiah, as well as monetary policy and regulating the payment and banking system, and is instrumental 
in accumulating economic resources, also has considerable analytical capacity. This in turn attracts a 
considerable amount of technical support from international sources, including scholarships for staff to 
study abroad. 
 
The Ministry of Trade has established a coordinating board with offices abroad, which produces 
information on possible investment opportunities. Moreover, the signing of regional and international 
trade agreements as well as government budget processes is said to spur on directorates-general in the 
Ministry of Trade to facilitate a flow of relevant information, as both have implications on revenue 
generation for the ministry as well as the GoI as a whole. 
 
The president’s response to the Norwegian government’s $1 billion commitment to the GoI in exchange 
for action around climate change is also illustrative of such incentives, but also reflects the president’s 
desire to seek favourable perceptions on the international stage—as Indonesia has been identified as 
the world’s third-largest producer of greenhouse gases. As part of the package of measures to reduce 
these, the president committed to developing a moratorium on the issuing of forestry licenses. 
Mandated by the president, the UKP-PPP set up a taskforce to generate knowledge through 
consultation with various stakeholders, including academia and CSOs specialising on the issue 
(facilitated by a leading civil society foundation, Kamitraan). Such incentives were said to have led to 
the establishment of a centre within the BKF, likely to be manned by around 15 research staff, to 
consider options on climate financing. 
 
                                                          
24 www.depkeu.go.id/Eng/Organization/?prof=visi. 
25 www.depkeu.go.id/eng/Organization/?prof=tupoksi. 
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Policy-makers were said to have sought knowledge in securing donor investments. For instance, the 
Country Coordinating Mechanism—set up to manage Global Fund money—commissioned research 
ahead of Round 11 of the Global Fund and brought in a consultant from Ghana to work with domestic 
counterparts in preparing the proposal. 
 
Finally, incentives to seek economic benefits also apply to individuals within the government. 
Suryadarma et al. (2011) suggest that, given low civil servant salaries, some officials see 
commissioning research as an opportunity to collect rents. This practice reportedly takes place in most 
government ministries and agencies, with officials said to offer contracts to the ‘highest bidder’, 
collecting rents either through cash in envelopes or disguised as a management item in the budget. 
Inevitably, this leads to less funding for research and poorer quality outputs, and ultimately prevents 
top-class research providers from serving government clients. 
 
Seeking favourable perceptions among the media and the public 
The introduction of direct elections for the president, local leaders and now MPs, coupled with the 
growth of the media, was said to have caused dramatic changes in the behaviour of policy-makers, 
especially those seeking political office (see Qodari, 2010). Mietzner (2009a), for example, argues that 
the extensive cash transfer programme was instrumental in SBY’s 2009 election triumph. Although SBY 
suffered in the opinion polls in 2008, Mietzner (2009a:4) argues that: 
 
The introduction of massive cash programs for the poor triggered SBY’s meteoric rise from electoral 
underdog to almost unassailable frontrunner. Between June 2008 and April 2009, the government spent 
approximately US$2 billion on compensation payments for increased fuel prices, schooling allowances, 
and microcredit programs. As a result, SBY’s popularity skyrocketed from 25% in June 2008 to 50.3% in 
February 2009, and PD’s support surged to 24.3% in the same time frame. 
 
As we described above, the implementation of the cash transfer programme involved considerable 
analytical work in Bappenas. Some respondents also suggested that policy issues, which involved a 
higher degree of media focus, had often led to constructive and evidence-informed changes. For 
example, the process around recent changes to immigration laws attracted considerable media 
attention, with pressure from CSOs. As a result, the matter was discussed openly and the commission 
drafting the legislation consulted widely. Another respondent suggested that seeking favourable 
perceptions among the media, particularly in response to natural disasters, could encourage provincial 
leaders, for instance, to invest in, and use, knowledge inputs such as robust disaster risk assessments. 
 
The role of the media in shaping perceptions of election candidates as well as in framing issues was 
said to have given birth to a range of new actors, including survey institutes. Such institutes are called 
on to map voter preferences, understand the strengths and weaknesses of a candidate and decide 
what strategies would persuade voters to vote for them. 
 
But polling does not seem to be limited to assessing the prospects of election candidates. According to 
some workshop participants, government agencies have also started to undertake polling among 
‘service users’ to assess the quality of service delivery (perhaps inspired by ministers’ incentives to 
retain posts in the cabinet). One respondent suggested that district-level offices for the Ministry of 
Social Affairs had, for instance, set up online forms enabling members of the public to comment on the 
quality of certain services. 
 
However, Mietzner (2009b) suggests that the emergence of opinion polling as a central element of 
electoral politics in Indonesia has tempted many party leaders to pick candidates and policies based 
on survey results and not their political platform. This has created tensions in political parties, 
undermined their role as vehicles of representation and aggregation and encouraged candidates to 
place image politics above substantive policy platforms.26
                                                          
26 However, survey work and opinion polling could be used in a policy-oriented manner. For example, changes identified in 
citizen priorities from survey work could potentially influence changes in party platforms. 
 And considering the impact of their political 
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moves on their standing in the polls, Indonesia’s contemporary politicians have become reluctant to 
launching groundbreaking (and potentially controversial and unpopular) policy initiatives. 
 
But after decades under Soeharto’s New Order regime, the new populists’ attention to voters’ wishes 
has been welcomed as a positive change, as Muhammad Asfar, a pollster from Indonesia’s second-
largest city Surabaya, suggests: ‘The district head told us to find out what projects and policies the 
people wanted to see implemented before the next ballot; we went there, conducted a survey, and 
drafted a list of things that the voters wanted to see done.’ Recommending that the district build water 
irrigation systems and begin other urgently needed infrastructure projects, Asfar felt that his polling 
institute had made a concrete contribution to the development of the area in which the survey was 
held. ‘Without such pressure from opinion polls, the district head would never have addressed these 
crucial problems; now, you can call this populism, but I call it practical, real, and tangible democracy,’ 
said Asfar (in Mietzner, 2009b:122). 
 
Seeking favourable perceptions among international actors 
With the president’s (and other politicians’) credibility at stake on the world stage, particularly given 
the country’s relatively new status as a middle-income country, policy actors have often drawn on 
knowledge inputs to meet international targets and benchmarks or prepare for negotiations in 
international forums (which could also bring about economic benefits). For example, in meeting the 
MDGs, Bappenas, in preparing the next medium-term development plan, approached the World Bank 
on what it could do to contribute to the MDGs and MDGs+, particularly those that were health-oriented. 
Calls to meet the MDGs may also explain to a certain extent why the minister for health considerably 
increased staffing in the Balitbang to around 40 and why the minister is, according to some 
respondents, placing more demands on staff to produce high quality analyses. But this could also be 
for a variety of other reasons, which we outline elsewhere in this section, including the need to 
maintain high levels of economic growth (if one assumes that ‘health is wealth’) and, given inter-
ministerial competition, the need to maintain donor investments from the likes of the Global Fund. 
 
Although closely linked with other incentives to, for instance, seek economic benefits, respond to 
presidential directives and inform political arguments, similar dynamics have spurred several actors 
within the government to seek knowledge inputs. For instance, the UKP-PPP commissioned research on 
how the economy could be more competitive in relation to its neighbours. There has also been demand 
for information on the effect of Japan’s slowdown on the Indonesian economy. Seeking to increase the 
country’s tax base, the Ministry of Finance sought comparative research on tax intensity (which 
highlighted the country’s poor performance). Under considerable pressure to reduce greenhouse 
gases, the former minister for finance, impressed with initiatives taken by Australia, sought help from 
the Australian Treasurer to think about policy options on climate change adaptation and mitigation. 
 
Preparing for negotiations in G-20 and ASEAN forums and signing trade agreements also seems to drive 
knowledge production. The deputy-minister for trade, for instance, himself produced background notes 
ahead of a recent G-20 summit (as he could not be sure of the quality of the papers if they were 
commissioned out). Further, the government’s signing of UN conventions and treaties abroad was seen 
to put pressure on policy-makers at home to respond to non-state actors such as CSOs in 
domesticating such laws and, in the process, draw on expertise to, for instance, draft bills. This seems 
to be the case on issues of gender and women’s rights where the Women’s Coalition has been called 
on for considerable assistance. 
 
Seeking to exercise authority over others 
Demand for research is often shaped by the need for certain actors to establish or maintain authority 
over others. For instance, the BKF was seen to provide leadership over policy areas which are the line 
responsibility of other people within the ministry (such as the Directorate-general for Budget) and 
government (including Bappenas). This includes the important role of managing fierce competition 
between ministries (and lobbying from ministers) over resources. Although a strong personality and 
relationships with others are important (the minister for finance was seen as involving the current head 
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of the BKF in several areas of the ministry’s work, suggesting a high level of trust in the head to 
perform), the strength of argument is also bolstered by the considerable knowledge produced by many 
of the BKF’s 400 staff. 
 
This dynamic can also be seen between the central and sub-national levels. In allocating funds to 
community health centres (puskesmas), the Balitbang in the Ministry of Health (which in turn may have 
drawn on the expertise of various universities) undertook a study taking in 300 puskesmas samples, 
which the Planning Bureau used to determine allocations which, given the power asymmetry between 
the Ministry of Health and local governments, faced little contestation. 
 
Seeking to prevent and/or mitigate the effects of crises or acute disorders 
The combination of trauma from the effects of the AFC and the occurrence of frequent natural disasters 
(by virtue of Indonesia’s location along the Pacific ring of fire), in addition to the role of the media in 
shaping perceptions of politicians seeking election, has put considerable emphasis on policy-makers 
to take measures which prevent or at least mitigate the effects of crises. For instance, in light of the 
frequently occurring exogenous shocks, such as high profile natural disasters, and the role of the 
media in influencing the rise or fall of high-ranking officials dealing with such issues, there have been 
demands for information and analysis from the BNPB on, for instance, international good practices in 
disaster risk reduction. 
 
Moreover, the UKP-PPP and one presidential advisor have shown interest in information to help control 
food prices and curb youth unemployment to avoid political unrest. In a bid to avert religious 
extremism and possible future terrorist threats, research has been carried out to understand how and 
where people could be radicalised. This revealed that children attending madrasas were particularly 
vulnerable. As a result, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, with the support of the ACDP, embarked on a 
consultative process to address religious intolerance. And, traumatised after being hit hardest by the 
AFC, the government, taking action early after the global financial crisis hit the US and Europe, promptly 
undertook research to inform the design of social protection measures—interventions which ultimately 
helped it to ‘sail through’ the (albeit less severe) crisis of 2008/09. 
 
Seeking to deflect or insulate oneself from criticism and/or influence 
Given the relatively high levels of political competition within the government and the role of the media 
in shining a light on policy-makers, some respondents suggested that knowledge and associations 
with particular sources of knowledge were used as a strategy to deflect criticism of unpopular policies 
or provide decision-makers with a degree of insulation (should things go wrong). For instance, this was 
seen by one respondent as an incentive for line ministries to draw on external World Bank analysis. 
Another respondent suggested that, by asking LPEM to estimate the impact of a 30% increase in the 
cost of electricity, the government helped to insulate itself from subsequent criticism, with much of it 
unfairly directed towards LPEM, which was deemed (incorrectly) by the media to have initially 
suggested the figure. 
 
Repeatedly commissioning research or doing so over a long period of time could be interpreted as a 
way of enabling decision-makers to defer decision-making to a later date, especially when decisions 
are hotly contested and are made in the presence of powerful interest groups. On the issue of fuel 
subsidies, for instance, it appears that the government has undertaken several studies over the years 
to inform policy options, with the latest one being undertaken by a consortium of three universities 
early in 2011. While repeatedly undertaking research reflects the need to reassess options, given the 
volatility of international fuel prices and other aspects of the international economy, it may also 
suggest a desire to appear to be doing something and, in the process, help to insulate the GoI from 
excessive criticism while at the same time avoiding taking potentially difficult decisions (see Box 10). 
 
 
 
 
  
58 
Box 10: The production of knowledge on reforming the energy subsidy regime 
Subsidies for fuels (comprising coal, gasoline, diesel oil, kerosene and liquefied petroleum gas) and electricity 
have received huge amounts of government support in Indonesia for decades. During the 1980s, when 
Indonesian’s oil production was higher, fuel and electricity subsidies were more affordable. However, oil 
production has steadily declined over the past 10 years—by 40% in total—and, last year, Indonesia withdrew from 
the Organization of the Petroleum-exporting Countries (OPEC). Coupled with this, fuel and electricity subsidy 
expenditures rocketed, with the Indonesian government spending more on energy subsidies in 2010 than it spent 
on defence, education, health and social security combined, with subsidies likely to be worth over Rp134 trillion 
($15 billion) in 2011. 
 
Fuel subsidies in particular have corresponded to transfers from the central government to the state-owned oil 
company (Pertamina) to cover the losses the company incurs when the domestic price is kept below international 
prices. Oil price volatility has hence created significant challenges in managing the Indonesian budget. High 
international oil prices have resulted in expenditures far exceeding revenue from fuel. The government made 
reductions in the level of subsidies in 2001/02, 2005 and 2008. However, these reductions were more than offset 
by rising international fuel prices, with total expenditure on fuel subsidies increasing substantially over this 
period. The government has reiterated on many occasions its intention to eliminate these subsidies, as they are 
seen to benefit the well-off more than vulnerable individuals (who consume less fuel) and because subsidies 
crowd out higher quality expenditure on infrastructure investment, human capital accumulation and social 
protection programmes. 
 
In 2010, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources set up a commission to assess policy options. However, 
respondents suggested that findings were (i) not sufficiently ambitious, with bureaucrats, aware of the 
sensitivities, perhaps self-censoring; and (ii) technically deficient in some aspects, with estimates of cost savings 
seen as much too optimistic. But the GoI subsequently announced a plan in 2010 to raise electricity prices and 
limit fuel subsidies. The measure would have restricted private car owners in the Greater Jakarta area from buying 
subsidised fuel from April 2011. Only public transportation would be entitled to subsidised fuel. In 2012, 
subsidies were to be further reduced. However, the plan has been postponed indefinitely, with the government 
citing increasing global oil prices as a key impediment. 
 
More recently, in March 2011, the government commissioned a study on the restriction of subsidised fuel 
consumption. It entrusted university research centres at UGM, Bandung Institute of Technology (Institut Teknologi 
Bandung, or ITB) and UI to participate in the study. UGM was assigned to study the subsidised fuel restriction 
policy from an economic perspective, ITB from a technical perspective and UI from a supervisory standpoint.27
 
 
However, one respondent suggested that interest on research on the issue had shifted from identifying options 
for removing the subsidy to how the government could increase the fuel price, with the shift pushed by the 
president and vice-president. 
With a large price disparity between subsidised and non-subsidised products, strong incentives exist for illegal 
practices such as fuel smuggling and diversion to unintended recipients in industry and business. Successive 
proposals have thus faced strong political opposition from many MPs, many of whom themselves benefit from 
subsidised fuel and have links to key economic actors who gain from the status quo (IISD, 2011). 
 
Another respondent suggested that developing a knowledge base would help to insulate policy-makers 
from (undue) influence and opinions of non-state actors. Although the government appears to have 
become more responsive, one respondent suggested that ‘demand from the surrounding by no means 
reflected the objective situation.’ In other words, demands made by civil society and the media do not 
necessarily reflect a neutral perspective. For example, in relation to education policy, one respondent 
suggested that, without an evidence base, the minster was swayed by public opinion (often mediated 
by the press and television) from one day to the next, which in itself some respondents considered 
unlikely to be informed by objective or politically neutral analysis. Specifically, in response to the 
controversy over national examinations, the Ministry of National Education, with support from the 
ACDP, was to undertake a study into examination practice (see Box 11 for more on the controversy). 
Similarly, concerning the Bank Century case, a workshop participant suggested that the existence of an 
objectively defined indicator to help determine when and at what stage banks should be bailed out or 
left to fail may have resulted in less conflict between the executive and legislature over the Bank 
Century bailout. 
                                                          
27 www.majalahtambang.com/detail_berita.php?category=15&newsnr=3645. 
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Box 11: The controversy over national examinations 
In 2003, the government initiated ujian nasional (UN), or nationwide standardised exams. These were to test 
students in four subjects at junior secondary level and six subjects at senior secondary school level. Students 
had to get an average 5.5 out of a possible 10 in each subject to allow them to continue to higher levels of 
education. This became the only means to appraise a student’s academic performance. 
 
The decision to initiate the UN sparked intense nationwide debate among teachers, education experts, parents 
and students. Those who opposed argued that the exams were unfair considering the high levels of inequality in 
education between regions in Indonesia, which would have a negative impact on teachers and the education 
environment in general. The government, on the other hand, argued that the UN was necessary to measure 
education performance across the country and to help the government improve the quality of education. Faced 
with intense pressures for their students to pass and prove their worth in teaching, many teachers were said to 
encourage students to cheat during the examinations. Cases of cheating ranging from leaking exams to the 
circulation of answer sheets were uncovered in several schools across Indonesia. 
 
In 2007, a lawsuit was filed by a group of students and parents at the Central Jakarta City Court, seeking the 
elimination of the UN. When the court reached its conclusion a long time later—in September 2009—the 
government had to upgrade educational facilities nationwide before it could hold national exams. However, in 
January 2010, following a request from a UN working committee on the DPR’s Commission X, which focused on 
education issues, the Supreme Court came down on the side of the government, stating that its verdict did not 
mean the UN should be delayed. 
 
Despite the controversy, the Ministry of National Education persisted with the UN in 2011, but changed the 
weighting of a student’s overall pass mark, 60% of which would be informed by the UN, with the remaining 40% 
coming from the school’s own examination score. The change resulted in the percentage of students passing 
approaching 100%. The controversy finally led the ministry to approach the ACDP for assistance in establishing a 
body of knowledge on what the UN was trying to measure and the best way to do this. 
 
Seeking to bolster arguments or legitimise policy 
According to some respondents, research has often been used to bolster or defend policy positions 
and approaches to addressing policy problems that have already been taken (although such positions 
could also be in support of particular elements of the bureaucracy in intra-governmental competition 
for resources—an economic benefit). One respondent mentioned how quantitative impact evaluations 
were particularly useful in helping to defend programmes in the parliament (and perhaps justify 
continued government funding). On a particular labour law, the Ministry of Labour had reportedly 
commissioned research from a number of sources in a bid to identify politically viable options. In 
addition, in relation to fuel subsidies, some MPs, who were said to be preventing the government from 
removing fuel subsidies, suggested that they had seen studies showing that the current fuel subsidy 
regime did not benefit only the wealthy. And several respondents suggested that research from 
Balitbang, although considered weak, was often drawn on, as it was ‘politically viable’. 
 
A few respondents implied that knowledge could help bolster political arguments. In relation to 
economic policy, one respondent suggested that, 
 
‘The role of research in economics is a vested question. Often, because results are often so unclear and so 
open to debates, economic research is often used as a tool to support a rhetorical debate rather than being 
an argument killer in itself. It’s rare that an economic study wins the day. Foundations of the research are 
rarely questioned. It becomes the role of the champion for that research to construct it into a rhetorical 
argument that cuts through at a political level.’ 
 
As such, much of the research produced by the BKF, for instance, is arguably produced to help the 
minister for finance to make strong arguments when negotiating with other members of the government 
(and to help him to exert authority over others). 
 
Concerning the issue of fuel subsidies, in 2008, the vice-president, wanting to present a strong case for 
reducing subsidies to the parliament, drew on World Bank analysis highlighting the (negative) 
budgetary and inflationary impact of not reducing fuel subsidies and what the savings could be used 
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for. And, although many within the government seemed to accept the need to reduce subsidies further, 
given the high oil price, the government commissioned a number of further studies, arguably to bolster 
its argument given the presence of strong opposition (see Box 10). Finally, Lay (2010) suggests that 
MPs found that working with CSOs helped them to access evidence to improve their arguments during 
legislative processes. 
 
Seeking to exert pressure on others 
As the Bank Century case shows, as do some of the debates during plenary sessions, MPs are often 
influenced by a desire to put pressure on certain policy actors. And, as some respondents suggested, 
drawing on technical information or allying with civil society experts are effective tools to do that. For 
instance, the head of Commission XI allied with Democratic Youth in order to successfully prevent the 
privatisation of a local government hospital in Jakarta (Lay, 2010). Moreover, having discussed the 
acrimony there existed among central government officials on fiscal decentralisation, some officials 
may have sought analysis to discipline local authorities or at least highlight deficiencies in local 
government performance. One such example is research commissioned by the Ministry of Health and 
undertaken by UI and UGM highlighting the failure of local governments to meet a government mandate 
to allocate at least 15% of funding to health care. Comparative research and performance indices (on 
budget transparency processes, for instance) are increasingly being undertaken at the district level in a 
bid to highlight (with the help of the media) performance of local governments. Some respondents 
believed that this could in turn influence district heads’ incentives to undertake more (knowledge-
informed) developmental strategies. 
 
Seeking to prove and increase one’s legitimacy  
Given the challenges some MPs face in properly representing their constituents (vast distances, 
inadequate resources, weak analytical capacity and an excessive number of tasks), MPs have drawn on 
knowledge inputs in the form of alliances with civil society groups. Lay (2010) suggests that MPs are 
more likely to work with organisations if they have a clear-cut constituency and a network helping them 
to better represent their constituents by, for instance, facilitating consultation processes and helping to 
channel up ‘grassroots’ voices, providing them with greater levels of legitimacy in the eyes of senior 
government officials. For instance, in promoting better health care for the poor, PDI-P allied with SRMI, 
which in turn was able to mobilise thousands of displaced people from 10 locations across Jakarta. 
Together, they were able to force local authorities to direct the government’s cash for the poor scheme 
to 3,000 people and secure the GoI health insurance scheme for 1,500 people (Lay, 2010). 
 
Seeking to strengthen relationships with others 
Our research suggests that, given the dominance of informal and personalised networks, research may 
be commissioned to maintain or strengthen relationships. Although, as discussed earlier, the strength 
of personal networks is facilitated by weak internal knowledge management mechanisms together with 
prohibitive government knowledge procurement regulations, such problems suit many top officials, as 
this enables them to use project money to strengthen their patronage networks through the direct 
appointment of specific individual researchers and specialists (Sherlock, 2010a). The role of knowledge 
exchange in maintaining relationships is exemplified by Lay (2010), who suggests that MPs may pass 
on or ‘leak’ information to CSO contacts as well as channel information from CSOs into decision-
making spaces, while CSOs in return are required to apply Chatham House Rules and maintain 
confidentiality of the source (Lay, 2010). 
 
Seeking to establish and improve one’s credibility 
In addition to maintaining relationships, some respondents suggested that the use of research could 
help establish and improve one’s credibility in relation to those around them. A number of respondents 
suggested that a strong incentive for Bappenas to produce and use research was to enable it to be 
viewed by others as a credible source of knowledge (thus helping it to fulfil its role as a think-tank for 
government agencies) and gain the trust of other ministry officials. As such, one could interpret this as 
attempts to re-exert its power in the government, given the overlapping nature of planning functions 
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between it and the Ministry of Finance. Such incentives may have led Bappenas, which seems to have 
insufficient power to adequately coordinate line ministries, to, for instance, secure a deal with AusAID 
to fund a policy analysis unit as well as support to use computer modelling data in the drawing-up of 
the medium-term development plan, and one with USAID to fund an in-house senior advisor. In 
addition, one respondent suggested that MPs were likely to draw on research and analysis if it was 
likely to make them appear more credible in relation to their political party or other key actor(s). 
 
Seeking to advance one’s career 
Given the earlier discussion around civil service performance, it seems unlikely that civil servants, 
particularly those below the upper echelons, view drawing on information and analysis in decision-
making as a way of advancing their career. Possible exceptions, though, include staff from the Ministry 
of Finance and the Central Bank, two institutions which have received permission from Kempan & RB to 
establish performance-based remuneration systems. Nevertheless, it is unclear how performance is 
defined and whether this has had an effect on officials’ demand for and use of knowledge inputs. 
Among senior officials, it is more likely that promotion to director-general and especially new deputy-
minister posts is based at least in part on a track record of designing good policies and strong 
leadership. But, given the high levels of rotation and turnover among senior civil servants, it is unclear 
whether promotion criteria can include an assessment of the effectiveness of policy outputs (and 
outcomes). As we discuss elsewhere, elected politicians may feel that drawing on knowledge may help 
them to establish credibility in relation to their party or the electorate, put pressure on other actors and 
build relationships, all of which may advance their own political career. 
 
Seeking to act in accordance with one’s ethics 
There may be individuals who gain satisfaction from performing their job well, which may mean they 
are more likely to draw on research, analysis and stakeholder consultations. Individuals may believe 
that consulting with a range of stakeholders is in itself a good thing. For instance, Lay (2010) suggests 
that some MPs are confident that civil society involvement in policy processes is a good thing in itself—
related to the basic idea of democracy that people have the right to be involved in public matters and 
to access information. These traits are probably stronger for some actors than others. As one 
respondent suggested, the use of knowledge in policy-making among ministers is highly variable and 
supposedly dependent on whether or not the minister values research (which can be informed by 
whether or not they themselves have a research background). 
 
And the extent to which the political economy conditions particular actors (or not) differs according to a 
range of reasons, including position within the system. For example, senior technocrats such as 
deputy-ministers and heads of commissions may be in a better position to act in accordance with their 
ethics given less direct exposure to political competition. As discussed in Section 4, personalities such 
as Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, the head of UKP-PPP, and the former minister for finance, Sri Mulyani 
Indrawati, were seen as progressive reformers who valued research and consultation processes. One 
vice-minister, said to have driven every major reform in his ministry in recent years, appreciated advice 
and knew how to frame policy questions. But, as we highlighted in Section 4, not all those who seem to 
be free from some of the political economy constraints we outlined earlier have ethics in line with some 
of the normative prescriptions of the (neoliberal) good governance agenda. 
 
Other possible factors 
Here, we discuss two factors for which there is limited evidence. First, as mentioned earlier, some 
ministries and agencies, such as Finance, Trade, the Central Bank and Public Works, were said by some 
respondents to produce both outputs and outcomes that are more quantifiable in economic terms and 
where indicators of progress are clear, decision-making is more rational and systems for storing and 
reusing information are better. This may suggest that policy-makers could have incentives to adhere to 
established technical standards in a limited number of ministries and thus are more likely to draw on 
knowledge in the process. 
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Second, in general terms, there is often a perception that issues such as trade and fiscal policy that are 
viewed as technically more complicated create an incentive to bring in people with academic 
backgrounds and technical skills. This suggests that issues that seem less complicated, such as health 
and education, are unlikely to attract quite as much technical input and conversely enable a broader 
number of actors to comment and critique. A number of respondents suggested that the media and 
civil society were more likely to report on social issues such as health and education, perhaps because 
they could relate more to the issue. As they had been ill and been to a hospital, they felt they were 
better placed to have a say on how the health system should be designed; or, since they had been to 
school, they could comment on designing education policies (which may also indicate why legislators 
have increasingly been seen to draft legislation on these issues). However, a number of respondents 
reasoned that the quality of debate on such issues in the media tended to be very poor, reflecting a 
lack of understanding of what ‘good’ policies (on health and education, for instance) really are. This 
would suggest that almost all policy issues can be characterised as technically complicated and that 
levels of stakeholder engagement are driven mainly by perceptions rather than actual levels of 
complexity. 
 
7.2 Factors that might discourage policy-makers from using knowledge 
 
Having identified a number of factors which might encourage policy-makers to invest in, demand 
and/or use knowledge, we now consider those which might discourage policy-makers from doing so. 
Although there are often countless reasons why policy-makers might not draw on knowledge, our 
research suggests four key factors.28
 
 
Lack of convening power 
Unless policy-makers are responding to a higher placed supervisor, if a person lacks power and, hence, 
the capacity to convene others and take a decision, they are unlikely to request analysis on any one 
issue. One respondent suggested that policy problems often had relatively straightforward solutions 
but required the convening and cooperation of multiple actors (including central and local as well as 
public and private actors) which, given the competition over territory and resources, tended to result in 
deadlock. Moreover, the analysis in Section 4 highlighted that subordinates are probably unlikely to 
want to take a position on an issue and ‘influence’ or ‘sell’ ideas (that any research might indicate) to 
their seniors unless they are asked, making it more difficult for them to demand analysis to help them 
in the first instance. 
 
Resistance from politico-bureaucrats and corporate interests 
Even if policy-makers invest in and demand knowledge of various sorts, they are not always in a 
position to use such knowledge to inform their decision-making. Our repeated mentions of the fuel 
subsidy issue are illustrative of how corporate interests are able to exert considerable influence on 
policy-makers and prevent them from pushing through reform. Furthermore, the nature of the research 
questions posed, the analysis conducted and the way in which results have been presented all seem to 
have been conditioned by the interests of those who may have a great deal to lose from any divergence 
from the status quo. 
 
Short time horizons 
As we highlighted in Sections 4 and 5, the desire among elected leaders to seek re-election, the glare of 
the media spotlight and increasing public pressure mean that policy-makers often feel compelled to 
draft laws and guidelines quickly. Short time horizons, perhaps coupled with limited capacity among 
domestic research centres to deliver research products in appropriate formats, often mean that plans 
are brought forward, frequently with little analysis, and/or launched without adequate piloting or 
                                                          
28 Vincent Cable, now a minister for the UK government, outlined five 'S's that limit the ability of decision-makers to pursue an 
evidence‐based approach: speed, superficiality, spin, secrecy and scientific ignorance. This resource can be found at 
www.odi.org.uk/Rapid/Meetings/Evidence/Presentation_3/Cable.html.  
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testing. Respondents pointed to a number of examples to illustrate this: the launch of initiatives to 
promote free basic education without having undertaken studies to assess, for example, the 
complexity of financing and implementing such an initiative; and a law mandating every district in the 
country to develop one international standard school intended to increase access for children from 
poor backgrounds to high standards of education. As these schools required considerable parental 
contributions, the poor were effectively excluded—something which one respondent suggested could 
have been recognised as a risk ex-ante through prior analytical work. 
 
Inadequate analytical capacity 
Respondents suggested that a lack of analytical capacity may discourage some policy-makers from 
demanding and using knowledge. This seems to be particularly the case for MPs within the legislature, 
where, as we have suggested, the capacity of the secretariat-general and the budget office probably do 
not match the powers they have been given to draft laws, provide oversight of the executive and 
represent the country’s citizens. Furthermore, we have suggested that politicians in many cases seek to 
put pressure on others or establish their credibility, but many respondents suggested that poor 
perceptions of the capacity of the secretariat-general and its staff could mean that they are less likely 
to ensure that their positions are evidence-based/informed, or that they draw on informal contacts, if 
possible (where quality of analysis could be highly variable). 
 
7.3 Summary 
 
Our analysis of the political economy of policy-making in Indonesia suggests a range of factors which 
appear to shape policy-makers’ demand for and use of knowledge. Not only do such factors influence 
the behaviour of policy-makers generally, but also they may influence policy-makers to draw on 
knowledge in particular. We list these factors in Table 2 and attempt to indicate (although this would 
most likely vary according to the nature of the issue) which of the four actors—the president, ministers, 
MPs and senior (echelon one) bureaucrats—are likely to be susceptible to such incentives considering 
their location in the government and the constraints they are under. We also try to assess the relative 
strength of the evidence for each incentive. Our analysis suggests that there is strong evidence to 
indicate that four factors in particular—directives from the president (except the president 
himself/herself), economic rewards, public/media pressure and external factors—affect almost all 
types of policy-makers. 
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Table 2: Policy-makers’ incentives to use knowledge 
Factor Senior 
bureaucrats 
Ministers MPs President Relative 
strength of 
evidence 
1. Seeking to respond to the president or 
those with a presidential mandate such as 
a highly placed supervisor 
Yes Yes Possibly  Strong 
2. Seeking economic benefits for the 
government as a whole, for particular 
ministries or for individuals 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Strong 
3. Seeking favourable perceptions among the 
media and public 
Possibly Yes Yes Yes Strong 
4. Seeking favourable perceptions among key 
international actors (within key forums 
such as the UN) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Strong 
5. Seeking to exercise authority over others 
(in, for example, making allocative 
decisions) 
Yes Yes Yes  Moderate 
6. Seeking to prevent and/or mitigate the 
effects of crises (political unrest, natural 
disasters, financial crises) 
Yes Yes  Yes Moderate 
7. Seeking to deflect or insulate oneself from 
criticism and influence (from the media, 
the public or MPs) 
Yes Yes Yes  Moderate 
8. Seeking to bolster arguments or legitimise 
policy 
Yes Yes Yes  Moderate 
9. Seeking to exert pressure on others 
(through, for example, parliamentary 
enquiries) 
Yes Yes Yes  Moderate 
10. Seeking to prove and increase one’s 
legitimacy 
  Yes  Moderate 
11. Seeking to strengthen relationships with 
others 
Yes    Moderate 
12. Seeking to establish and improve one’s 
credibility 
Yes  Yes  Moderate 
13. Seeking to advance one’s career Possibly    Moderate 
14. Seeking to act in accordance with one’s 
ethics 
Yes Yes Yes  Moderate 
15. Seeking to adhere to established technical 
standards 
Possibly    Limited 
16. Seeking to address high levels of technical 
complexity 
Possibly    Limited 
 
In the final section, we summarise some of the institutional features of the policy-making system in 
Indonesia and discuss the factors that shape knowledge use in somewhat more depth before 
suggesting what this implies for AusAID’s Knowledge Sector Programme in Indonesia. 
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8. Conclusions, recommendations and further work 
 
This concluding section summarises our findings; discusses factors that both motivate and discourage 
policy-makers to use knowledge; provides recommendations for AusAID in selecting policy issues to 
work on and designing demand-side interventions; and makes suggestions for further research and 
learning. 
 
8.1 Formal policy processes 
 
In Indonesia, there seem to be two sets of major policy processes: (i) regular development planning 
and budgeting and (ii) the development of more ad hoc laws and regulations. While laws, which 
provide high level principles, require parliamentary approval, regulations, which provide detailed 
guidance to implement particular laws, do not. Importantly, the annual budget also requires 
parliamentary approval. Guidance for development planning seems fairly detailed, but this is less the 
case for laws and regulations. 
 
Nevertheless, formal knowledge in the shape of academic drafts and consultations with state and non-
state actors is, generally speaking, supposed to play a prominent role in policy formulation processes. 
However, our research suggests that, although varying considerably across sectors, formal rules are not 
always followed; when they are, they do not necessarily result in well-informed plans. Further, formal 
bureaucratic rules appear to provide weak incentives for policy-makers to invest in, demand and use 
knowledge in order to produce good outputs and outcomes. As such, this study aimed to uncover other 
(perhaps stronger) factors which encourage policy-makers to use knowledge, by identifying key 
institutional features of the policy-making process or, in other word, the ‘rules of the game’, which 
shape policy-makers’ knowledge-seeking/using behaviour. 
 
8.2 The ‘rules of the game’ 
 
The president, directly elected in 2004, is seen as the country’s most influential policy-maker. SBY is 
under considerable pressure to quicken the pace of economic and social development, especially from 
a vibrant media and civil society. As his credibility is at stake on the world stage, particularly given the 
country’s relatively new status as a middle-income country, he (and his cabinet) is often under pressure 
to prepare and perform in forums such as the G-20 and ASEAN and at the UN, and to meet global 
targets such as the MDGs. The role of the vice-president, elected on the same ticket as the president, is 
no longer a ceremonial position; his or her instructions can, in theory, carry considerable weight. 
 
Coalition politics mean that the appointment of ministerial posts is often informed by discussions 
between the president and the leaders of coalition parties. However, appointments to ministries 
considered economic, such as Bappenas and the Ministries of Finance, Trade and Public Works, have 
typically continued to benefit from meritocratic appointments, reflecting a continued focus on 
economic policy. But higher levels of political competition mean that cabinet-level decision-making can 
be drawn out, with unpopular reforms less likely to be realised and technocrats, especially those 
without political backing, facing higher levels of contestation than they did, say, under Soeharto’s New 
Order era. While higher levels of political competition ensure that key decision-making processes are 
subject to more contestation, this is also in part because of intense inter-ministerial bureaucratic 
competition over territory and resources, which in turn creates major coordination problems. 
 
The minister for finance, as, in effect, the country’s chief financial officer, is responsible for managing 
the macroeconomic framework, as well as controlling the budget. As such, the ministry has the 
authority to assess and resolve competing claims for resources from ministries and agencies. Although 
Bappenas is responsible for long-term, medium-term and annual planning, some of its functions 
overlap with those of the Ministry of Finance, and it appears to lack the authority and resources to 
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undertake its planning functions adequately. With regard to cross-ministry programmes, difficult 
reforms are often elevated to the level of the president and the vice-president to ‘debottleneck’ through 
the establishment of commissions and taskforces, such as the UKP-PPP and TNP2K. 
 
Within ministries, deputy-ministers and directors-general are key actors in shaping the decisions of 
ministers. Many seem to lack training in leadership and management, instead learning from past 
experiences and ‘on the job’. Performance of senior-ranked officials, to varying extents, is often 
determined by the nature of their personality and, in particular, their own personal and professional 
ethics. Further, siloisation limits the communication across divisions, which often affects the quality of 
policy work. However, steps are being taken in some cases to address this. 
 
Political parties have moved away from the violent conflict that characterised the early part of the 
country’s transition towards a system, and they now exercise power through negotiation, power-sharing 
and peaceful dispute resolution. The party system seems to have been institutionalised, with the five 
largest parties in the 1999 parliament also represented in the 2009 election. Such party longevity is 
rare in most East Asian democracies. However, although there is considerable variation, political 
parties tend to have low and falling memberships, lack independent funding sources and serve as 
weak platforms for presenting policy choices. 
 
The power of the DPR has expanded considerably in the short time since the fall of Soeharto. Despite 
most legislation being drafted by executive agencies, MPs are drafting increasing amounts, especially 
on social issues. They are increasingly active in overseeing legislation and more prominent in reviewing 
the annual budget. Even though considerable policy work, such as on government regulations, resides 
formally with the executive, theoretically speaking, DPR members can influence such work, as almost 
all major parties are represented in the cabinet. 
 
Power in the DPR is centred in its legislative commissions rather than in the party-controlled caucuses, 
with DPR members often identifying more strongly with their commissions than with their parties. 
Decision-making in the DPR is generally through deliberation and consensus-building, and all parties 
are expected to make concessions before agreement can be reached. While this prevents the adoption 
of partisan and exclusivist laws, it also makes it more difficult to pass coherent legislation. And, while 
the excessive powers vested in commissions has led to a lack of transparency and accountability, 
importantly, it has encouraged DPR members to scrutinise government activities even when their 
parties are represented in the cabinet. 
 
The personalisation of politics (facilitated by direct elections), coupled with the professionalisation of 
politics (encouraged by the rise of the media and the need to create a favourable image), has increased 
the cost of campaigning dramatically (and politics generally), which has limited the pool from which 
electoral candidates can emerge. Moreover, under pressure to canvass widely, hire opinion polling 
companies and political consultants and pay for television adverts, the need for politicians to have 
increasing amounts of campaign financing has brought them closer to corporate interests which, 
looking for a quid pro quo, have often had considerable influence on decision-making in the DPR. 
 
Our analysis suggests that, although the capacity of Balitbang varies widely, they have generally 
declined relative to their role during the New Order era. They tend to suffer from a number of mutually 
reinforcing problems, including insufficient funding, inadequately skilled and poorly remunerated staff, 
poor utilisation, high turnover and weak communication mechanisms with operational directorates. 
The extent to which they suffer these problems varies across Balitbang, with the BKF being a major 
exception: this has up to 400 staff and essentially helps the Ministry of Finance to manage the 
economy and prepare the budget. 
 
Ministries face a number of obstacles in commissioning outsiders to undertake research, including 
limited funding and inhibitive regulations. An important source of data is the BPS, particularly as 
policy-makers are showing increasing preference for quantifiable indicators. However, some 
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respondents reasoned that data could be better disaggregated and more regularly produced, especially 
for regions in Eastern Indonesia. 
 
Analytical capacity in the legislature seems to be weak but improving. Overall, resourcing of the 
parliament seems not to have increased in line with the considerable increase in its responsibilities. 
For example, DPR members are often hampered in their ability to represent their constituents. The 
secretariat-general seems to be under staffed and is not provided with the necessary incentives to 
produce appropriate material. Specialist staff for MPs, commissions, factions and parties seem to be 
increasing in number, but still appear ill-equipped to help MPs to make decisions. A budget office has 
been set up for DPR members to help them review the annual budget, but little is known of the quality 
of its work. 
 
Weak analytical capacity in the government owes largely to weaknesses in the civil service, which has 
suffered systemic problems in recruitment, training, promotion and compensation. This, coupled with 
rigidities in policy-making processes, especially in the budget, means that civil servants are unlikely to 
go beyond routine work. Although the government has initiated bureaucratic reform, senior officials 
during the New Order era continue to wield considerable influence, were said to view reform with 
suspicion and are likely to resist change. Partly because of weak analytical capacity within the 
government (including poor formal links) but also because this is a strong feature in Indonesian 
culture, informal or personal networks between policy-makers and knowledge producers such as 
academics, CSO activists and NGO practitioners are hugely dominant in the way policy-makers go 
looking for information. 
 
In sum, coalition politics at the national level and greater voice in the political arena (particularly of 
DPR members) have made the task of policy formulation or reaching consensus on critical policies and 
reforms much more challenging (World Bank, 2009a). To be sure, the complex set of interactions and 
interests among political parties and DPR-based commissions and individuals, including government 
ministers and top-level bureaucrats, has resulted in an executive which finds it impossible to establish 
a monopoly over the government and an often confused and inconsistent policy debate (Sherlock, 
2010b). 
 
But this is not necessarily surprising. Our research confirms earlier findings that policy-making at the 
highest level of the government is often complex, multi-factoral and nonlinear (Court et al., 2004). One 
respondent reasoned that, in many cases, policy-making was defined by a certain degree of 
arbitrariness even in the most developed countries, and things were not necessarily so different in 
Indonesia (Stiglitz, 1998). Of concern, though, is whether the bureaucracy has the capacity to 
undertake systematic analysis or whether there are sources outside the government, in the shape of 
NGOs, think-tanks and a vibrant research, community to undertake research; and whether there are 
mechanisms through which this could be brought up for consideration by top-level policy-makers. 
Although our analysis suggests that there is significant room for improvement, it also indicates a 
number of motivations for policy-makers to seek out and use knowledge. 
 
8.3 Factors that shape knowledge use 
 
Based in part on the analysis above, we find that policy-makers may be motivated to draw on and use 
knowledge in order to, 
 
1 Respond to the president or those with a presidential mandate, such as a highly placed 
supervisor; 
2 Seek economic or financial benefits: This may be for the government as a whole, individual 
ministries or individual government officials; 
3 Seek favourable perceptions among the media and the public by designing and launching 
populist policies and conducting opinion surveys to assess public preferences; 
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4 Seek favourable perceptions among key international actors by performing well 
economically, especially in comparison with neighbouring countries, preparing for negotiations 
in key international forums and meeting global goals and targets such as the MDGs; 
5 Exercise authority over others to, for instance, assess and resolve competing claims for 
resources; 
6 Prevent and/or mitigate the effects of crises and acute social and political disorders: This 
could be in relation to food price rises, fuel price rises, terrorist attacks or natural disasters; 
7 Deflect or insulate oneself from criticism and/or influence: This may be in relation to 
developing a firm position to avoid significant and repeated shifts in policy in response to 
external criticism from, say, the media and civil society; 
8 Bolster arguments or legitimise policy positions and approaches to addressing policy 
problems that have already been taken; 
9 Exert pressure on others by, for example, exposing them or highlighting deficiencies in their 
performance or behaviour; 
10 Prove and increase one’s legitimacy to improve, for instance, an MP’s ability to represent 
his/her constituents; 
11 Strengthen relationships with others by consulting those who are valued and trusted or to 
circulate patronage; 
12 Establish and improve one’s credibility, for example by wishing to be seen as a resource 
person by others; 
13 Advance one’s career in the civil service, or perhaps as a politician, wanting to establish 
credibility with colleagues in the party; 
14 Act in accordance with one’s ethics: This could be personal and/or professional, whereby 
individuals receive satisfaction from drawing on analysis or consulting with civil society as a 
way to develop good policy or see civil society consultation as good in itself; 
15 Adhere to established technical standards in a limited number of ministries where there 
seems to be a culture of ‘more rational’ decision-making and where outputs and outcomes are 
more quantifiable; or 
16 Address higher levels of technical complexity in areas which appear more abstract to the lay 
person, such as those relating to finance and economics. 
 
However, as we have seen, there is usually no one reason why policy-makers invest in, demand and/or 
use knowledge in policy-making. For instance, the consultations undertaken to draw up a moratorium 
on forestry licenses happened in response to presidential directives channelled through a highly 
placed supervisor, the head of UKP-PPP, but were also spurred on by economic incentives (aid up to $1 
billion), as well as a desire to be perceived favourably by international actors (and reduce greenhouse 
gases, in light of statistics revealing that the country was the world’s third-largest emitter of these). 
Another example features the analytical work undertaken by Bappenas and other line ministries on the 
large-scale cash transfer scheme in 2008. This was a directive from the president, but also coincided 
with the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Probably most crucial of all, it seems to have been 
influenced by SBY’s desire to seek re-election, which he achieved by seeking favourable perceptions 
among the media and the public. 
 
At the same time, policy-makers may be discouraged from seeking knowledge because, 
 
1 There may be actors or interests who oppose any reforms that knowledge might suggest or 
inform: Although policy-makers may demand knowledge, they may not be in a position to act 
on it. They may be faced with opposition from influential actors who benefit from the status 
quo. 
2 They may lack the power to convene multiple actors or those with more power than them: 
Given the extent of siloisation and the challenges of coordinating equals across government or 
within a ministry, acting on any knowledge is challenging and may discourage policy-makers 
from demanding analysis in the first instance. 
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3 They may not have the time: Given pressure from the media and the public to perform, many 
policy-makers feel compelled to roll out policies quickly, often without adequate research and 
analysis. 
4 They lack sufficient analytical capacity: Even if policy-makers want to draw on knowledge, 
given weaknesses in the government’s analytical capacity, coupled with systemic weaknesses 
in the civil service, they may lack sources to pursue. 
 
Overall, with the exception of a few factors, motivational and constraining factors are based largely on 
economic or monetary metrics, an assessment of power gained or lost, bolstering one’s status and 
safeguarding relationships, among others. The political economy of the demand for and use of 
knowledge is clearly bound up with the political economy of policy itself (Booth, 2011). 
 
8.4 Recommendations 
 
Designing demand-side interventions 
 
Selecting policy issues 
We suggest that AusAID use the motivational factors listed above as criteria to select a core set of 
issues (from a longer list, perhaps reflecting the country’s development priorities as articulated in the 
medium-term development plan) to focus its pilot interventions with policy-makers and policy-making 
institutions where there are likely to be greater levels of knowledge demand and use. This would 
involve, for instance, a mapping of the key actors working on policy issues and an assessment of the 
extent to which actors are compelled to implement presidential directives, want to accumulate 
economic benefits and seek favourable perceptions from the media, etc. However, as we have 
suggested, many of the factors we list, which are often associated with a monetary metric and 
calculations of power gained or lost, as well as the importance of informal and personalised networks, 
may not correspond with some of the normative values and approaches prescribed by the good 
governance agenda, from which the trend towards evidence-based policy stems. AusAID will need to 
consider how much it wants to or can ‘work with the grain’ and with the incentives of policy-makers in 
Indonesia. 
 
As policy-makers are often influenced by powerful interests, the aforementioned analysis could also 
assess the various interests involved. Although AusAID may want to avoid working on issues that are 
dominated by entrenched ‘client politics’ and ‘interest group politics’, but this is likely to rule out the 
most interesting and potentially influential areas of policy-making. It may be more helpful to take an 
approach similar to that suggested by Fritz et al.’s (2009) work on problem-driven governance and 
political economy analysis. The authors lay out a spectrum across which adopting a political economy 
approach (that is, one which identifies incentives of various actors and vested interests) can help 
either in selecting operations, given the existing space for change (that is, where there are no vested 
interests capable of derailing reform), or in seeking to expand the space for change proactively (see 
Figure 8). 
 
The lack of convening power, cited as a factor that may inhibit the use of knowledge, could be 
addressed by working with a highly placed supervisor or those with a presidential mandate. In our 
recommendations below, we suggest ways to address other inhibiting factors (weak analytical capacity 
and short time horizons) in designing demand-side pilot interventions. 
 
  
70 
Figure 8: Making reforms happen—translating political analysis into action 
 
Source: Fritz et al. (2009). 
 
It is likely that the motivation of a policy-maker to demand and use knowledge will affect the way 
evidence is generated and used. That is, where a policy-maker is concerned with more effective policy 
to, for instance, improve the state of the economy or meet international targets, standards for rigour 
and attention to detail within research findings are likely to be higher than where they are more 
concerned with associating themselves with a particular organisation and/or increasing the credibility 
of their position, whether for conscious or subconscious reasons. This may entail the need for supply-
side actors (in both government agencies and universities and research centres) to improve research 
governance and, importantly, to ensure that researchers have the incentives to produce analysis with a 
high degree of rigour and political neutrality. This is addressed in part below, but also in AusAID’s other 
diagnostics, which focus on ‘supply-side’ actors. 
 
Demand-side interventions to strengthen the government’s technical capacity 
We here provide some suggestions as to the shape of possible interventions. The precise nature of any 
interventions will depend on the policy issue, the role of the actors in the policy process and their pre-
existing level of capacity. So, given our analysis, we indicate first who AusAID could work with and 
then, where possible, the focus of possible interventions.  
 
Who and what 
1 Highly placed individuals (such as heads of presidential commissions, ministers, deputy 
ministers, director-generals) on leadership issues: advice, mentoring or the establishment of 
forums for senior officials to share experiences including success stories on, for example, 
implementing reform processes with a focus on the role of knowledge; 
2 Expert staff working with highly placed individuals: undertaking stakeholder mapping, 
poverty and social impact analyses and political analyses of reform processes, in order to help 
policy-makers negotiate the politics of reform, as well as communicating research products in 
appropriate delivery formats; 
3 Directors-general on improving information flow between and within divisions and, given high 
turnover, mechanisms to capture and store information of a strategic nature; 
4 Relevant Balitbang, although problems for Balitbang appear to be related to problems with the 
wider civil service (see below), it may be worth working with relevant Balitbang staff on 
producing high quality research in appropriate delivery formats; 
5 Sub-directorate staff within ministries on research management, methods, and 
communication; 
6 BPS, to produce more robust regular and disaggregated social and economic data across 
Indonesia, particularly in the east; 
7 Expert staff for relevant parliamentary commissions: improving their advisory capacity 
and/or facilitating linkages with CSOs through, for instance, events, forums and information or 
contact directories; 
8 Expert staff for MPs: These tend to be key knowledge brokers, but many were said to lack the 
technical expertise to help MPs filter information. Support could include facilitating linkages 
between them and other sources of knowledge as well as training in interpreting, analysing, 
synthesising and presenting knowledge in appropriate formats; 
9 Parliamentary research services in the secretariat-general on, for instance, improving access 
to information (journals), facilitating linkages to other knowledge sources and drafting and 
presenting syntheses in appropriate formats.; 
Selecting operations, given the existing space 
for change 
Seeking to expand the space for change 
proactively 
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10 Parliamentary budget office: Support to analysing the annual budget, responding to MPs’ 
requests in a timely and appropriate manner and proactive engagement through, for instance, 
the publication of briefings in time for particular discussions (most probably those undertaken 
by commissions); 
11 Political parties: Arrangements to facilitate linkages between political parties and CSOs and 
the generation of knowledge to help improve their function as a policy platform; 
12 Ministry of Finance and Kempan & RB on bureaucratic reform, including civil service reform, 
and relieving regulatory obstacles in knowledge procurement and resourcing for the parliament 
and political parties. 
 
How (for those providing research and technical advice) 
In addition to what is suggested above, support in working with research or expert staff could be 
achieved by providing in-house support through an advisor working alongside the staff. However, given 
sensitivity regarding the excessive use of foreign consultants, AusAID could explore whether it could 
second Indonesian experts from domestic research centres or indeed donor agencies to government 
units for a fixed length of time. Alternatively, or in addition, support could take the form of training, 
advice or networking on a range of issues, including research methods, communication, knowledge 
management and project management. 
 
8.5 Further work 
 
Given the general nature of this study and the potential presence of significant variations (such as in 
configurations of stakeholders and interests) across sectors, once specific issues have been selected 
(based on the findings from this study), we propose that AusAID assess in more depth the 
opportunities and constraints for knowledge demand and use with a focus on particular sectors and/or 
specific projects and policies (or reform processes). In particular, we suggest that AusAID, 
 
• Undertake further sector- and/or issue-specific political economy analyses and, in doing 
so, map interests and incentives of actors who are considered to have some influence 
over policy outcomes: This could include analysis of the role of the president, ministers and 
other cabinet-level posts, deputy-ministers, directors-general, political parties, parliamentary 
commissions, researchers from Balitbang, universities and research institutes, the media, 
CSOs, the judiciary and business and corporate interests, among others. As well as policy 
development, this could focus on budgeting (allocation and disbursements) and policy 
enforcement. Given that AusAID will likely pursue a multi-year programme, we suggest that this 
analysis be updated in order to be able to provide an input into how the programme may be 
adapted to the evolving context. 
• Capture in more depth the nature of historical legacies: This should look at ‘how things have 
become the way they are today’ (World Bank, 2009b:36), especially how colonial histories and 
decolonisation have shaped institutions, as well as external relations. 
• Investigate further the role of discourse, knowledge and ideas in shaping knowledge-
seeking behaviour: This could also include analysis of the types of information and the 
formats in which it is demanded by policy-makers at different levels, as well as the way in which 
policy arguments are framed and presented. This does not necessarily require historical 
research but more a summary of key trends, events, processes and policies which give shape to 
the current situation. 
• Undertake a more technical analysis of decision-making dynamics: This could include 
identifying different tasks policy-makers have (and how this varies according to rank), the types 
of decisions made, the level of risk decision-makers attach to different decisions, how different 
decisions are framed, the time spent making decisions and how decisions are made (taking in 
the variety of sources of knowledge policy-makers turn to). 
• Scope out possible partners: These could include government and non-government agencies, 
in particular, but not limited to, Balitbang, expert staff in ministries, parliamentary commissions 
and MPs, as well as others listed above. These could be selected using the Alignment, Interest 
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and Influence Matrix of the Research and Policy in Development programme, where AusAID 
could partner with those who are both interested in the policy issues and aligned with 
AusAID/GoI’s approach (see Mendizabal, 2010). 
• Identify strategies to improve the demand for and use of knowledge: These could include 
interventions related to research literacy among policy-makers, networking, research 
production, research communication and knowledge management, among others. 
• Develop frameworks for planning, monitoring and evaluation, as well as mechanisms to 
use learning to improve programme design and management: These could include periodic 
forums to convene AusAID’s Knowledge Sector Programme stakeholders to share experiences 
and good practices. 
 
Finally, several respondents, as well as the literature, highlighted the role of the courts in settling (or 
not) a range of disputes, including those related to election results and the slow implementation of 
policy. For instance, the Committee for Action on the National Social Security System (Komite Aksi 
Sistem Jaringan Sosial Nasional, or KASJSN) recently won a class action lawsuit against the government 
over the suspension of the mandatory national social security programme. Given the highly codified 
nature of the Indonesian legal system, it is not necessarily surprising that the judiciary seems fairly 
active. As such, we feel strongly that analysis of the judiciary and its use of knowledge should be a 
central element (along with that of the other branches of the government, the executive and the 
legislature) within the issue-specific political economy studies we mention above. 
 
  
  
73 
References 
 
Abonyi, G. (2005) ‘Policy Reform in Indonesia and the Asian Development Bank's Financial Sector 
Governance Reform's Program Loan’. ERD Working Paper 76.  Manilla: ADB. 
Arinanto, S. (2008) and Fatmawati (2008) ‘An Evaluation of the National Legislative Strengthening 
Program’. Report to The Asia Foundation. 
Aspinall, E. (2010) ‘The Irony of Success’. Journal of Democracy 2(21): 20-34. 
Aspinall, E. and Mietzner, M. (2010) ‘Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia: An Overview’. In 
Mietzner, M. and Aspinall, E. (eds) Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia. Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
Bappenas (2009) ‘Pedoman Penyusunan Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional 
2010−2014’ [‘Guideline for Preparing the National Medium-term Development Plan 2010−2014’]. 
http://bappeda.madiunkota.info/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/pedoman-rpjmn-2010-2014.pdf.  
Beaton, C. and Lontoh, L. (2010) ‘Lessons Learned from Indonesia’s Attempts to Reform Fossil-fuel 
Subsidies’. Manitoba: IISD. 
Blondal, J., Hawkesworth, I. and Choi Hyon-Deok (2009) ‘Budgeting in Indonesia’. OECD Journal on 
Budgeting 9(2): 1-31. 
Booth, A. (2005) ‘The Evolving Role of Central Government in Economic Planning and Policymaking in 
Indonesia’. Bulletin of Indonesia Economic Studies 2(41): 197-219. 
Booth, D. (2011) ‘Working with the Grain and Swimming against the Tide: Barriers to Uptake of Research 
Findings on Governance and Public Services in Low-income Africa’.  London: Africa Power and 
Politics. 
Carothers, T. (2006) ‘Confronting the Weakest Link: Aiding Political Parties in New Democracies’. New 
York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
CastleAsia (2010) Who's Who in Yudhoyono's Indonesia. Jakarta: CastleAsia. 
Court, J., Hovland, I. and Young, J. (2004) Bridging Research and Policy in International Development: 
Evidence and the Change Process. London: ITDG. 
Crouch, H. (2005) ‘Patrimonialism and Military Rule in Indonesia’. World Politics 4(31): 571-587. 
Department for International Development (2004) ‘Drivers of Change Public Information Note’. London: 
DFID. 
Department for International Development  (2009) ‘Political Economy Analysis How To Note’. London: 
DFID. 
Downs, A. (1965) ‘A Theory of Bureaucracy’. The American Economic Review 1/2(55): 439-446. 
Edelman, M. (2009) ‘Synergies and Tensions between Rural Social Movements and Professional 
Researchers’. Journal of Peasant Studies 1(36): 247-267. 
Febrian, S.H. (2010) Handbook on the Legislative Process.  Jakarta: UNDP. 
Freedom House (2009) Freedom in the World 2009. Washington, DC: Freedom House. 
Fritz, V., Kaiser, K. and Levy, B. (2009) ‘Problem-driven Governance and Political Economy Analysis: 
Good Practice Framework’. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Hadiwinata, B.S. (2006) ‘The 2004 Parliamentary and Presidential Elections in Indonesia’, in Croissant, 
A. and Martin, B. (eds) Between Consolidation and Crisis. Elections and Democracy in Five 
Nations in Southeast Asia .  Berlin: Lit Verlag. 
Hadiz, V.R. (n.d.) ‘Indonesia a Decade after Reformasi: Continuity or Change’. Singapore: Department of 
Sociology, National University of Singapore. 
Hamid, A. and Atamimi, S. (1992) ‘Perbedaan Antara Peraturan Perundang-Undangan dan Peran 
Kebijakan’ [‘The Difference between Legislation and the Role of Policy’]. 46th Dies Natalis PTIK, 
Jakarta, 17 June. 
Harris, D., with Foresti, M. (2010) ‘Indonesia's Progress on Governance: State Cohesion and Strategic 
Institutional Reform’. London: ODI. 
Heryanto, A. (2010) ‘Entertainment, Domestication, and Dispersal’. In Aspinall, E. and Mietzner, M. 
(eds) Problems of Democratization in Indonesia: Elections, Institutions, and Society. Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
International Institute for Sustainable Development (2011) ‘A Citizen's Guide to Energy Subsidies in 
Indonesia’. Manitoba: IISD. 
  
74 
Jones, H. (2011) ‘A Guide to Monitoring and Evaluating Policy Influence’. Background Note. London: 
ODI. 
Jones, N. and Villar, E. (2008) ‘Situating Children in International Development Policy: Challenges 
Involved in Successful Evidence-informed Policy Influencing’. Evidence and Policy 1(4): 53-73. 
Jones, N., Datta, A. and Jones, H. (2009) ‘Knowledge, Policy, and Power: Six Dimensions of the 
Knowledge-Development Policy Interface’. London: ODI. 
Lay, C. (2010) ‘Civil Society–Parliament Linkages in Indonesia’. Report for ODI. 
Mahendra, A. (2008) ‘Agung Oka Implikasi Hukum Terhadap Peraturan Daerah yang Bertentangan 
dengan Peraturan Perundang-Undangan yang Lebih Tinggi’.  
http://okamahendra.wordpress.com/2008/12/15/implikasi-hukum/.  
Mardha, A. (2009) ‘The Process of Legally Drafting Regulations in the Development of the First Nuclear 
Power Plant (NPP) in Indonesia’. International Journal of Nuclear Law 3(2): 243-249. 
Martinez-Diaz, L. (2006) ‘Pathways through Financial Crisis: Indonesia’. Global Governance 12(4): 395-
412. 
McCarthy, J. and Ibrahim, R. (2010) ‘Review of Social Science Capacity Building Support to Indonesia's 
Knowledge Sector’. Report. 
Mendizabal, E. (2010) ‘The Alignment, Interest, and Influence Matrix (AIIM)’. London: ODI. 
Mietzner, M. (2009a) ‘Indonesia's 2009 Elections: Populism, Dynasties, and the Consolidation of the 
Party System’. Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy. 
Mietzner, M. (2009b) ‘Political Opinion Polling in Post-authoritarian Indonesia: Catalyst or Obstacle to 
Democratic Consolidation’. Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 1(165): 95-126. 
Mietzner, M. and Aspinall, E. (2010) Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia. Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies. 
Mujani, S. and Liddle, R.W. (2007) ‘Leadership, Party, and Religion: Explaining Voting Behavior in 
Indonesia’. Comparative Political Studies 7(40): 832-857. 
Nachiappan, K., Mendizabal, E. and Datta, A. (2010) ‘Think Tanks in East and Southeast Asia’. London: 
ODI. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2010) ‘Joint Evaluation of the Paris 
Declaration, Phase 2 [Report]’. Paris: OECD. 
Oey-Gardiner, M. (2011) ‘Study of the Role of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) in Bridging 
between Research and Development Policy’. Report. 
Pamungkas, S. (2009) ‘Koalisi Minus Loyalitas’ [‘Coalition Minus Loyalty’]. Report. 
Perkin, E. and Court, J. (2005) ‘Networks and Policy Processes in International Development: A 
Literature Review’. Working Paper 252.  London: ODI. 
Qodari, M. (2010) ‘Professionalisation of Politics: The Growing Role of Polling Organisations and 
Political Consultants’. In Aspinall, E. and Mietzner, M. Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia: 
Elections, Institutions, and Society. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
Robison, R. and Hadiz, V.R. (2004) Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age 
of Markets.  London and New York: Routledge. 
Rosser, A., Anuradha, J. and Donni, E. (2011a) ‘Power, Politics, and Political Entrepreneurs: Realising 
Universal Free Basic Education in Indonesia’. Working Paper. Brighton: IDS. 
Rosser, A., Wilson, I. and Sulistiyanto, P. (2011b) ‘ Priyambudi Leaders, Elites, and Coalitions: The 
Politics of Free Public Services in Decentralised Indonesia’. Developmental Leadership 
Programme Report. 
Sherlock, S. (2010a) ‘Knowledge for Policy: Regulatory Obstacles to the Growth of a Knowledge Market 
in Indonesia’. Report for AusAID. 
Sherlock, S. (2010b) ‘The Parliament in Indonesia's Decade of Democracy: People's Forum or Chamber 
of Cronies’. In Aspinall, E. and Mietzner, M. Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia: Elections, 
Institutions, and Society. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
Shiraishi, T. (2008) ‘Technocracy in Indonesia: A Preliminary Analysis’. Report.  
STIE YKPN (n.d.) ‘Perencanaan dan Penyusunan Anggaran [Planning and Budgeting]’. 
Stiglitz, J. (1998) ‘The Private Uses of Public Interests: Incentives and Institutions’. The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 2(12): 3-22. 
  
75 
Sukma, R. (2010) ‘Indonesia's 2009 Elections: Defective System, Resilient Democracy’. In Aspinall, E. 
and Mietzner, M. Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia: Elections, Institutions, and 
Society. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
Sumarto, S. (2011) ‘The SMERU Research Institute: History and Lessons Learned’. Report for AusAID. 
Suryadarma, D., Pomeroy J. and Tanwidjaja, S. (2011) ‘Economic Factors Underpinning Constraints in 
Indonesia's Knowledge Sector’. Report for AusAID. 
Sutmuller. P. and Setiono, I. (2011) ‘Diagnostic on Evidence-based Public Policy Formulation under 
Decentralisation’. Report for AusAID. 
Suzetta, P. (2007) ‘Perencanaan Pembangunan Indonesia’ [‘Indonesian Development Planning’]. 
http://ditpolkom.bappenas.go.id/basedir/Artikel/094.%20Perencanaan%20Pembangunan%20
Nasional%20-%20Paskah%20Suzetta%20%2822%20Maret%202007%29.pdf.  
Tomsa, D. (2010) ‘The Indonesian Party System after the 2009 Elections: Towards Stability?’ In Aspinall, 
E. and Mietzner, M. (eds) Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia: Elections, Institutions, and 
Society. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
Ufen, A. (2006) ‘Political Parties in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Between politik aliran and Philippinisation’. 
Working Paper. Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies.  
UKP-PPP (2011) ‘Debottlenecking Priority Development Program: Achievements and Challenges’. Joint 
European Business Luncheon PowerPoint presentation.  
Wilson, J.Q. (1989) Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It. New York: Basic 
Books. 
World Bank (2009a) ‘Indonesia Development Policy Review: Enhancing Government Effectiveness in a 
Decentralised Indonesia’. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
World Bank (2009b) Problem-driven Governance and Political Economy Analysis: Good Practice 
Framework. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Young, J.and Mendizabal, E. (2009) ‘Helping Researchers Become Policy Entrepreneurs: How to 
Develop Engagement Strategies for Evidence-based Policy Making’. Briefing Paper 53.  London: 
ODI. 
 
  
  
76 
Appendix 1: Analytical framework 
 
Structural factors, institutions and actors as drivers of development outcomes 
 
Source: Fritz et al. (2009). 
 
Examples 
We will open the interviews trying to discuss the policy process by looking at specific issues. Questions 
will largely have to react to the particular example and story which the interviewee comes up with, but 
the questions below gives a rough outline. 
 
• Please give an example of a particular policy process in which you were involved; where there 
was a big decision made, or policy formulated, and you have first-hand experience of some of 
the process. If there are many, choose one which you feel is typical. 
o What began the process? Where and how was the agenda set? What was the perceived 
problem? 
o Who was involved in discussing and debating the issue? What was their approach to the 
process? 
o How was a decision reached? By whom? Where? 
o How was the decision implemented and communicated? 
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o What role did research and analysis play? Where were academics or ‘experts’ involved? 
• Can you give an example of a piece or body of research which has been particularly influential 
in policy?  
o Why was this the case?  
o Who was involved? 
o What institutional/organisational processes were involved? 
o How was the research packaged and framed? 
• Can you give an example of a key moment where a piece of research which had important 
lessons for policy was not used? 
o Why was this the case?  
o Who was involved? 
o What institutional/organisational processes were involved? 
o How was the research packaged and framed? 
o How typical were these examples? What makes them similar to many other instances of 
policy-making, and what makes them different? 
 
Understanding different aspects of the policy process 
Here, we can talk about policy-making in general, but also we could explore this by going through a 
particular sector with the interviewee, making sure that parallels are drawn to other sectors at each 
stage. 
 
Actors  
• What role do different actors (inside and outside the state) play in policy processes?  
• Who are the most influential in different processes, or at different stages? What are these key 
actors’ material interests in the process? 
• What are the formal and informal relationships between different actors? What are their 
strength, source and influence? 
• How do actors’ beliefs, values and attitudes affect behaviours in policy-making processes? 
• Which actors are perceived to have ‘expertise’ on issues (e.g. technical or long experience)? 
How is this legitimacy built? 
• What are the incentives key actors have to support or not support the use of certain 
forms/sources of knowledge in the policy process? 
 
Institutions 
• What are the formal rules that shape the policy-making process and actors’ engagement in that 
process? As above, questions that relate to specific and identified institutional arrangements 
may be more helpful than a general question on formal rules. Specifics may include:  
o What has been the impact of the various iterations of the massive programme of 
decentralisation reforms undertaken since 1998? As a result, how has the market for policy-
relevant knowledge changed in accordance with changes in the extent to which decisions 
(and the budget allocations necessary to implement those decisions) are made at the 
central/local level? 
o What has been the impact of electoral reforms on the incentives for the use of 
knowledge/information in making key policy decisions? 
o What has been the impact of parliamentary reforms, including the introduction of the 
Regional Representatives Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, DPD), and potentially greater 
separation of powers and a more independent and active role for the legislative branch 
relative to the executive? 
• What are the underlying realities? What are the informal rules and the ways in which decisions 
are really made? Specifics may include: 
o Questions of ‘money politics’, particularly at the local level; 
o Corruption, collusion, and nepotism (korupsi, kolusi, dan nepotisme, or KKN) (including to 
what extent changes in formal rules like the advent of democratic decentralisation have 
changed the scope for or form of corruption/rent-seeking and the effectiveness of 
organisations like the KPK). 
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• How do these factors shape the windows and opportunities for the engagement and influence 
of different stakeholders? 
 
Knowledge 
• How (if anywhere) has a basis of (research-based) knowledge been linked to an issue? Where is 
there such knowledge which is ignored? 
• What types of information, and in what formats, are demanded by policy-makers at different 
levels? 
• How are policy arguments framed? How should information or analysis be presented in order to 
resonate with key stakeholders? 
 
Structural features 
• How do the recent political and economic history and the wider governance context affect policy 
processes? Specific questions may include: 
o The impact of political and economic crises of the late 1990s; 
o The stability and cohesiveness of the nation (including, but not limited to, separatist 
movements). 
• Rates and distribution of poverty and inequality (spatial distributions of poverty and localised 
natural resource wealth are key issues in Indonesia)? Natural and human geography (e.g., 
population dynamics)? Specific questions may include: 
o Variations across districts in the capacity to fulfil roles and responsibilities (including fiscal 
capacity and, therefore, natural resource revenues). 
 
A few more direct questions 
• What factors do you think shape the uptake of research on a policy issue?  
• How do actors tend to use evidence, analysis and research in the policy process? 
• When are policy processes (whether design or implementation) likely to be more ‘evidence-
based’? 
• What is likely to negate the influence of research-based arguments? What hinders the influence 
of research? 
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